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Zusammenfassung 
Die Arbeit untersucht im Kontext von sozial-ökologischen Systemen die 
Rolle des Rechtstreits für die Reduzierung von Verwundbarkeit und den 
Aufbau von sozialer Resilienz der Il Chamus in der Baringo-Region in 
Kenia.  
Die Il Chamus, eine Maa-sprechende Gruppe, leben südlich des 
Baringosees im ostafrikanischen Grabenbruch. Zu ihren dominanten 
Wirtschaftsweisen gehören Weidewirtschaft, Viehhaltung, sowie 
Gartenanbau und Fischen. In ihrer Vergangenheit haben sie eine hohe 
Anpassungsfähigkeit aufgewiesen, die sich darin widerspiegelt, auch mit 
widrigen Umweltdynamiken sowie sozialen und politischen Wandel 
bestmöglich umzugehen.  
Die theoretische Grundlage der Arbeit stellt eine soziale Resilienzanalyse 
im Rahmen sozial-ökologischer Systeme dar. Die Prozesse des 
Umweltwandels des sozial-ökologischen Systems der Il Chamus werden 
ebenso analysiert wie die natürlichen Ressourcen und der 
Verwundbarkeitskontext sowie die Strukturen und Prozesse, die soziale 
Resilienz bedingen. 
Um diese Strukturen und Prozesse zu verstehen, beinhaltet die Arbeit 
einen geschichtlichen Abriss der ethnischen Gruppe Il Chamus und der 
Baringo-Region, eine Analyse der sozialen Organisation der Il Chamus, 
sowie ihrer natürlichen, sozialen und symbolischen Ressourcen. Es 
werden die Hauptfaktoren identifiziert, die Verwundbarkeit bedingen 
können. Zu diesen Stressoren gehören der Neophyt Prosophis Juliflore, 
gewaltsame Konflikte zwischen den Il Chamus und den Pokot, sowie die 
politische und soziale Marginalisierung der Il Chamus durch den 
kenianischen Staat. 
Aus der Perspektive einer politischen Ökologie  werden die 
Machtverhältnisse untersucht, die einer Umweltgovernance des sozial-
ökologischen Systems der Il Chamus inhärent sind. Hierbei wird der 
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Rechtsstreit als ein bedeutender Weg für die Aushandlung des Zugangs zu 
politischen, finanziellen und natürlichen Ressourcen zwischen den Il 
Chamus und dem Staat, aber auch innerhalb der ethnischen Gruppe 
diskutiert. Der Rechtsweg wird auch als eine Strategie eingesetzt, um 
nachteilige Auswirkungen der Umweltgovernance zu mindern. Die 
Untersuchung zeigt, dass der Rechtsstreit, verstanden als ein Teil von 
Umweltgovernance, eine Möglichkeit darstellt, Resilienz aufzubauen.  
Anhand einer Analyse zweier Klagen der Il Chamus gegen den Staat wird 
die Rolle des Rechtsstreits für den Aufbau von Resilienz beleuchtet. Es 
werden die politischen und rechtlichen Strategien der Il Chams 
untersucht, wie politisches Interesse in Rechtsansprüche überführt wird, 
die sich auf internationale Rechtskonzepte, wie das der Indigenität, 
beziehen.  
Abschließend kann die Arbeit zeigen, dass die in den Klagen verwendeten 
Argumente, sich auf die ethnische Identität und die sozialen Institutionen 
der Il Chamus beziehen und somit diese von großer Bedeutung für den 
Aufbau und Erhalt der sozialen Resilienz der Il Chamus sind. 
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Abstract 
Within the context of social resilience in social ecological systems (SES), 
this thesis looks at the role of litigation in addressing the vulnerability 
context and thereby enhancing the social resilience of the Il Chamus 
community who reside in the politically bounded social ecological system 
of the Baringo lowlands of Kenya. 
The Il Chamus, a Maa-speaking community settled at the banks of Lake 
Baringo, have over the years managed to sustain a livelihood based on 
irrigation, agro-pastoralism and fishing . They have shown remarkable 
resilience and ability to survive detrimental environmental dynamics and 
profound changes in their social and political conditions. 
The theoretical basis of this thesis is social resilience analysis within the 
framework of social ecological systems. It therefore looks into the 
processes of environmental change within the Il Chamus SES, identifying 
its environmental resources, vulnerability context and sources of its social 
resilience. 
The thesis includes a study of Il Chamus history and social organization 
and an ecological and social profile of Lake Baringo. It identifies the main 
factors driving the vulnerability context of the Il Chamus SES as the 
invasive plant Prosopis juliflora, ethnically instigated violence and political 
as well as economic marginalization by the state.  
As a study in political ecology, this thesis also looks at the political power 
dynamics inherent in the environmental governance of the Il Chamus 
SES. In this connection, litigation is presented as negotiating the unequal 
power relations between the state and the Il Chamus as well as among 
the Il Chamus and therefore mitigating the unfavourable outcomes of 
environmental governance. This study therefore locates the resilience 
building capacity of litigation in the process of environmental governance. 
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A legal analysis of cases brought by the Il Chamus against the 
government is used to illustrate the role of litigation in resilience building. 
The thesis analyses the political and legal strategies of the Il Chamus and 
describes how they transform political interests into legally claimable 
rights that appropriate international legal concepts linked to indigenous 
identity. 
Finally, the thesis presents arguments showing that the use by the Il 
Chamus of litigation grounded on ethnic identity and social institutions 
has been instrumental in enhancing their social resilience. 
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Preface 
The lake Baringo Basin is a complex and diverse setting with numerous 
contradictions, ambiguities and challenges. I came to Lake Baringo for the 
very first time in April 2010 on a mission to explore my potential fieldwork 
sites. Together with my research colleagues from the University of 
Cologne we drove from Nakuru via Marigat town to the small settlement 
of Kampi ya Samaki on the shores of Lake Baringo. From Kampi ya 
Samaki we drove back towards Marigat through the Il Chamus 
settlements of Salabani, then on to Ng’ambo and finally to Kiserian and 
Rugus.  
The lake emerges suddenly on the approach to Marigat and on a hot 
sunny day provides a spectacular view. My memories from this time, 
apart from the rugged beauty of the terrain and the scorching daytime 
heat, are of typical events in the daily unfolding life of a rural community 
in the Kenyan Rift Valley: market women aggressively trying to sell 
onions and tomatoes to passing motorists and travellers in the centre of 
Marigat town; excited children running behind our vehicle asking for 
sweets and small change; goats grazing the stony road-side and people 
generally going about their daily lives.  
At Kampi ya Samaki, there was a definite tourist feel to the area. A toll 
gate at the entrance to the settlement controls all vehicles entering and 
leaving, and all visitors are charged an “entry fee”. Several tourist offices 
dot the small settlement and brokers hawk services for bird watching 
expeditions and boat rides across the lake. The lake is host to Hippo, 
crocodile and several bird and snake species, and a snake park and at 
least three tourist class hotels are found within the camp. 
Away from Kampi ya Samaki and into Salabani and Ng’ambo locations, 
the Prosopis Juliflora plant stands out. It brings a lush green  colour to the 
area, but this pleasant sight is tempered by a thick layer of hot dust 
hiding nasty thorns referred to locally as misumari (Swahili for nails). 
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Expert eyes will recognize snake marks along the dusty tracks, even 
differentiating them by type. A common warning to visitors here is to 
beware of thorns and snakes.  Snake bites are quite common here and a 
traditional snake poison healer sells poison antidote not far from the local 
dispensary. Another common sight is that of ripe Cactus fruit dangling 
untouched from the trees. The Il Chamus, without a care for the potential 
nutritional benefits of the Cactus fruit, see the Cactus plant more as 
traditional fencing material than as food. Also roaming freely in the area 
are Ostriches, protected by taboo among the Il Chamus.  
Immediately noticeable was a flourishing charcoal burning trade 
ostensibly fuelled by legally sanctioned destruction of Prosopis plant which 
has been designated a noxious weed by the Government of Kenya since 
2008. Classification as a noxious weed means that usual stringent 
charcoal burning regulations are relaxed. Sacks of charcoal lay at 
strategic points along the roads awaiting pick up by trucks arriving from 
Nakuru.  
At Kiserian, any sense of normality accumulated from Kampi ya Samaki, 
Salabani and Ng’ambo is lost as images that resonate with the reputation 
of the Lake Baringo basin as a hotspot for violence begin to emerge.  
Here, one notices a definite air of tension and fear of impending violence, 
and images of a thriving Charcoal business in Salabani and Ng’ambo 
locations are replaced by images of violence: a refugee camp consisting of 
a crowd of Manyattas built next to a former airstrip; a military camp next 
to a missionary settlement; a communal cattle Kraal; empty fish drying 
racks; unused fish smoking hearths; an abandoned cattle auction shed; 
vacated homesteads; an abandoned Chief’s residence at Mukutani. Little 
commercial activity goes on here, and the few shops that are open for 
business sell goods at a marked premium.  
Beyond Kiserian into Rugus is an expanse of land referred to as ‘no man’s 
land’ due to the fact that it is considered too insecure to settle on. It also 
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marks the boundary between the Il Chamus and Pokot communities. A 
joint conservancy administered by the two communities was established 
here with the hope of establishing lasting peace between the two 
communities1.  
 
Map 1: Fieldwork exploration route2. 
This overview paints an ambiguous picture of strife and triumph in a 
difficult social ecological environment that is volatile and prone to 
violence. The fact that the Il Chamus have managed to create and 
                                               
1 RUKO Conservancy is named after Rugus on the Il Chamus side (RU), and Komolion on 
the Pokot side (KO). 
2 Unless otherwise stated, the cartography for all maps in this document  have been 
done by Monika Feinen, Institut für Afrikanistik und Ägyptologie, Philosophische Fakultät, 
Universität zu Köln. 
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preserve a niche in their current location for at least two centuries is 
testimony to their resilience. This thesis presents a novel approach 
framed within resilience analysis that sets out to understand the 
interactions between the Il Chamus society and its environment, and how 
it deploys the political and legal tools at its disposal in effectively adapting 
to a changing environment and responding to various contexts of 
vulnerability.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This study focuses on the agency of the Il Chamus community who have 
become vulnerable as a consequence of  both social and ecological 
processes within the politically bounded social ecological system (SES) 
defined by the immediate wetland surrounding the Lake Baringo Basin. 
This area is occupied by the Il Chamus, Pokot and Tugen communities.  
Over the years the Il Chamus have become increasingly vulnerable as a 
consequence of: political disenfranchisement and economic 
marginalization stemming directly from government policy that has 
generally neglected the arid and semi-arid lands of Kenya (ASAL), of 
which Baringo is a part; Inappropriate interventions by the state that led 
to the colonization of Il Chamus pastoral resources by the invasive plant 
Prosopis Juliflora; and violent attacks from its more populous neighbours. 
This study is an ethnographic study on the Il Chamus that highlights the 
impact of marginalization, Prosopis juliflora and violence on their 
livelihood. It looks at institutions as socially constructed phenomena that 
form part of the regulatory mechanism that relate the physical and social 
sub systems of the social ecological system. We see for instance that as 
an outcome of violence, traditional institutions give way as the dynamics 
of power shift from a gerontocracy to emerging powerful individuals 
created by a developing political ecology driven by violence. How the Il 
Chamus react to a vulnerability context characterized by 
disenfranchisement, the invasive species Prosopis Juliflora and violence is 
the main point of departure for this study. The risks posed by Prosopis 
Juliflora and violence are nevertheless not strange or unique in the area, 
as Baringo has historically been a showcase for crisis, ranging from 
drought, livestock and human diseases, locust invasions, and 
environmental degradation in general (Anderson 2002: 73). 
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1.1 Problem statement 
Politically bounded SESs in Africa such as that of the Il Chamus of the 
Baringo lowlands have over the years reacted in unique and often creative 
ways to system transformations. Such transformations are brought about 
by a wide range of factors that have included colonial occupation, 
profound environmental change and degradation, state intervention into 
local mechanisms of environmental regulation, inter-ethnic violence and 
political upheavals due to unstable or weak governments. Within the 
multi-disciplinary setting of studies of processes of change in such SESs, 
there is a need to understand the role of social actors in shaping and 
responding to system transformations.  
Profound changes in the ecological and social outlook of the Lake Baringo 
environment have resulted from both natural environmental processes of 
change as well as social and political ones. One of the main challenges 
within the study of social resilience in SESs is how to incorporate social 
processes of change into our understanding of SES dynamics.  Key drivers 
of change have to be identified and their interaction with other ecological 
and social variables understood and explained. 
If the complex moments of resilience, collapse and reorganization are to 
be captured in a manner consistent with a convergence in theoretical and 
analytical understandings of SES dynamics then social and political 
processes that affect SES governance have to be understood together 
with ecological processes and incorporated into resilience analysis.  
For the Il Chamus SES, this study identified as key drivers of change the 
invasive plant Prosopis juliflora; political and economic marginalization; 
and inter-ethnic violence. These factors have resulted in increased 
vulnerabilities for the Il Chamus in the late 20th and early 21st century.  
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This study therefore aims to show the agency of the Il Chamus in the 
shaping and reacting to changes in their SES through the use of litigation. 
Identifying the above named drivers of vulnerability as unfavourable 
outcomes of governance, this study uses legal analysis to show how the 
processes and outcomes of litigation have a resilience building effect on 
the livelihood of the Il Chamus. For instance, the process of litigation is 
shown to smoothen out internal conflicts and strengthen community 
cooperation. Also, by bringing out the political and contested nature of 
environmental governance, we are able to better understand how the 
litigation effectively intervenes in the process of environmental 
governance by holding the state to account and re-negotiating the 
balance of power towards the Il Chamus. 
Thus, by introducing legal analysis into the paradigm of resilience 
thinking, this study hopes to make a contribution to the understanding of 
the role of social action in SES transformations. In particular, it uses legal 
analysis to show the negotiation and contestation of power relations 
within the political dynamics of SES governance and hence demonstrate 
the role of litigation as a resilience building tool.  
1.2 Research context. 
This particular project on legal regulation in the lake Baringo Basin is part 
of the research unit known as “Resilience, Collapse and Reorganization in 
Social Ecological Systems of East and South Africa’s Savannahs (RCR)”, a 
collaborative effort between the University of Bonn and the University of 
Cologne, together with counterparts from several African universities in 
Kenya and South Africa3. The research unit brings together crop 
scientists, soil scientists, economists, geographers, historians and cultural 
anthropologists. As the name suggests, the research unit investigates 
resilience, collapse and reorganization within the heuristic model of the 
adaptive renewal cycle (Holling 1973, the Resilience Alliance 2009) in 
                                               
3 Full details of the research unit are available at www.fg1501.uni-koeln.de 
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complex coupled social ecological systems in Africa (see section 2.1). 
Research within the unit is currently ongoing in various sites in Africa, 
including Thaba Nchu (Free State, South Africa), Kuruman (Northern 
Cape, South Africa), Naivasha and Baringo (Kenya). In Baringo, research 
was conducted within the Pokot and Il Chamus communities.  
The unit of analysis adopted in this study is the social ecological system 
(SES), which integrates physical ecological and social components in a 
complex relationship, exhibiting “multiple scales of variables, cross-scale 
connections, multiple equilibriums and nonlinear interactions that 
generate complex dynamics and are therefore inherently unpredictable” 
(Berkes, Colding and Folke 2003: 31). As a result, change and uncertainty 
are taken as given and human beings must learn to live with them if they 
are to achieve sustainable development. How they do this depends on 
their adaptive capacity and resilience. This study takes an innovative 
approach to resilience research that links litigation, as a component of 
governance, to effective access to resources and hence to resilience 
building. This study therefore looks at how the Il Chamus make use of 
strategic litigation as a resilience building mechanism.  
This study identified marginalization, violence and the invasive plant 
species Prosopis juliflora as key drivers of social ecological change in the 
Lake Baringo wetland. As typical with complex coupled social ecological 
systems (see section 2.1), complex dynamics emerge from the interaction 
of these drivers with other variables in the system. This study traces their 
effects of on the livelihood of the Il Chamus, and analyses the resultant 
vulnerability context as well as the Il Chamus response to their status. In 
particular, it was seen that violence, seen as social practice within a 
context of political contestation forming part of the environmental reality 
in the region (Bohle 2007b:9), has created winners and losers as well as 
special vulnerabilities and opportunities.  
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Specifically, and perhaps most importantly, violence has led to the 
emergence of powerful players within the social arena known locally as 
Wanjurusi4 who have subverted the traditional institutional make-up of 
the SES and now dominate the social and economic landscape at the 
expense of the less powerful. Community members find individual ways to 
cope and as a group they coalesce around an ethnic identity that seeks to 
perpetuate a narrative of marginalization and place an emphasis on 
minority and indigenous group rights. This course is championed by 
educated community leaders and appeals to both national and 
international legal institutions that recognize the concept of ethnic 
minority and indigenous rights. How they convert this politicized image of 
their identity into social capital is a key aspect of this study. The study 
therefore looks at how legal regulation offers a tool for the Il Chamus to 
build their resilience and thus reduce their vulnerability to stressors in a 
context driven by marginalization, violence and the invasive plant 
Prosopis juliflora. 
Being in a relatively weaker position in relation to their Pokot and Tugen 
neighbours as well as having little say in persistent government 
intervention efforts in the region, the Il Chamus find litigation and the 
appeal to authority a better prospect than would larger or more 
militarized groups such as the Pokot who would rather go for violent 
regulation. While some Il Chamus have obviously benefited from it, the 
bulk of the Il Chamus population is rather a victim of violent regulation 
emanating especially from their numerically and militarily superior 
neighbours. This study therefore will also analyse the politicization of Il 
Chamus ethnic identity and their appropriation of the global concepts of 
marginalization and indigeneity in their quest to influence and secure their 
livelihood through strategic litigation. In the context of resilience building, 
litigation is also seen as attempt to influence decision making in the 
                                               
4 Wanjurusi (s: Mnjurusi), is a word whose origin is unknown to me but which has the 
loose meaning in the Baringo and surrounding areas of a “broker”, someone who 
facilitates things. 
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management and regulation of their SES by intervening in the local 
process of environmental governance and also opening up access to new 
international networks of patronage. 
1.3 Research questions. 
The research questions addressed in this study fall into three broad 
categories: the first addresses the ecological and social constitution of the 
SES. What are the key drivers of change in the SES and what linkages in 
terms of backward and forward loops exist between them and other 
variables within the various subsystems that make up the SES? 
The second category looks at the vulnerability context from an actor 
oriented perspective. What are the key sources of vulnerability and what 
individual and group coping mechanisms do they engender? Who are the 
key players and what are their specific agendas? 
The third category of questions looks specifically at litigation as resilience 
building. How are narratives of ethnic identity, marginalization and 
indigeneity constructed and translated into legally contestable claims? 
How does the process of litigation result in increased social capital for the 
Il Chamus? What rights are targeted by Il Chamus litigation and how 
effective are they in securing these rights? How effective can Il Chamus 
litigation be said to be in terms of resilience building? 
1.4 Research location: the Lake Baringo basin 
The Lake Baringo basin provides a unique location from which to study 
the social and ecological phenomena involved in processes of 
environmental change. It is a wetland within a wider Savannah area 
located north of the Kenyan Rift Valley province, and is inhabited by 
mixed agro-pastoralists from the Pokot, Tugen and Il Chamus 
communities. 
The project area covers the wider catchment area of Lake Baringo 
spanning eastwards to the boundaries of the Laikipia plateau. The 
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catchment spans an area of 6,800 km2, while Lake Baringo itself has a 
surface area of 108 Km2. (Odada et. al 2006: 1). 
 
 
Map 2: Research location. 
One of Kenya’s five RAMSAR sites, Lake Baringo is, along with Lake 
Naivasha, part of the Montreux Record since 2002.  This is the register of 
wetland sites on the list of wetlands of international importance where 
changes in ecological character have been noted as a result of 
technological developments, pollution or other human interference. 
Lake Baringo was designated a RAMSAR site in 2002 because of a number 
of adverse changes and threats to its survival, including: habitat 
degradation by siltation, adverse effects of the invasive species Prosopis 
Juliflora, changes in the rivers' courses and diversion of water; increased 
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water turbidity and a decrease in water nutrient content (RAMSAR5, see 
also Odada et al 2006). According to Schagerl and Oduor, reducing water 
levels coupled with the construction of dams on the rivers draining into 
the lake are a major threat to the future of the lake, and the resulting 
turbidity has a direct impact on the economic viability of the lake and 
portends catastrophic consequences for the inhabitants (Schagerl and 
Oduor 2003: 302). 
 
Apart from agro-pastoralism, fishing, irrigation, charcoal burning and 
tourism define the dominant economic activities in the region. Violent 
interaction between and among the three communities named above is 
also a common feature of life in the basin with profound effects on its 
regulatory profile. 
The physical features of the Baringo basin have the appearance of a 
degraded environment and perceptions by the authorities on the 
destructive nature of African range management have led to a long 
history of interventions starting with the colonial government and 
persisting to this day. This research locates this history within the 
framework of contestation of ideas and knowledge and the quest by 
certain actors to exert dominance over environmental change discourse. 
Thus the interventions have found political justification by articulating 
dominant discourses such as those based on desertification, 
environmental degradation and the related notions of equilibrium systems 
and carrying capacity.  
1.5 Methodology and fieldwork  
To fully realize the research objectives, desk based research and archival 
investigations at Oxford University6, the National Archives at Kew Gardens 
in the United Kingdom and also in Nairobi, Kenya, as well as the Rift 
                                               
5 Source: http://www.ramsar.org/key_montreux_record.htm. 
6 With much thanks to Prof. David Anderson who hosted me for a week during February 
2010 at Oxford. 
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Valley provincial Administration offices in Nakuru, the Electoral and 
Boundaries Review Commission offices in Nakuru as well as the District 
administration offices in Kabarnet and Marigat were complemented by a 
field based study. The fieldwork component of the research was planned 
to take a minimum of twelve months duration, and consisted of a six 
week exploratory fieldwork survey between April and May 2010, followed 
by a longer fieldwork period from August 2010 to October 2011. During 
this time I acquainted myself with the environment and people living in 
the research area, observed, recorded and analysed the institutions, 
culture and economic activities around which their livelihoods revolve. The 
research design relied on ethnographic methods as well as a household 
survey census. In the main part I relied on participatory methods of 
inquiry including observation and taking part in various community 
activities. I held numerous interviews with particular focus groups as well 
as individuals. I also employed extended case study analysis to give 
meaning to the interviews.  
The fieldwork was guided by the following specific objectives:  
1. To identify the relationship between the various groups of actors and 
the drivers of change within the society and their positions in the 
hierarchy of power that defines political and social relations, and 
specifically to analyse the social and cultural practices controlling and 
implementing their agendas. 
2. To describe the social constitution of power as well as the economic 
and social organizational structure of the Il Chamus with respect to 
dominant economic activities and cultural practices.  
3. To analyse the emergence and development of social networks and 
social-ecological relations in contested arenas. 
4. To outline the respective spatial and social arenas of influence of the 
identified agent groups. 
29 
 
5. To outline and analyse physical, cultural and structural forms of 
vulnerabilities surrounding environmental entitlements and resource 
based livelihoods. 
6. To discover the main concerns, perceptions and discourse as far as the 
main stressors within the community were concerned. 
To help with my fieldwork, I had the use of a digital camera, a digital 
voice recorder, a hand-held video recorder, a GPS (Global Positioning 
System) machine and a laptop. For local transport I had the use of a 
motorcycle, which proved very useful in navigating the rugged terrain of 
Salabani and Kiserian, but was virtually unusable after heavy rainfall. I 
also enlisted the help of several field assistants at different stages of the 
research. I made use of a general household survey questionnaire (see 
appendix) to get demographic, economic and social data. Further data on 
the issues of Prosopis and violence were obtained from informal 
discussions, general observations and the mass news media. Free listing 
interviewing techniques as well as general informal conversations were 
also used to source information. Social gatherings, cultural events and 
community meetings provided focal points for observation of group 
activity and also discovery of community concerns. 
One thing I noticed immediately was that the community was rather used 
to researchers coming and going as several NGOs had been to the area. 
This should have made the research process easier but one of the 
consequences of so much research activity was the commercialization of 
the process. So it was that members of the community had come to 
expect some sort of compensation for taking part in the research process, 
and consequently a decision was made within my research group to offer 
200 Kenya Shillings (enough to purchase two kilograms of sugar) to each 
family that participated in the general survey census. This had an impact 
on the willingness to participate in the research process after the general 
survey was over, and in this regard my research assistants were very 
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helpful in obtaining cooperation without further monetary inducements. 
Locating stable and reliable assistants was also a great challenge, and in 
the end I used a total of six different assistants with only one, Johannes, 
who was also my local guide, lasting through the whole research period. 
This high turnover rate of reliable assistants can be explained by the 
simple fact that the more educated they are, the more likely they are to 
go as soon as a better opportunity presents itself. 
I first decided to base myself at Kampi ya Samaki, from where it was only 
a fifteen minute motorcycle ride to one of the sites (Salabani), and a 
twenty minute boat ride to the other (Kiserian). Practical as it seemed, 
the reality was that the boats to Kiserian operated at tourist rates, with 
return journeys costing an average of 6000 Kenya Shillings (about 60 
Euros at the going exchange rate then).  Additionally, the prospect of 
wading through approximately fifty meters of slimy mud at the boat 
landing on the Kiserian shores of the lake made boat journeys to Kiserian 
a very unattractive option. A motorcycle ride to Kiserian through Marigat 
and Ng’ambo took at least two hours, so it was out of the question to 
attend to the two sites simultaneously, and I took the conscious decision 
to base myself at Salabani. From there I would visit Kiserian periodically. 
I found the people in Salabani extremely friendly and welcoming and soon 
found a willing host in Stan, a young Il Chamus man of the Il Kiliaku age 
group. Stan was the head of a family unit comprising his mother and 
siblings, and was unmarried at the time. He had lost his father7on a raid 
by Pokot in Salabani during a daytime raid at a time when Salabani was 
particularly vulnerable. He and other Il Chamus I spoke to at this time did 
not just consider the Pokot as enemies but as the very incarnation of the 
devil and referred to them as Shetani (Swahili for Satan). Few Il Chamus 
will have a good word for the Pokot, who most consider to be devious, 
thankless and cruel. It was quite obvious that the Il Chamus harboured a 
                                               
7 Mzee Lenapurda Long’orkoben, shot dead at Meisori during a daytime raid by Pokot on 
the 3rd of May 2005. A comprehensive list of Il Chamus victims of deadly violence is 
provided in Chapter 5. 
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deep resentment for the Pokot, who seemed to have an upper hand in 
any confrontations between the two communities owing to their superior 
numbers and access to arms. While Il Chamus raids into Pokot territory 
for cattle were not unheard of, most of their forays into Pokot land were 
either in search of stolen stock or retaliatory. However it did seem to me 
that blaming the Pokot was a little exaggerated and “Pokot” had become 
a generic explanatory term for all sorts of ills that beset the community.  
My residence at Stan’s homestead in Salabani provided me with a chance 
to be part of the community and here I observed daily life unfold. I also 
had the opportunity to witness one of the most important ceremonies in 
the Il Chamus social life, namely the initiation of a new age group which 
takes place an average of every ten years. Stan’s own marriage and other 
landmark social events stood out and a significant part was captured on 
tape and in pictures.  
Here, I was also exposed to the reality of violence and insecurity as well 
as to the menace of the Prosopis plant. Young Il Chamus Morans patrol 
the area at night, looking out for any signs of a potential attack. In the 
mornings, they vent their energy on the Prosopis plant, slashing by Panga 
new offshoots of the plant in their fields. 
In terms of insecurity and violence, however, life in Salabani seemed to 
be more stable than in Kiserian where images of violence and its prospect 
are visually dominant. While in Salabani people were aware of the 
potential threats, they seemed not to be pre-occupied about it. The 
Prosopis plant dominates the visual environmental landscape in Salabani. 
The deceptive lushness of the green cover conceals an undergrowth of 
deep resentment for the plant. While the dominant narrative among the 
community revolves around the perceived ills of the Prosopis plant, the 
community seems to be making what they perceive to be the best out of 
a bad situation, with charcoal burning by far the most important economic 
activity noted apart from pastoralism. Charcoal burning is rampant with 
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seemingly no regulation apart from a mission to get rid of Prosopis. 
However, Acacia and other tree species are facing a threat in the absence 
of clear regulations. 
My experiences in Kiserian painted quite a different picture from what I 
had in Salabani. Here, I was initially met with a lot of suspicion as the 
topic of violence and insecurity was very sensitive in this area and I 
noticed that most people were uncooperative if not evasive. I therefore 
made a conscious decision to first administer the general household 
survey questionnaire before attempting to probe any deeper. Even this 
effort was beset with problems as I and my field assistants in this task 
were physically obstructed by rowdy youths from proceeding with our job. 
Their main problem with us, articulated through a local councillor, was 
that they objected to “foreign” youth “working” in their area while they 
themselves had no jobs. What I thought was a small misunderstanding 
soon threatened to escalate into a physical confrontation and my 
attempts to seek audience with the local chief proved futile as he was 
apparently looped into the dispute and had taken sides with the local 
youth.  
This confrontation shed a little light on the underlying tensions among the 
Il Chamus themselves in the area, and was also my first real exposure to 
the power and influence of the emerging powerful actors known as 
Wanjurusi. There seemed to be in existence unseen “turfs” under the 
influence of certain powerful individuals that even the local administration 
could not stand up to. 
It took the intervention of the District office in Marigat a few days later to 
let us proceed with our work. Despite the setback, this event opened my 
eyes to the mechanics of local power relations in the area and showed me 
an aggressive and almost militant side of the Il Chamus that I had never 
seen before. On the literal say so of the councillor, the obstruction was 
lifted and we proceeded smoothly from then on. 
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Also while in Kiserian, I understood somewhat the source of resentment 
the Il Chamus have for their Pokot Neighbours. Sometime in mid-
February, at the height of the dry season when pasture was scarce, we 
noticed some movement at the top of Noompausi hill, near the shores of 
Lake Baringo at Kiserian. From Kiserian centre, one could make out, 
dotted across the distance armed Pokot herdsmen with their cattle. Even 
though this land is generally perceived as belonging to the Il Chamus, 
they were to camp there for the next six or so weeks, grazing their cattle 
and from time to time bringing them nearer the lake for watering. It 
appeared that the Pokot herdsmen were intent on forcing access to 
grazing and water for their cattle. During this period the atmosphere at 
Kiserian was extremely tense and at Mukutani there was an increased 
presence of armed youth. This situation severely hampered my activities 
which were reduced to a necessary minimum, which was mainly pure 
observation. I did not feel safe enough to take any pictures at this time, 
and even though many precious moments passed by unrecorded, they 
remain etched in my memory. 
Around mid-March, with the rains having resumed, the Pokot herdsmen 
camped around Noompausi hill began to retreat. However, on the 19th of 
March, at around midnight, we awoke to loud screaming, whistles going 
and the sound of gunfire. It emerged that the retreating Pokot herdsmen 
had somehow made away with 49 Il Chamus cattle and were being 
pursued by armed Il Chamus Morans. On this occasion 22 cows were 
recovered. The reality of violence both created an opportunity to see first-
hand its impact on local livelihoods and hampered the research process, a 
necessary evil from the research point of view. 
Discussions about violence usually drew an expectation to take sides, and 
visual and verbal prompts that did not elicit supportive comments could 
be interpreted as being on the side of the ‘enemy’ and as such, objectivity 
was practically very hard to maintain. Many times I found myself in 
complete sympathy with the plight of the Il Chamus and unable to stake a 
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claim on any status as an objective and passive observer. Even more 
challenging was the urge and feeling of compulsion to intervene. Would 
for example, a petition to the Divisional police station in Marigat for more 
officers using my status and association with a prestigious German 
University be unwarranted activism, or was it advocacy, or could it be 
justified as ‘participant observation’? 
I felt at times that I was not succeeding in gaining the confidence and 
trust of the community enough for them to let me into the part of their 
world that was not visible to a casual observer. To identify major actors, 
their agendas and how they operate needed a view from the inside. No 
one would easily admit to owning a gun for example, or tell you the 
source, route or any relevant information to do with access to 
ammunition. It was therefore a landmark moment for me when while 
conducting an interview one day, my host proceeded to climb onto a 
makeshift ladder consisting of a stool buffered by old sheets of cloth and 
placed atop a squeaky old table to retrieve a neatly folded bundle: “Let 
me show you my gun”, he said, as he clambered carefully down. The 
sight of the man reaching for the gun marked a great turning point in my 
‘battle for trust’. I felt I was now trusted enough to be let into some 
secret aspects of their daily life. I sincerely believe that in the end, I 
found out as much as an outside confidant could know without 
themselves being Il Chamus. 
Another challenge was that even though the District administration 
system had been decentralized to Marigat, the truth was that most 
documents relating to my field sites were still in Kabarnet, and contending 
with the bureaucracy at Kabarnet was at the best of times testing. 
Eventually I found some useful annual district reports and development 
plans in a disused office building which served as a library and also 
doubled up as a motorcycle garage. For other material I had to go to the 
Government offices in Nakuru or the National Archives in Nairobi. 
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As regards the data collected, various challenges presented themselves. It 
was my initial intention to conduct a survey of the whole population in 
Salabani and Kiserian, but after covering about 30 households in Salabani 
I realized that an estimate of the total number of households made during 
an earlier exploratory fieldwork survey had been grossly under estimated. 
I therefore had to obtain a random sample from the whole population and 
start the whole process afresh, incurring in the process a considerable 
loss of time and resources. The data was then entered into excel and 
Epidata and analysed using access, which was quite difficult for someone 
encountering Epidata for the first time. The qualitative data on the other 
hand accumulated into many hours of audio and video footage which has 
to be translated, transcribed, edited or otherwise converted into usable 
case studies, a process that is still ongoing. 
Finally, I had to address the question of the utility of the research from 
the point of view of the Il Chamus community. When invited to comment 
or ask any questions after an interview session, the most common 
question was how the study would benefit the community. My consistent 
answer which I considered honest was that I would be the greatest direct 
beneficiary of the research, and any benefits to the community would be 
incidental to information being provided in the thesis being robust enough 
and available to the community and their development partners. From my 
own point of view, the fieldwork was an integral component of my 
research that has given me insights into the role of violence and conflict 
in the shaping of human-environment relations in the Lake Baringo Basin. 
1.6 Chapter arrangement. 
The remainder of this work is organized as follows: Chapter two discusses 
the theoretical underpinnings and key concepts used in the research, 
including an explanation of the location of the research in the political 
ecology field, social ecological systems and coupling, theories underlying 
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resilience and vulnerability, the adaptive capacity model, and the role of 
law in resilience building. 
Chapter three provides a brief historical outline of the Il Chamus society 
as well as some aspects of its political and social organization. The 
concept of the adaptive cycle within the framework of resilience theory is 
used here to analyse the evolution of the Il Chamus economy from 
hunting and gathering to irrigation, and the collapse of the irrigation 
economy to give way to a pastoral lifestyle. 
Chapter four considers the SES as a resource giver providing 
environmental entitlements to its users. The livelihood resources of the 
Lake Baringo basin are described here within the context of a rapidly 
changing environment and the competing narratives that describe it.  
Chapter five looks at the vulnerability context of the Il Chamus, focusing 
on three key factors identified as the main drivers of vulnerability in the 
SES: Prosopis juliflora, violent regulation and marginalization. Chapter six 
contains an analysis of the concept of marginalization through the lenses 
of a legal process conducted by the Truth and Justice Reconciliation 
Commission of Kenya (TJRC).  
Chapters seven and eight analyse two important Il Chamus cases against 
the government and aim to show the agency of the Il Chamus in 
responding to their condition of vulnerability, and demonstrate the utility 
of litigation as a resilience building mechanism. This analysis also explores 
the political power dynamics between the Il Chamus and the state as well 
as among differently located actors within Il Chamus society itself. 
Finally, an assessment is made on the efficacy of legal regulation within 
the framework of resilience thinking. The thesis as a whole hopes to 
introduce an innovative approach that uses legal analysis to interrogate 
the dynamics of political contestation within the framework of adversarial 
litigation. In this novel approach to resilience analysis, the process of 
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litigation is used as a mirror for societal power relations, and litigation 
itself as a strategy for holding stakeholders in governance to account and 
thereby mitigating the unfavourable effects of governance. The resilience 
building effect of litigation is thus found in its ability to intervene in 
governance. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical underpinnings and key concepts. 
2.1 The location of the research in the political ecology field 
Studies that relate humans to their environment, especially those on  arid 
environments occupied by pastoralists have developed gradually from 
largely equilibrium centred perspectives to those that highlight non 
equilibrium and chaotic properties of ecosystems, within an emerging 
paradigm referred to as “new ecological thinking” (Scoones 1999, McCabe 
2004).  
Earlier ecological thinking as expressed in the works of Clements (1916) 
and Geertz (1963) were inspired by the biological concepts of equilibrium 
and the homeostatic regulation of natural biological communities which 
were used to analogously explain successional change towards climax or 
equilibrium states within ecological communities existing in a defined 
closed ecosystem. McCabe attributes the introduction of the concept of 
the ecosystem to Sir Arthur Tansley in 1935 (McCabe 2004: 21). The 
ecosystem provided an analytical framework that combined human and 
environmental aspects to the study of natural phenomena, dominated in 
these times by notions of equilibrium. These equilibrium based ideas 
came to provide the basis for such concepts as climax vegetation 
communities, carrying capacity and its perceived threat of environmental 
degradation that came to inform governmental interventions into 
pastoralist areas such as the Baringo basin (McCabe 2004; Anderson 
2002). 
Studies under the rubric of cultural or human ecology or ecological 
anthropology (such as Steward 1955, Bennett, 1976 and Hardesty 1977) 
considered man as exogenous to his environment and linked human 
cultural behaviour to physical environments, so that cultural attributes, 
whether based on identity, dominant occupations or geographical 
locations, were seen as adaptations or responses to environmental 
variations that defined particular niches within closed ecosystems. 
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Steward (1955), was particularly influential in this field, linking 
subsistence strategies to social organization. Rappaport’s work among the 
Tsembaga of New Guinea for example ( Rappaport 1967a), showed how 
ritual practice involving periodic mass culling of pigs in this SES8 played a 
significant role in the regulation of environmental and social relations. It 
not only cemented social relations and networks but directly impacted on 
the physical and ecological relations within the Tsembaga closed 
‘ecosystem’, culminating in what he called a “ritually regulated 
ecosystem” (Rappaport 1967b: 29).  
Similarly, Goldschmidt has analysed the changes in occupation among 
pastoral societies as a function of ecological and cultural adaptability. For 
example, he describes the Il Chamus settling down to agriculture as an 
instant of ecological adjustment, “a seeking out of a balance in the use of 
resources that is as efficient as possible in terms of existing technology” 
(Goldschmidt 1965: 403).  
Cultural ecology was however criticized for ignoring important variables 
exerting influence on the environment such as disease and population 
pressure (see Netting 1968 and Ellen 1982, also quoted in McCabe 2004: 
23), over-emphasizing energy flow models and equilibrium systems 
analysis at the expense of the political dimension of social reality. It was 
also suggested that cultural ecology ignored the structural links between 
local, regional and global scales (see for instance Simmonds, 1993; Peet 
and Watts, 1996).  
A marriage of cultural ecology with political economy concepts that 
stressed the political side of social relations marked both a thematic and 
conceptual turn in the study of human-environment relations. The need to 
bring politics into ecology led to  a diverse and discursive political ecology 
with numerous variations to suit different fields of inquiry, and the 
approaches, explanations and application of political ecology concepts 
                                               
8 Known as the Kaiko pig festival 
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have tended to depend on the field of study concerned. Within this 
diversity, however, is a common desire to understand the processes of 
environmental change and the role of human agency within it. The 
common theme in these studies is best captured by Harvey: “all 
ecological projects (and arguments) are simultaneously political-economic 
projects (and arguments) and vice versa. Ecological arguments are never 
socially neutral any more than socio-political arguments are ecologically 
neutral. Looking more closely at the way ecology and politics interrelate 
then becomes imperative if we are to get a better handle on how to 
approach environmental/ecological questions” (Harvey 1993: 25). 
 
This study is thus interested in the recent strand of political ecology that 
seeks a nuanced understanding of the role of power relations in human-
environment relationships, which is most closely represented by the 
works of Blaikie and Brookfield (1987), Bryant (1992, 1998), Bryant and 
Bailey (1997),  Peluso and Watts (2001), Bohle and Fünfgeld (2007) to 
name but a few. Some writers have expressed the fear that since these 
studies increasingly focus on the social and political struggles related to 
the environment there is an inherent risk of reducing the role of ecology 
in political ecology (see for instance Nygren and Rikoon 2008) and 
thereby consigning natural scientist insights on processes of ecological 
change to the periphery of political ecology. It is my considered view 
however, that to fully grasp the role of human social and political action in 
environmental regulation is a process not dependent on an equally 
weighted balance between “ecology” and “politics” in political ecology. 
This study is therefore guided by the following insight regarding political 
ecology by Bryant: “Political ecology examines the political dynamics 
surrounding material and discursive struggles over the environment in the 
third world. The role of unequal power relations in constituting a 
politicized environment is a central theme” (Bryant 1998: 79). 
Consequently, this study looks at the politics of access to resources as a 
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function of governance, using legal analysis to explore the uneven power 
relations between the Il Chamus and the government as well as among 
differently located actors within Il Chamus society. 
Crucial in Bryant’s formulation of political ecology is the notion of “a 
politicized environment”. It encompasses an actor oriented expression of 
the contested power, knowledge, meanings of environmental processes 
and the differentiated effects of the outcome on various sections of 
society.  
 
At the core of  this politicized environment are competing forms of access 
to and control over resources exercised over various political scales and 
arenas ranging from the individual, community, national and the global 
(Watts 2003: 258). In this study, the analysis of Il Chamus case law 
brings out the contested nature of this relationship, with the courts 
providing an arena for the expression of alternative formulations of 
environmental knowledge. 
 
A key theme within the idea of a politicized environment that runs 
through the entire fabric of this thesis is the idea of contestation. Within 
this context, the Lake Baringo basin is seen as an arena in which 
environmental entitlements are contested through political processes that 
invariably create winners and losers. Within this politicized environment 
we also see contests between discourses of knowledge and meanings, and 
between differentially situated political actors at different scales. As seen 
in sections 2.6 and 2.7 below, this contestation defines the nature of 
environmental governance, which, in the case of the Il Chamus, is 
mediated by the application of strategic litigation. It is through its 
potential to enhance access to resources that litigation becomes a 
resilience building mechanism for the Il Chamus. The notion of indigenous 
identity on which Il Chamus litigation is predicated is also a very much 
contested idea. Current formulations of the notion of indigeneity have 
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developed through the sustained activism of transnational human rights 
and advocacy groups into a useful legal resource for communities 
identifying themselves as indigenous. 
 
A further instance of the contestation is over meanings and environmental 
discourses such as the contention that African traditional range practices 
are unsustainable and invariably result in environmental degradation, 
poverty and associated ills. This is a clear reflection of the domination of 
the discourse of carrying capacity and inferiority of “unscientific” methods 
of pastoral production over that of traditional ecological knowledge. In 
fact, according to Seidle and Tisdell, the contested concept of carrying 
capacity is much more useful as a political tool. It is scientifically 
untenable because it relies on value judgments, which are by nature 
subjective and hence vulnerable to politicization (Seidle and Tisdell 1999: 
396, 407). Leach and Mearns (1996) offer a deeper analysis of the 
political use of environmental concepts within the contestation of ideas 
and knowledge. They show how environmental policy in Africa is driven to 
a large extent by a set of powerful but unscientifically proven images 
whose veracity is not beyond doubt. Based on a Malthusian logic, these 
images are expressed in terms of imminent destruction of the 
environment and the urgency of intervention. Such images are backed by 
concepts such as overgrazing, overpopulation and desertification.  
Government interventions based on this logic then have certain 
outcomes, the interpretation of which again reflects the hegemony of 
dominant discourses of development over those of marginalization and 
exploitation. In brief, encapsulated within the processes of environmental 
change are social and political struggles of access to environmental 
entitlements played out in a politicized environment. This thesis therefore 
takes a political ecology approach and relates the efforts of a group of 
vulnerable actors who use litigation to influence the political process that 
affect their daily livelihoods.  
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This politicized environment is further defined by the articulation of 
environmental issues through the lenses of ethnicity and marginality in 
both legal and overtly political terms aimed at countering official 
government policy in particular and environmental governance in general. 
An analysis of litigation offers in this context a view into the political 
processes controlling access and distribution of resources and the agency 
of communities in influencing the effects of this interaction. My research 
therefore intends to describe the ecological and social processes 
governing access to resources, and the utility of litigation by the Il 
Chamus in exerting a positive effect on their vulnerability context.  
Litigation that is linked to a global network of advocacy groups and that 
draws upon national and international sources of law while relying on  
politically charged concepts embodied in notions of marginalization, 
minority groups and indigenous identity reflects a trend in contemporary 
political ecology that highlights the plight of marginal groups within a 
globalized political and economic governance structure. Here, politics of 
redistribution and politics of recognition come together under the banner 
of ecological and social justice, through the mobilization of cultural 
practices encoded within such notions as traditional ecological knowledge, 
indigenous property rights, right to life, spiritual link to land use, 
community land ownership, and the like (Watts 2003: 259).  
2.2 The concept of coupled social ecological systems (SESs) 
This research uses as a unit of analysis the social ecological system. 
Complex physical and biological processes that define the ecological 
status of the lake basin interact with other equally complex processes 
from the social and cultural subsystems that together constitute the social 
ecological system (SES). This process of interaction between social and 
physical entities is referred to in contemporary scholarship as coupling. 
Turner (2003) and Crumley (1994) refer to social ecological systems as 
being intricately coupled. In other words they are enmeshed in a complex 
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relationship that relates various autonomous elements of the system 
through mutual feedback loops and effects that are spread over space 
and time.  
Central to the notion of coupled social ecological systems is the process of 
coupling. According to Liu et al (2007), coupled human and natural 
systems (CHANS), are the result of continuous complex interaction over 
time between man and nature, and Anderies, Janssen and Ostrom (2004: 
3) define a coupled social ecological system (SES) as “an integrated 
system of geo-biophysical, social and cultural subsystems with reciprocal 
feedback, interdependence and self-organization in which some of the 
interdependent relationships among humans are mediated through 
interactions with biophysical and non-human biological units”.  
Coupled SESs bring together individual system elements from both the 
social and ecological realms in reciprocal feedback loops that are defined 
across various scales.  Becker and Jahn (2006) describe how such 
coupling between system elements can be internalized to create a new 
composite system that relates, through mutual feedback, different 
elements within itself. Coupling takes place over organizational, spatial 
and temporal levels and is influenced by both human and non-human 
agency manifested in various forms of adaptation and regulation (Liu et al 
2007, Lansing et al 2006, Scoones 1999). 
At an organizational level, SESs can be viewed as connected by nested 
hierarchies with both self-organizing and interdependent components 
(Anderies, Janssen and Ostrom 2004: 3) with reciprocal and feedback 
effects (Liu et al 2007, Gunderson and Holling, Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment 2005). Natural processes within the SES interact to provide 
humans with ecosystem services which in turn define their environmental 
entitlements. Humans access their environmental services by applying 
various forms of regulation within a framework of institutions.    
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Coupling in geographical space may build up from local level processes 
such as irrigation and environmental conservation, whose effects may be 
felt beyond the local to the national and regional levels. These processes 
escalate gradually to integrate with global dynamics that define global 
climate change such as ozone layer depletion and global warming. One 
can think of the link between variables that define the phenomenon of 
global climate change on the one hand, and micro climate variations and 
their social economic effects on the other, as describing a facet of spatial 
linkages between the local, the regional and the global. Not only are 
natural and human systems linked in this coupled state but so are 
different societies linked to each other within this all-encompassing web. 
Liu et al refer to the “effects of distant people on local natural systems 
and the effects of distant natural systems on local people” Liu et al (2007: 
642). In this globalized reality, local environmental and social processes 
are linked to wider systems creating in this process effects ranging from 
micro environmental changes such as shifting rainy seasons to social 
perturbations including local mobility, international migration, increased 
international trade and its effects on local markets, and the impact of 
global centres of environmental governance on local environments.  
Both contiguous and remote linkages have evolved to form patterns and 
processes at both the local and global scales. Such processes may then 
evolve to form new social-ecological systems with their own dynamics, 
which can manifest into various pathways subject to the degree of change 
ranging on a scale from infinitesimal to gradual to rapid and profound. 
Environmental degradation, for instance, is described as a ‘slow and 
silent’ process, while violent regulation is often a loud and rapid process 
(Bohle 2007: 9) .Our main interest here is in rapid and profound changes 
which necessitate a search for new regulatory systems. As a consequence 
of the profound changes, human action and natural phenomena may 
combine into a new system that is dominated by either and set the SES 
on a new path. This may create vulnerabilities and adaptive reactions 
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ultimately leading to reorganization or even collapse. Identifying key 
drivers of vulnerability and the social and political processes that shape 
human agency in confronting this vulnerability is a key aspect of this 
study. 
An important observation that is addressed by this research is the 
hitherto apolitical nature of the study of SES processes of change, 
especially looked at from a political ecology perspective. This research 
therefore combines a physical ecological approach to SES with a social 
and political approach that uses legal analysis as a tool to portray the 
social and political processes of contestation. 
2.3 The concept of resilience 
Underscoring the fact that coupled SESs are comprised of complex social- 
ecological systems and are regulated by complex social interactions, and 
are therefore complex themselves, Berkes, Colding and Folke (2003: 4) 
propose the use of the idea of resilience as an “organizing concept and 
scoping device” to mediate between the intersection of ecological and 
social system complexity and thus project issues of change and 
adaptation through the “lens of resilience”. 
The concept of resilience is gaining importance across many disciplines 
and is one that many can relate to from its everyday meaning and usage.  
Holling (1973) is credited with introducing the resilience concept into 
ecological literature to explain the workings of nonlinear dynamics that 
see ecosystems survive perturbations and change (Gunderson 2000). 
According to Holling (1973: 17) “Resilience determines the persistence of 
relationships within a system and is a measure of the ability of these 
systems to absorb changes of state variables, driving variables, and 
parameters, and still persist”. He differentiates resilience from stability, 
which he defines as the ability of a system to return to an equilibrium 
state after a temporary disturbance. He points out, however, that “an 
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equilibrium centred view is essentially static and provides little insight into 
the transient behaviour of systems that are not near the equilibrium” 
Holling (1973: 2), therefore of little help in complex couples SESs that are 
likely to be in continuous transit through different states and zones of 
attraction, or revolving around multiple equilibria. 
Apart from Holling’s concept of resilience that stresses the persistence of 
systems, several other conceptualizations of resilience exist. The 
Resilience Alliance (2009) and Carpenter et al. (2001) see resilience as 
the amount of change a system can withstand and still retain the same 
controls on structure and function, also expressed as its capacity for self-
organization, learning and adaptation. Similarly, Walker et al. define 
resilience as the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and 
reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the 
same function, structure, identity and feedbacks (Walker et al. 2004). 
Folke, in yet another approach, conceptualizes resilience as opportunity 
emerging from disturbances in SESs, and thus disturbance is seen as a 
chance for innovation and development (Folke 2006: 253).  
The analysis of resilience in SESs has solidified into the so called 
resilience theory, whose objective is to understand the source and role of 
transformative change in adaptive systems (Holling et al. 2002:5). The 
theory links dynamic cycles across spatial and temporal scales. At the 
core of resilience theory is the adaptive cycle, which is a heuristic model 
of phases through which changes in ecological systems go through 
(Holling 2001:394-395).  
Individual adaptive cycles are nested in a hierarchy across time and 
space. These nested hierarchies may have a stabilizing effect due to the 
fact that they provide the memory of the past and of the distant to allow 
recovery after change occurs. They may also have a destabilizing effect 
when dynamics across scales become "over-connected" or "brittle," 
allowing small-scale transformations to "revolt" and explode into larger-
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scale crises. Taken together this theoretical framework is called 
"panarchy" (Gunderson and Holling 2002). 
According to Holling and Gunderson, resilience theory rests on four key 
assumptions about ecosystems. First, change is neither linear nor 
constantly chaotic, but rather episodic and patterned. Periods of slow 
accumulation of "natural capital" are suddenly interrupted by periods of 
release and reorganization, caused by the interaction of fast and slow 
variables. Second, spatial and temporal attributes are discontinuous and 
scale specific. Third, ecosystems do not have a single equilibrium around 
which they are homeostatically regulated but display multiple equilibria. 
Fourth, fixed rules independent of scale applied to such systems lead to 
loss of resilience, therefore the key to enhancing system resilience is to 
develop learning abilities and expect uncertainties (Holling and Gunderson 
2002:25-27).  
2.4 Social resilience 
In one of the most recent and comprehensive reviews on the concept of 
social resilience, Keck and Sakdapolrak (2013) propose to include in the 
definition of social resilience three kinds of capacities, namely copying 
capacities, adaptive capacities and transformative capacities. These 
capacities make societies able to better anticipate, manage and cope with 
change. Coping capacities refer to the “ability of social actors to cope with 
and overcome all kinds of adversities”; adaptive capacities refer to their 
“ability to learn from past experiences and adjust themselves to future 
challenges in their everyday lives”; transformative capacities refers to 
their “ability to craft sets of institutions that foster individual welfare and 
sustainable societal robustness towards future crises”.  
 
Transformative capacities are of crucial significance to this study, as they 
“encompass people’s ability to access assets and assistance from the 
wider socio-political arena, including from governmental organizations 
and so-called civil society, to participate in decision-making processes, 
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and to craft institutions that both improve their individual welfare and 
foster societal robustness toward future crises.  As such it explicitly 
incorporates topics of progressive change and development”.  Most 
importantly, they find that social relations, network structures, 
institutions and power relations as well as knowledge and discourses 
constitute the major determinants of social resilience (Keck and 
Sakdapolrak 2013: 11). These attributes speak directly to Il Chamus 
litigation as a resilience building mechanism, as is seen more explicitly in 
chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
 
It follows therefore that resilience building especially in the livelihoods of 
the poor and marginalized is as much a technical as it is a political 
process (Keck and Sakdapolrak 2013:5). Similarly, Eriksen and Lind 
(2009) look at resilience building as a political process, noting that the 
way people adjust to multiple stressors is an intrinsically political process 
that involves competition by various actors each aiming to secure their 
own interests, creating winners and losers in the process. Social relations 
and political alliances  are formed between individuals, politicians, 
customary institutions and government administration in a bid to 
influence decision making processes that impact on their livelihood 
choices (Eriksen and Lind 2009: ). Social resilience then is intimately 
connected to the nature and quality of governance, under which both the 
technical and political aspects of resilience are regulated. 
 
2.5 Vulnerability as social practice 
Much like the term resilience, vulnerability is a widely used term with 
varied and contested meanings but yet accessible due to its widespread 
use in everyday language, where it evokes a negative sense of being 
susceptible to harm due to a position of disadvantage relative to other 
stronger players. Vulnerability as understood and applied in the current 
study is not far removed from this popular perception of the term. 
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Studies of SESs especially within the framework of adaptive cycles and 
resilience theory relate vulnerability quite closely with resilience. Scholars 
like Berkes (2007) take vulnerability not just a matter of exposure to 
hazards but as an integral part of the resilience of the system concerned. 
In this context vulnerability is key to the understanding of change within 
ecosystems in three important ways: resilience thinking that incorporates 
vulnerability allows for a holistic evaluation of hazards in coupled SESs; it 
emphasizes the ability of a system to contain a hazard by either 
absorbing the disturbance or adapting to it, thereby focusing on what is 
done rather than what cannot be done, and; provides learning 
opportunities and options for dealing with future uncertainties and thus 
important for resilience building to deal with uncertainty and surprise in 
SESs (Berkes 2007: 283 ). 
 
The ability of societies to build their resilience determines how well they 
can react to endogenous environmental changes. Adaptive capacity at all 
levels of society depends on the resilience of their institutions and the 
natural systems on which they depend. The greater their resilience, the 
greater is their ability to absorb shocks and perturbations and adapt to 
change. By the same logic, the less resilient the system, the lesser is the 
ability of institutions and societies to cope and adapt to change (see also 
Adger 2000).  
 
Social resilience exerts a direct influence on the security of individuals 
within the societies. Security here refers not just to availability of 
livelihood resources, but the ability of members of a given society to 
effectively access these resources. Sen’s entitlement approach (Sen 1981, 
1999), or Watts and Bohle’s extended entitlements approach (Watts and 
Bohle 1993) that emphasize entitlements, rights, access and distribution 
of resources is instructive here. Langridge et al 2006, link the creation of 
social resilience to a community’s ability to access resources that are 
critical to its survival. In a specific case study focusing on four 
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communities in California, they found that, in relation to the crucial 
resource of water, social resilience is enhanced by the strengthening and 
diversification of a range of structural and relational mechanisms to 
access (Langridge et al 2006:1, 3). Such mechanisms of access are 
defined by essentially political processes, and executed through 
administrative and legal institutions and the social networks that link 
communities and individual actors to these institutions. In the case of the 
Il Chamus, litigation can be seen as one of such political processes aimed 
at facilitating access.  
 
Vulnerability can then be seen as a socially constructed phenomenon that 
depends on both the ecological and social circumstances of an SES, as 
well as the institutions that regulate the relations between these two 
facets, and the society’s effective access to environmental entitlements. 
Effective access that translates into material benefits for the society at 
large has a direct impact on its ability to adapt to change and hence it’s 
social resilience (Adger et al. 2003:181). 
 
This study therefore makes a critical link between social resilience and the 
effective access to resources. How resources are distributed and 
effectively accessed becomes a matter of power dynamics, and is 
therefore an inherently political process. Thus, vulnerability and resilience 
building can be seen as social practice involving differently located actors 
within a society. According to Bohle, and this is the position adopted in 
this study, social vulnerability is social practice, where human livelihoods 
and human securities are constantly contested and fought over. It is 
embedded in social and environmental arenas, where human security, 
freedom, and human rights are struggled for, negotiated, lost and won. 
However, in these struggles and contestations, the vulnerable are not 
mere victims, but rather possess sufficient agency to attempt to alter 
their condition in life. Living with vulnerability then becomes a constant 
struggle to cope with threats to their livelihood, which involves actively 
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seeking out and negotiating for options that minimize risk to their 
livelihoods and increase their relative security. Success or failure in this 
effort is relative, but what is crucial here is the agency of the vulnerable 
as they stake a claim in the political processes that determine their 
livelihood status rather than what they fail to do (Bohle 2007: 9). In the 
case of the Il Chamus, their efforts to enforce participation in the political 
process through litigation are largely shaped by the nature and quality of 
governance. 
 
2.6 Linking environmental governance, litigation and resilience building 
 
This thesis is premised on the idea that access to resources is directly and 
significantly related to social resilience, and further, that access to 
resources is regulated by processes of environmental governance. 
The politics of access to resources take place within a framework of 
governance executed to a large extent but not exclusively by the state. 
Governance here refers to “the structures and processes by which people 
in societies make decisions and share power” (Folke et al 2005: 444). 
Lebel et al further define governance as including “laws, regulations, 
discursive debates, negotiation, mediation, conflict resolution, elections, 
public consultations, protests, and other decision making processes” 
(Lebel et al 2006: 4).  
Environmental governance therefore determines how resources are 
distributed, and formulates the rules that regulate access to these 
resources, and basis of their exploitation and ownership. The various 
stakeholders compete to influence the decision making process to meet 
their own ends, and in this sense governance becomes the product of an 
interaction between these stake holders. Among these stakeholders may 
be actors representing the state civil service, parliament, ethnic 
communities, NGOs and the civil society at large, as well as academic and 
research institutions, each with their own agenda. As such a political 
53 
 
process of contestation by the various stakeholders, governance 
invariably produces winners and losers. 
Because of their weak position in the power dynamics that structure the 
processes of environmental governance, the Il Chamus have been 
perennial losers in the political contestations determining access to 
resources in Kenya. Their weak political position is defined by exclusion 
from decision making processes, and lack of effective political 
representation. Intervention measures by the government, such as the 
introduction of Prosopis Juliflora, which was done without the consent of 
or consultation with the Il Chamus is a case in point.  
The Il Chamus also live in an area plagued by endemic violence, and 
added to this the acknowledged harsh ecological reality defined by 
general heat and aridity. This is now compounded by the effects of the 
invasive Prosopis Juliflora. In terms of livelihood security this constitutes a 
risky environment and the Il Chamus have to creatively and constantly 
adapt to the shifting nature of vulnerabilities caused by such a risky 
environment. Marginalized from the political processes emanating from 
the centre that have a direct impact on their daily lives, the Il Chamus 
seek to enforce participation in these political processes by appealing to 
the authority of legal regulation. According to Barnet (2006), the inability 
to participate in and influence decisions and structures that influence their 
livelihoods reinforces the vulnerability of marginal groups and keeps them 
marginalized. The Il Chamus can thus be seen as seeking to enforce 
participation in the political process through litigation and in this way 
reduce their vulnerability.  
Within the resilience theme, active participation in the political processes 
in which crucial livelihood outcomes are determined is crucial to reducing 
the vulnerability and enhancing the social resilience of communities like 
the Il Chamus that live in risky environments. Alcorn et al. have shown in 
their case study of the Dayak people’s social movement in Indonesia that 
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the erosion of ecological resilience can be effectively countered by social 
renewal. They contend that if the political system is inaccessible to certain 
communities who may wish to modify institutions in response to negative 
ecological feedback, then, during crises, ecological resilience will diminish 
until the system flips. Resilience depends on a vibrant, diverse and 
inclusive political atmosphere. They further posit that social movements 
through political action can prevent SESs moving to undesirable states if 
they successfully challenge the political system to accommodate their 
voices and their concerns about ecological feedback. (Alcorn et al. 2003: 
299-300). 
 
The Il Chamus have chosen litigation as a form of political action aimed at 
articulating their interests and thus secure their livelihood. This litigation 
is based on a discourse of marginalization and indigenous identity and is 
framed as a social justice and human rights issue. Litigation provides the 
Il Chamus with a space over which social justice struggles can be 
articulated and mediated upon. As such, it is used to enhance the 
participation of local people in the national political process and counter 
negative outcomes of environmental governance by increasing their 
effective access to resources, a crucial factor in resilience building. 
Where some communities are marginalized and disenfranchised, 
environmental governance decisions made by the state have no 
significant input from such communities. In such cases, litigation plays a 
key role in tempering these governance choices and mitigating their 
negative impacts on communities such as the Il Chamus that experience 
marginalization. Litigation predicated upon a political identity as a 
marginalized or an indigenous group opens up access to legal rights and 
protections that have been developed over time through the interaction of 
transnational advocacy groups, international and regional human rights 
mechanisms, national courts and academic institutions. The notion of 
indigenous rights has thus developed to become a powerful political tool 
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because being identified as such opens up access to recognized rights 
that have a direct impact on access to resources. Indigenous rights as 
defined and utilized today are themselves the product of a protracted 
process of political agitation and negotiation fronted by representatives of 
indigenous peoples themselves, experts, states and national and 
international NGOs at the highest level of political activity within the 
United Nations system. 
2.7 The role of law in resilience building 
In a general sense, the law is viewed as a tool that regulates and sets 
human conduct within certain limits, using as leverage the threat of 
punitive sanctions. The “rule of law”, in this respect, operates on a 
premise of legitimacy and general acceptance and its effectiveness 
depends on compliance by those subject to it.  
In a path breaking and novel approach, this study takes a different turn 
from the function of the rule of law as a means of controlling human 
behaviour, to a tool of resilience building. Based on the premise that 
access to resources is a key determinant of resilience, it takes litigation as 
a check on environmental governance crucial to determining effective 
access to resources, which access is itself positively linked to resilience.  
As a political process that involves contestation by different actors with 
different capabilities and agendas, environmental governance may result 
in unfavourable outcomes that may have a negative impact on the 
livelihood options of certain communities such as the Il Chamus. I argue 
that this has indeed been the case, and by addressing the political basis 
of such outcomes, litigation may result in a reconfiguration of political 
power that may thus have a redistributive effect on resources. The key 
contention of this thesis, therefore, is that litigation can influence the 
dynamics of access to resources by intervening in the process of 
governance. This is particularly useful in countering unfavourable 
outcomes that ensue from unequal power relations between the various 
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stakeholders in governance. It not only holds the relevant governance 
structures to account but also promotes the agendas of the litigants by 
invoking legal rights, as well as enforcing their participation in the political 
process.  
Current literature on the use of communal litigation as a tool (Comaroff 
and Comaroff 2009, Lynch 2011a, Lynch 2011b, Igoe 2006) focuses on its 
role in the strategic construction of ethnic or indigenous identities and on 
the efficacy of this activity in translating difference into value. For 
instance, Comaroff and Comaroff have noted a global rise in the use of 
litigation in processes of governance and particularly in the struggle for 
cultural identity. They have coined the term ‘lawfare’ to describe this use 
of legal means for political and economic ends (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2009: 56). They identify the  prominence of ‘lawfare’ in the growing 
influence of human rights advocacy, a proliferation of law based NGOs 
and increasing activity among arbiters of legal disputes that has led to an 
unprecedented growth in global jurisprudence.  
Igoe (2006), on the other hand, has looked at the construction indigenous 
identities by the Barbaig and Maasai communities in Tanzania as a 
response to the process of globalization. According to Igoe, there is 
nothing indigenous about the communities claiming the identity, and it is 
instead an effective “means to mobilize resources and moral, political, and 
legal advantage on a global stage- a strategy of ‘extraversion’ (Igoe 
2006: 401, quoting Bayart 2000 on strategies of extraversion in Africa). 
According to him such claims to identity are really efforts to connect to an 
international network of institutions, ideas, and money. 
In Kenya, Lynch (2011a and 2011b) has studied the Ogiek, Sengwer, 
Endorois and Pokot, and recognized the utility of indigenous identity as a 
legal strategy. She has shown how these communities have 
instrumentally and opportunistically harnessed the global discourses of 
indigeneity, marginalization, minority rights and environmental protection 
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to strengthen their claims to land and associated resources as well as 
enter new spaces of political action and diversify patronage.   
In an analysis of a legal decision by the ACHPR, Lynch (2011a) recognizes 
the successful deployment of ethnic difference in litigation by the 
Endorois, but cautions that such differentiation is inherently exclusive, 
and when validated by the courts as on this occasion, diverts attention 
from inequalities in wealth and power while encouraging increased 
territoriality. For Lynch, this creates an undue emphasis on ‘politics of 
recognition over politics of redistribution’. While Lynch clearly separates 
litigation from politics, this thesis considers litigation as part of the 
political process itself and therefore part of what Lynch describes as the 
neglected politics of redistribution.  
While the above mentioned literature does not consider litigation from a 
resilience concept point of view, the intended benefits of what they 
variously term lawfare (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009), strategies of 
extraversion (Bayart 2000, Igoe 2006, Lynch 2011,) or even strategic 
legal positioning (Lynch 2011a) are clear. For instance, Lynch has found 
that the ethnic differentiation articulated by resort to indigeneity and 
other forms of identity can be traced to “a common search for prosperity 
and security of tenure amidst underdevelopment and state failure”. 
Hence, an increasing scarcity of land and the ensuing competition leads to 
the “politicisation of identity as a means to protect and promote claims to 
ethnic terroir” (Lynch 2011b: 150, quoting Bates 2008: 92, 133). 
An important question addressed by this thesis and also considered by 
the above mentioned authors is about the usefulness of litigation. For 
instance, quoting lost cases by Barbaig and Maasai communities in 
Tanzania as well as Maasai in Kenya, Igoe assesses the legal pursuit of 
such claims as unsuccessful and based on this analysis he finds litigation 
as not beneficial to the communities( Igoe 2006: 405). The Comaroffs 
have also highlighted the fact that litigation does not always yield its 
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promise and is often biased towards the rich and powerful and in many 
cases seemingly promising or strong cases are lost. In many other cases, 
litigants end up losing even when they have ‘won’ in court due to weak or 
non-implementation of favourable court orders (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2009: 57). Lynch also rightly questions the value of courtroom victories in 
the face of unresponsive authorities (Lynch 2011a: 40). 
This thesis, however, takes the position that because litigation is both a 
technical and a social and political process, its resilience building effects 
necessarily go beyond the simple courtroom outcome of a case, such that 
even when cases are lost in court, or when the implementation of 
courtroom decisions is weak, positive outcomes are spread over time. In 
this context, litigation must be viewed as a process rather than an event 
with a single win or lose outcome. 
Thus, for the Il Chamus, litigation has: enforced their participation in the 
national political process; enhanced their access to international 
networks; smoothened internal relations by focusing their attention on a 
common external foe and reducing internal conflict and dissent; had an 
impact on their social institutions by providing an opportunity to enact 
and solidify community age-group roles; clarified contentious issues 
relating to indigenous identity, political representation, marginalization 
and the Prosopis weed in a way that has enhanced their effective access 
to resources. It is the positive relationship between the effective access to 
resources and resilience that marks litigation in this context as a 
resilience building mechanism rather than just a tool to regulate 
behaviour and enforce rules in the traditional sense. By highlighting the 
strong link between effective access to resources and resilience, this 
thesis therefore locates the resilience building capacity of litigation in the 
process of environmental governance. 
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Chapter 3: A brief outline of Il Chamus society: history and social 
organization. 
Introduction  
The Il Chamus have been able to carve out and hold on to a niche within 
what is generally acknowledged to be an arid and harsh environment 
characterized by extreme weather conditions, drought, disease and 
violence (see for instance Little 1992:18, Anderson 2002:20; Kiage and 
Liu 2009:1). Despite the harsh conditions of the environment in the Lake 
Baringo basin, the Il Chamus have shown remarkable resilience by 
maintaining a continuous presence in the area for at least two centuries.  
This chapter gives a brief outline of Il Chamus society, covering aspects of 
its history and social organization. It is broadly divided into two sections. 
The first section is an outline of a historical perspective of the Il Chamus 
that traces changes in their physical and social environment as well as 
their lifestyle orientations. Over their history, the Il Chamus have 
experienced lifestyle changes ranging from foraging, irrigation agriculture 
to various degrees of pastoralism. Fishing has remained a constant 
supplement to these different modes of subsistence ever since they 
settled around Lake Baringo. This historical transition is analysed within 
the resilience theory model of the adaptive cycle. The second section 
looks at some aspects of their social organization, focusing on the roles of 
clans and totems in the determination of societal roles. 
In this chapter, oral historical narratives recounted as folklore and oral 
literature recorded in field notes are used to complement and sometimes 
corroborate written source material. 
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3.1 The transformation of the Il Chamus pre-colonial system through the 
adaptive cycle 
This chapter identifies a complete adaptive cycle that starts from around 
the 1830s and covers the entire pre-colonial Il Chamus historical period to 
the beginning of colonial rule in the 1910s. During this period the Il 
Chamus society was transformed from a foraging based hunter/gatherer 
economy to one driven by irrigation agriculture. This irrigation economy, 
supplemented by trade in ivory, saw the Il Chamus location, then known 
as “Njemps”, develop into an important trading centre and stop-over for 
itinerant traders and voyagers. It eventually collapsed and gave way to a 
dominantly pastoral economy. The complete switch to pastoralism from 
around the 1920s onwards represents an exit of the system from the 
previous adaptive cycle and the beginning of a new cycle characterized by 
pastoralism and external regulation through state interventions. 
To put our analysis properly into the context of the adaptive cycle, the 
next section provides is a brief theoretical consideration of the concept. 
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Figure 1: the adaptive cycle9. 
Within the adaptive cycle, SESs are conceived to pass through four 
phases: r, K, Ω and α. Phase r is characterized by growth and 
exploitation, usually leading to a conservation phase, K. During these two 
phases, the system displays reasonably predictable dynamics. The phase 
from r to K is also known as the fore-loop, and represents the slow, 
incremental phase of growth and accumulation. As the system 
progressively settles into the K phase, resources get increasingly locked in 
and the system becomes more rigid and less responsive to external 
shocks and stimuli. Invariably, this phase is followed by a turbulent 
collapse and release phase, Ω that quickly gives way to a phase of 
reorganization, α. The phase from Ω to α is also known as the back-loop, 
                                               
9 Adapted from Gunderson and Holling (2002: 37). Graphic design by courtesy of Noah 
Raford. 
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and it is here that reorganization and renewal take place. The 
reorganization phase may be rapid or slow and innovation and new 
opportunities are possible. Unlike the r and K phases, the Ω and α phases 
display unpredictable dynamics. A subsequent α phase follows which may 
or may not be similar to the previous α phase. Where a new path is 
chosen, as in the present case where there is a switch from irrigation to 
pastoralism, the system will exit the previous cycle and follow a new 
adaptive cycle. As a cautionary observation, the adaptive cycle is not 
necessarily regular; systems can move back and forth between phases 
and follow different pathways (Walker et al 2004: 2; Gunderson and 
Hollig 2002). 
The next section describes the evolution of Il Chamus lifestyle orientation 
through historical phases that follow their evolution from foragers to 
irrigating agriculturalists and eventually pastoralists, making references to 
phases of adaptive cycle model from α to Ω where appropriate. 
3.1.1 Origins of the Il Chamus: growth and exploitation (the r phase) 
The Il Chamus claim to have come to the Lake Baringo basin at a time 
period that is out of the scope of any written sources and only covered in 
the realm of popular folklore. This orally perpetuated historical account of 
their origins is however of immense symbolic value to the Il Chamus 
especially in the light of contemporary international legal discourse on 
indigenous and minority group rights. It links them to an “ancestral” place 
to which they claim aboriginal occupation and accords them a unique 
identity that is distinct from surrounding communities. As will be seen 
later in this thesis, the nexus between occupational history and cultural 
uniqueness helps to strengthen their claim to the status of an indigenous 
or minority group. Being recognized as such allows them to claim certain 
protections under various instruments of national and international law. 
This aspect is explored further in Chapters 6 and 7 where an analysis of 
court cases by the Il Chamus is undertaken. 
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Both oral and written accounts are clear that the Il Chamus never 
possessed sufficient amounts of cattle in their early history to sustain a 
pastoral lifestyle (See for example Little 1998: 445). They were initially 
hunting and gathering and their settlement at Lake Baringo probably 
occurred during the latter half of the eighteenth century. This period is 
described in Il Chamus oral history as a period of great wandering, famine 
and poverty. It is a time when impoverished Il Chamus led the life of 
mobile hunter gatherers. The earliest age group recalled in popular Il 
Chamus folklore is Il Meichopo of the Il Keroi clan. It is recounted to be a 
time when people still wore skins and children run around naked. The 
name Il Meichopo itself means ‘the naked’. None of David Anderson, Peter 
Little or Paul Spencer, who between them possess unquestionably 
authoritative information on the Il Chamus, mentions this age group. This 
is ostensibly because it is impossible to corroborate oral information 
regarding this period with any archival or other secondary evidence. 
Spencer, also on account of oral history, identifies Il Karrankuti, which he 
describes as bordering “on the timelessness of mythical events, long, long 
ago” (Spencer 1998: 138). For this reason I take it as anecdotal rather 
than factual evidence as it forms part of the folklore recounted by Il 
Chamus oral historians. 
This early group of Il Chamus settlers was, as recounted in folklore, 
descended from a southbound migratory party of a Maa speaking group. 
Attracted by the resources that the lake had to offer, they settled around 
the shores of Lake Baringo. They found here a settled clan known as Il 
Keroi with whom they integrated. The origin of the Il Keroi is not quite 
known but they are thought to have had strong Kalenjin and possibly 
some Uasin Gishu Maasai elements, and therefore already drew their 
composition from a diverse pool (Vossen 1978, quoted in Little 1985: 
244).  
Today, clans associated with the Il Keroi clan claim to be the progeny of 
“true” Il Chamus (see also Anderson 1998: 142). This coming together of 
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fairly different ethnic entities to forge a common identity was a common 
occurrence during this period. Bollig, for instance, in respect of the Pokot,  
writes of the 1750s to 1830s as a period of “becoming”, where identities 
are subject to profound changes with violent warfare playing a big role in 
the process (Bollig 2006:22-24). 
These early settlers soon grew in number and started to move and settle 
further away from the lake shores, practicing some early form of 
agriculture. They made a fortress to secure themselves from the 
numerically and militarily superior groups such as the Turkana, the Pokot, 
and sections of the greater Maasai such as the Loogol-ala Maasai and the 
Laikipiak Maasai. This fortress was located at the present day Sintaan 
(see Map 5) and was heavily fenced. They named the settlement 
Manyatta Il Kateeyo.  
Inside, they built some tall granaries made of Bamboo reeds and thatched 
with grass. Sentries, operating from vantage positions atop the granaries, 
were employed to look out for intruders. According to folklore, it was in 
this Manyatta that the first irrigation canal was dug for the purposes of 
growing millet and sorghum, an event credited to the time when Il Petaa 
age group were Moran (around 1846). How the Il Chamus developed their 
irrigation technology is not quite known, though Spencer claims that they 
discovered irrigation by serendipity (Spencer 1998: 139).  
This period, between 1830s to 1850s, when the Il Chamus are gradually 
moving away from a foraging subsistence economy and starting to 
incorporate irrigation technology and accumulate knowledge and 
resources, corresponds to the r phase of the adaptive cycle. 
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3.1.2 Il Chamus development of irrigation agriculture: towards 
conservation (the K phase) 
Internal conflicts led to the splitting of the original Il Chamus settlement 
into two, later referred to as Il Chamus Lekeper and Il Chamus Leabori. 
Lekeper were situated in the location nowadays known as Il Chamus 
(Njemps) location, formerly referred to as Njemps Ndogo. Leabori were 
found in Il Ng’arua, Ng’ambo, Salabani, Kiserian, and Rugus locations, 
together comprising the former Njemps Kubwa (see map 5).  
 
During this period the Il Chamus continued to develop their irrigation 
agriculture. They also did fishing and kept some animals, mainly small 
stock. Early European explorers and ethnographers were impressed by 
the fortified Il Chamus villages as well as their irrigation agriculture and 
fishing. Thompson (1887: 264), for instance, describes what he saw of 
the Il Chamus system of irrigation: 
 
“…wonderfully ingenious system of irrigation by artificial canals of (for 
them) great magnitude. They construct dams across the deep channel of 
the Guaso Tigirish10 and thus raise the level of the water to that of the 
plain, and then, by an intricate network of channels, they spread the 
precious fluid over a large area, and raise their millet and melons…” 
 
The basic technology of the irrigation system was the damming of water 
from the sources and subsequent transportation of the water to the fields. 
According to Anderson, water for irrigation was diverted from the Perkerra 
and Molo rivers, and the technology was a furrow system that involved 
the construction of boulder and brushwood dams from which water was 
carried a fair distance to the irrigated fields which span over several 
square miles growing mainly sorghum and millet (Anderson 1988: 527, 
Spencer 1998: 140).  
                                               
10 In today’s names, this likely refers to the confluence of the Molo and Perkerra rivers. 
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The success of the Il Chamus irrigation system also depended to a great 
deal on the availability of water from the Molo and Perkerra rivers, as well 
as the botanical knowledge of the various varieties of millet and melon 
that they grew. More importantly, however, was the system of social 
control and management of the irrigation system which was overseen by 
the Olamal, a council of elders. The next section considers the role of the 
Olamal in the social control of the irrigation system. 
 
3.1.3 The Olamal and the social control of the irrigation system 
 
Because the irrigation was primarily a communal exercise with each 
family contributing labour towards common activities such as 
maintenance of the irrigation canals (Little 1985: 245), communal 
discipline through cooperation and compliance was of crucial importance.  
 
The Olamal oversaw all aspects of the irrigation enterprise including the 
settling of any disputes that may have arisen. They exercised complete 
control over the irrigation system, deciding on the allocation of both land 
and water (Spencer 1998: 141).   
 
The system therefore relied on the complete submission to the authority 
of the Olamal. In explaining the source of their seemingly absolute 
authority, Spencer traced the etymology of the word Olamal to the 
greater Maasai, where it referred to “a ritual delegation with coercive 
powers and a propitious aura so long as the authority of their combined 
will meets with total and unquestioning respect. Where the integrity of an 
Olamal is violated, however minor the infringement, misfortune is 
expected to follow... the Olamal insisted on complete discipline and 
resisted the emergence of any factions or cliques. They were particularly 
active during the period of preparation towards the end of the dry season, 
involving repairs to the irrigation channels and digging individual plots. 
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They also met regularly in the growing season, except when the ground 
was so well watered with rain that the irrigation system became 
superfluous, literally. No one could sow or harvest his crop until the 
Olamal had given their permission, and this would be finally ratified with a 
blessing by an elder of Kabis or of Lamaee.” (Spencer 1998: 141). Thus 
the Olamal did not just exercise complete authority over the irrigation 
system but their authority had an aura of mystical significance and was 
accompanied by ritual, overseeing all aspects of the irrigation system 
from planting to harvesting. 
 
The ritual connection to the authority of the Olamal was also observed by 
Thompson in his travels among the Il Chamus, though he may not have 
recognized its significance at that time:  
 
“One night I was awakened by hearing great singing and dancing, as if 
the best of fun was going on in the village across the liver... the revelers 
were moving along the river banks. Then they stopped and howled for 
about an hour to Ngai. This done, they were addressed by some of the 
elders, and finally they crossed the stream and proceeded up its course. 
The singing had been a prayer to Ngai to assist in the damming up of the 
stream for the purpose of spreading its waters into their fields. This 
operation occupied them several days. Their efforts were finally crowned 
with success, and the canals overflowed with their life-giving fluid” 
(Thompson 1887: 312). 
 
Thus, the Olamal relied on complete compliance with their authority and a 
threat of a curse from the elders or even expulsion from the community 
ensured that they were obeyed. Spencer also adds another dimension to 
the continued submission to the authority of the Olamal, suggesting that 
during a peaceful period when the community is not engaged in war, the 
transition through Moranhood is used to inculcate principles of compliance 
and discipline (Spencer 1998: 148). 
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While the Il Chamus were themselves not at war, they were affected by 
violence taking place around them, and to minimize chances of attacks, 
they avoided keeping large numbers of cattle so as not to attract the 
bigger predatory communities (Spencer 1998: 150). They were thus able 
to maintain a peaceful existence in the middle of violence. 
 
This violence was defined by warfare among various sections of the 
greater Maasai communities. It was armed conflict and violence referred 
to as “the Iloikop wars” that lasted almost 40 years, from 1840s to 
1880s. According to Anderson these wars pitted different sections of Maa 
speakers (Il-Oshon)11 against each other in conflict over cattle and access 
to pasture and water (Anderson 2002: 24; Waller 1976:532).  
 
During this period of warfare the Il Chamus were still confined to their 
two fortified villages by the southern edge of Lake Baringo, where they 
continued to expand their irrigation agriculture, successfully growing 
sorghum and millet. These wars eventually proved to be an important 
source of labour for the Il Chamus irrigation system, which contributed to 
the development of irrigation as a commercial enterprise. 
 
The Il Chamus capitalized on the availability of displaced and destitute 
pastoralists who became a valuable source of labour, and they 
strengthened their commercial viability by absorbing them as refugees 
into their ranks. There was a steady rise during this period towards 
economic and social prosperity. Some of the refugees, maintaining a 
pastoral ideal in their outlook, saw a spell in Il Chamus territory and 
agriculture as a chance to rebuild their stock in cattle. Many of them were 
fellow Maa speakers (such as Toijo, Loosekelai, Uasin Gishu and Laikipiak) 
                                               
11 Sections or Il-Oshon of the Maa speakers involved included but were not limited to 
Loosekelai, Il Purko, Uasin Gishu, Laikipiak, Il Toijo, Keekonyukie, Damat, Kaputiei, 
Loodokilari and Loita. 
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who eventually integrated themselves and became Il Chamus (Anderson 
2002: 27).  
 
It is to be noted, however, that Il Chamus irrigation was not unique within 
the pre-colonial communities of East Africa, and Anderson suggests that 
in fact irrigation appears to have been an integral part of the subsistence 
strategy by pastoral communities (Anderson 1988: 523). Other examples 
include:  the relatively technologically simple irrigation by the Turkana on 
the floodplains of the Kerio and Turkwel rivers; the flood irrigation by the 
Pokomo of River Tana; the furrow irrigation plains of the Taita and 
Taveta; and the furrow plains of the Marakwet escarpment and Weiwei 
valley near the Cherangani hills. In fact, indigenous irrigation was so 
widespread as to be the norm rather than the exception (Anderson 1988: 
523-527). What was therefore unique about the Il Chamus was the 
successful orientation of their irrigation towards a commercial market 
serviced by ivory traders and other travellers, if only for a limited period 
of time.  
 
3.1.4 Success and Stability of Il Chamus irrigation: conservation (the K 
phase) 
 
During the decade between 1870 and 1880 the Il Chamus rose to the 
peak of economic success from their irrigation and ivory trade. “Njemps”, 
as the area was then known, developed into an important trading post for 
Swahili itinerants and ivory traders. Their irrigation technology had 
reached an optimum level. Not only did they enjoy good returns from 
irrigation but the area had plenty of wildlife, including Elephants. Major 
Powell-Cotton describes it thus:   
“The pasturage must be exceedingly rich, judging from the large herds of 
game which frequent this part, and the excellent condition in which we 
found their meat…Hartebeest, Giraffe, Rhino, Warthog, Lion, Serval, 
Hyena, Black-backed Jackal, Ostrich, Zebra, Eland, Oryx, Waterbuck, 
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Grant’s Gazelle, Stein bock, Duiker, Dik-dik, and Leopard” (Powell-Cotton 
1904: 316). Thomson too relates shooting elephant at Njemps (Thomson 
1884: 709).   
 
“Njemps” was during this time an important source of ivory shot locally 
and became a strategic base for ivory trade. Early European expeditions 
took advantage of the good elephant numbers in the region and are said 
to have amassed significant fortunes (Anderson 2004: 36, 37). This 
period therefore marked a special golden age for the Il Chamus. “Njemps” 
built a reputation as an important commercial hub, offering food and rest 
to traders and travellers alike who passed through Baringo.  
 
Swahili ivory and cattle traders from the coast, European voyagers, local 
pastoralists and hunters thus became part of a mutually supporting 
network that helped to raise the status of “Njemps” as an important 
trading post. Soon, the European powers of Britain and Germany took 
note of the strategic importance of “Njemps”. 
Viewing “Njemps” as a strategic centre especially in terms of their interest 
in the lucrative ivory business, the Imperial British East African Company 
(IBEAC), acting as colonial agents of the British, entered into a treaty with 
the Il Chamus12. 
Similarly, Dr. Carl Peters noted the strategic importance and potential of 
“Njemps”. In a letter to the German Emin Pasha Committee, he wrote:  
“A Baringo nation would be of the very greatest importance for the 
general opening up of Central Africa…I consider it equally important in the 
interests of civilisation and of a general European trade to defend, and 
                                               
12 Treaty No. 73 of 14th July 1890, referred to as “Treaty between IBEAC and the Chief of 
Njemps”, PRO FO 2/140, quoted in Anderson, DM: Massacre at Ribo Post: Expansion and 
Expediency on the Colonial Frontier in East Africa, The International Journal of African 
Historical Studies, Volume 37, No. 1 (2004), pp. 33-54, at p. 38 
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permanently to secure, the colony of intelligent and submissive Wakuafi13 
dwelling here from the destruction with which they are continually 
threatened at the hands of the Massai and Wasuk14. In a word, I consider 
the establishment of a strong European station by the Baringo to be called 
for in the interest of the whole further development of civilisation in 
Eastern and Central Africa”. Dr. Carl Peters also concluded a treaty with 
the Il Chamus, offering German protection to them. As a mark of 
authority established over the Il Chamus, he hoisted a German flag at 
“Njemps” (Peters 1891: 272-273). 
Despite the promising potential of Baringo as a future trading and 
administrative centre, a collapse of the successful irrigation led economy 
was imminent. The next phase saw many factors such as drought, 
disease, and renewed warfare combining to eventually halt the growth of 
“Njemps”. 
3.1.5 Collapse of the Il Chamus irrigation economy and the advent of 
colonial rule (the Ω phase) 
During this phase, the fortune built around the Ivory trade and the 
success of irrigation agriculture began to diminish, and with it started the 
disintegration of the Il Chamus community and a decline from their peak.  
 
Becoming a victim of their own success, many among their substantial 
refugee population left with their newfound wealth to get re-established 
as pastoralists. This left them without the labour to work their elaborate 
irrigation industry. In addition to this, natural disasters occurred that had 
a serious impact on their irrigation, initially through flush floods that 
diverted the course of the Perkerra River and later through prolonged 
periods of drought and famine as well as epidemics of small pox, 
rinderpest and bovine pleuropneumonia. As a result, the Il Chamus found 
                                               
13 Wakuafi was a generic term used by early colonial explorers to refer to peripheral 
groups such as the Ndorobo. In this case Dr. Carl Peters is referring to the Il Chamus, 
who were generally considered as one of the many “Wakuafi” groups. 
14 Wasuk, or the Suk, was used in reference to the Pokot. 
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they could no longer sustain the unique economy that grew during the 
golden age of expansion and prosperity.  
 
The combined impact of famine and disease led to another break-out of 
war among the surrounding Maasai sections, this time even more vicious, 
and the Il Chamus are recorded to have been so badly affected that they 
briefly went back to a life of foraging, a state in which Thompson found 
them in 1884 (Thompson 1887: 312; Anderson 2002: 34). This violence 
and disease led to a vacation of the area as the remaining Maasai groups 
sought better opportunities elsewhere, with some going as far as into the 
Central province. This contributed to the area being seen by potential 
Colonial settlers as a Terra Nullius “ripe for occupation” (See here Morgan 
1963: 140,146). Colonial annexation of the adjoining highlands was soon 
to become a reality, beginning from around 1911. 
 
By 1897 Baringo had already lost its status as an important trading 
centre. Austin (1899: 307) writes: 
 “Njemps, formerly a center for Swahili caravans proceeding to Kavirondo 
and the great lake, has now sunk into comparative oblivion. Food is 
exceedingly scarce and chiefly brought in by natives from Kamasia”. 
The irrigation system broke down for want of labour and also due to the 
Perkerra River changing its course as a result of heavy flooding (Spencer 
1998: 175; Anderson 2002: 46, 47). As the irrigation system at “Njemps” 
collapsed, the entry of colonial authority steered the Baringo SES onto a 
new path, one where pastoralism was to play a dominant role. 
Thus, from the beginning of the transformation of the Il Chamus economy 
from hunting and gathering up to the collapse of the irrigation system we 
have been able to trace the moments of a complete adaptive cycle. From 
the 1830s to 1850s, we identify a phase of gradual growth and 
accumulation (r) during which the Il Chamus, through hunting and 
gathering as well as harvests from a basic irrigation technology, start to 
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accumulate resources that begin to transform their economy. From the 
1850s to 1880s, we see a K phase where irrigation develops to its 
maximum potential capable of responding to the demand of traders and 
travellers. During this period, the Il Chamus location (Njemps) develops 
to a significant hub. Natural disasters in the form of floods, drought and 
disease, as well as the flight of newly wealthy Il Chamus and former 
refugees mean the irrigation system lacked sufficient labour and 
technology to cope. Accumulated resources previously locked in the 
system are released as wealth is converted to cattle stock. The 
transformation of the system to a cattle economy comes with new rules 
that see the authority of the Olamal, which was dependent on a 
successful irrigation system and peaceful submission to their authority, 
begin to wane. The entry of the colonial administration that restricts 
raiding from larger groups as well as providing a source of significant 
cattle stock for the Il Chamus sets the system on a new path of 
pastoralism. 
 
The resilience of the irrigation system during this adaptive cycle can be 
traced to a number of factors: the availability of refugees from the inter-
ethnic warfare surrounding the Il Chamus, as well as the Il Chamus policy 
of welcoming and swiftly integrating outsiders into their midst ensured a 
reliable supply of labour; the deliberate keeping by the Il Chamus of 
limited stocks of cattle made them less attractive to larger predatory 
communities, keeping their location relatively safe; an effective social 
organization system led by the Olamal was able to ensure cooperation 
and submission to authority, leading to a very efficient system of 
production. Finally a flexible attitude and willingness to adapt to new 
forms of production meant that the Il Chamus were able to reorganize 
and embrace new systems and technologies, contributing to the overall 
resilience of the Il Chamus as a group. In the next section, we see how 
the Il Chamus adapted to a new system oriented towards pastoralism. 
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This system however had to endure increased intervention from the 
colonial authorities. 
 
3.1.6 A period of reorganization and renewal: colonial rule, the switch to 
pastoralism and the beginning of state interventions. 
 
The advent of colonial rule during the last decade of the 19th century 
brought with it annexation of former pastoral grazing land and a policy of 
containment of the pastoral communities within designated reserves. Loss 
for the greater Maasai was gain for the Il Chamus. Proximity of the Il 
Chamus and Tugen reserves to the former territories used by the greater 
Maasai groups opened up to them access to grazing lands previously 
unavailable. With the presence of colonial authority now limiting the 
predatory instincts of the larger groups, the Il Chamus were able to make 
a move towards a lifestyle of predominant pastoralism.  
 
Apart from the colonial policy that confined local communities to reserves, 
colonial rule had a major influence on the switch of the Il Chamus to 
pastoralism in another way: a policy of violent pacification that involved 
so called “punitive expeditions” against communities perceived by the 
colonialists to be recalcitrant. These expeditions also involved capture and 
confiscation of cattle some of which were used to reward allies. 
 
3.1.7 The role of violent expeditions 
 
The image of violence as an enforcement tool was reinforced by colonial 
“punitive expeditions” which involved the use of armed violence. These 
punitive expeditions were violent, ruthless and efficient, and contributed 
to a significant degree in the complete switch of Il Chamus community to 
full time pastoralism. The British were not averse to allying themselves to 
certain communities and then launching punitive raids against others 
perceived to have wronged their allies, as the following examples show. 
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As allies of newly arrived Uasin Gishu Maasai into the Eldama Ravine 
area, the British launched a punitive raid against the Tugen in 1896, in an 
attack described by Anderson as “brief but brutal”, rewarding the Uasin 
Gishu with captured stock as compensation for alleged earlier Tugen 
raids. A further raid in May 1897 by combined British and Maasai troops 
descended on the Tugen inhabited areas of Eldume Ravine, killing over 
100 Tugen and capturing over 300 head of cattle and 8000 shoats as well 
as razing all crops to the ground. This barbaric act of brutality was 
followed by two further ones in 1899 and 1900 and went some way 
towards breaking the Tugen spirit of resistance towards the British 
(Anderson 2004: 40, 41). 
 
The British were similarly eager to “pacify” the Turkana and justified their 
raids against the Turkana with the need to protect other British subjects 
who were loyal. Further, Turkana relations with Abyssinia were seen as a 
threat to British interests. The Turkana felt the force of British punitive 
expeditions during the decade between 1910 and 1920, referred to by the 
Southern Turkana as Ekaru Apumpum (time of gunfire). Raids in 1911-
1915 and 1917-1918 (the Lapurr patrol) were especially devastating for 
the Turkana, dispersing clans and resulting on massive loss of cattle and 
emigration, and a general disruption of lifestyle (Lokuruka and Lokuruka 
2006: 130). During one such expedition in 1915 by a combined force of 
400 King’s African Rifles (KAR) troops under the command of 18 British 
officers, 400 Turkana were killed and great number of livestock 
confiscated (Collins 2006: 108). The devastating impact of this attack was 
made worse by the infamous Lappur patrol of 1917-1918, involving a 
stronger contingent of British allied forces made up of Sudanese troops, 
the KAR, and an assortment of levies from groups opposed to the 
Turkana. This force of over 5,000 well-armed men resulted in cattle losses 
into the hundreds of thousands and an unverifiable number of human 
casualties possibly into the thousands, but surely an annihilation from 
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which the Turkana would never recover (McCabe 2004: 50, Collins 2006: 
117). It was credited with finally breaking Turkana resistance. 
 
These punitive patrols by the British were not simply exercises in 
“pacification” or helping of allies to settle scores, but they were also 
instrumental in demonstrating with devastating and brutal effect the 
might of the British Empire, a vital aid in spreading out a thin 
administrative capacity. Fear of the British gun was meant to drive 
resistant groups into submission to British authority. The Il Chamus were 
clear beneficiaries of this particular British policy, as the following account 
about British raids on the Pokot shows. 
 
As allies of the British, the Il Chamus provided foot soldiers and local 
intelligence that aided the British with their punitive missions and in the 
process they benefited greatly in terms of British protection and cattle 
bounty. The devastating impact of this alliance is perhaps best described 
by Anderson, who describes one particular revenge attack by British and 
Il Chamus allied forces on the Pokot at Ribo Post in 1901: 
 
 “The ‘very drastic punishment’ meted out by this patrol was among the 
most brutal of any punitive expedition in the history of colonial East Africa 
, with approximately 300 Africans being slaughtered and over 500 cattle 
and 10,000 sheep and goats being seized. All villages in the vicinity of 
Ribo Post were razed to the ground and all grain stores were emptied by 
the troops” (Anderson 2004: 50). 
 
This, and other punitive raids in which the Il Chamus participated with 
their British allies, was, according to Anderson, significant in the shift of 
the Il Chamus towards pastoralism:  
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“The British misadventure15 at Ribo Post even accelerated the decline of 
the Chamus settlements as a reliable centre of food supply on the caravan 
route. The cattle gained by Il Chamus involvement in the punitive raids in 
the Kerio Valley were used to enable a shift in production away from 
cultivation and towards livestock husbandry.”(Anderson 2004: 54).  
As allies of the British, the Il Chamus were beneficiaries of these raids 
both in terms of protection from stronger groups afforded by their 
association with the British but also in terms of stock. 
 
By 1920, the Il Chamus had definitely become pastoralist in orientation. 
“Njemps” had lost its position as a commercial hub and the Ivory trade in 
the region had become less lucrative with increasing interest from the 
colonial authorities who introduced new restrictions and taxes (Anderson 
2002). Boosted by the acquired cattle stock from their alliance with the 
British, the Il Chamus wholly embraced pastoralism.  
 
3.1.8 Towards a new adaptive cycle: pastoralism and state interventions 
Il Chamus pastoralism set the system towards the path of a new adaptive 
cycle, the beginning of which was fraught with many challenges posed by 
drought, disease and the reconfiguration of pastoral resources as a result 
of the entry of European settler elite into the area and the consequent 
implementation of a Native Reserve policy. The devastating effects of a 
serious drought in the Baringo basin at the end of the 1920s, followed 
soon by a nationwide invasion of locusts towards the end of 1928 greatly 
affected the SES of the region. The extensive damage caused by the 
locust infestation alone, which took a special team of colonial officers to 
put under control using burning, spraying and bran baiting cost an 
estimated £55,000 over the colony (Annual Colonial Reports, No. 1510, 
Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Report for 1929: 18-19). Measured 
against the image of a supposed ‘granary’ (Little 1982), this created the 
                                               
15 The 300 or so African casualties were a rather high price to pay as a “punishment”. 
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impression of an area in the process of serious environmental 
degradation.  
The colonial government, following the recommendations of the Kenya 
Land Commission report16 (KLC 1934) which, while recognizing the 
economic potential of African held land reserves, felt that African farmers 
and pastoralists lacked the scientific know how which was necessary to 
effectively exploit the resources under their control. Moreover, it was felt 
that African farming and herding practices, if unchecked, would inevitably 
lead to desertification (KLC 1934: 559). 
The colonial government then felt it necessary to intervene at policy level 
on the environmental management of the African reserves. The African 
Land Development Board (ALDEV) was thus established in 1946. It was 
intended to guide development in the so called arid and semi-arid lands 
(ASAL) of the country, including Baringo. Its main focus was on the 
development and preservation of water resources as well as rangeland 
conservation. It was to follow the recommendations of the Kenya Land 
Commission Report 1934 and oversee measures to reduce herd sizes 
within regulated grazing schemes (Anderson 2002).  
Recognizing the potential of the so called ASALs, the colonial government 
adopted a more comprehensive policy framework that integrated the 
ASALs. This policy was aimed at maximizing the agricultural potential of 
Kenya as a whole through intensification, mechanization and 
commercialization. The “Swynnerton Plan” thus aimed to harness the 
potential of the ASALs through perceived “best practices” of the day, in 
tandem with intensive agriculture in the more productive areas of the 
colony in order achieve a significant boost in the Gross National Product 
(GNP). 
                                               
16 The National Archives: Report of the Kenya Land Commission 1934. Reference number 
CAB/24/248. 
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The underlying perception and driving logic behind both ALDEV and the 
Swynnerton Plan was however that traditional agricultural and pastoral 
practices were not only economically unproductive but were also a 
growing threat to the environment. They therefore went against the 
desired objectives of development of the ASAL which required modern 
intensive cattle production methods and investment in infrastructure such 
as boreholes, cattle dips, veterinary services, pasture, irrigation and 
others. 
Traditional methods were thus perceived as directly opposed to the 
colonial government’s development agenda, and this carried through even 
after independence. According to Little (Little 1982:7), both the colonial 
and post-colonial governments can be seen in their formulation of policy 
as being anti-pastoral in orientation as such policies have served to 
consign pastoralism to a peripheral role.  
State intervention then became an integral part of the regulatory 
mechanism of the SES, and this continued into the post-colonial era, and 
has had a major impact on the vulnerability context of the Il Chamus. 
Seen as unfavourable outcomes of environmental governance in this 
study, all the major aspects of Il Chamus vulnerability (Prosopis juliflora, 
marginalization and violence) can be linked in some way to state 
interventions and policy. These aspects are explored further in Chapters 
5, 6 and 7. The next section considers some aspects of Il Chamus social 
organization. 
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3.2 Some aspects of Il Chamus social organization: clans and totems 
 
Given the “melting pot” nature of the Il Chamus community, clans play a 
very important role in the anchoring of individual claims to Il Chamus 
ancestry. Il Chamus clans have a sort of hierarchy of importance 
depending on their history of accretion into the Il Chamus core 
community, which consequently informs their claim to certain physical 
and ritual domains, as well as leadership positions. Il Chamus clans claim 
their affiliation to either the Il Keroi or Il Toijo clans. Being a community 
of immigrants, only the Il Keroi clan could claim aboriginal status, and 
clans linked to the Keroi are considered to be “true” Il Chamus. Clans 
linked to the Il Toijo are strongly associated with the Samburu. A 
significant number of the Il Toijo was accepted into the Il Chamus as 
destitute pastoralists from Samburu around the 1840s following defeat by 
the Turkana. (Little 1992:28, 29).  
 
The relationship between the Il Chamus and Samburu can be seen in the 
association between some Chamus Il Toijo clans and their Samburu 
counterparts. For instance, the Loibuor Kichu clan in Il Chamus claims a 
close relationship to the Lorokichu and Pusikichu clans in Samburu and do 
not intermarry.  
 
The subsequent dominant position of the Il Toijo within the Il Chamus 
clan system is due to the cattle husbandry traditions they brought with 
them. Their influence, wealth and prestige grew the more pastoralism 
took a prominent role in the economic outlook of the Il Chamus. It must 
be remembered that refugees were absorbed into the Il Chamus 
community as individuals (Spencer 1998:137) and only later did they try 
to reconstitute themselves into their former clans, a process driven by the 
existence of sufficient numbers and a common clan history. In this 
process some clans (mostly those affiliated to the Il Toijo) retained their 
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former clan identities, while others were completely “Il Chamusized”17, as 
for example were elements of Uasin Gishu and Laikipiak Maasai who were 
absorbed by clans affiliated to the Il Keroi such as the Il Mae and the Il 
Kapis. This dual clan structure based on an Il Keroi/Il Toijo dichotomy has 
been kept alive till today (Little 1998: 447). 
 
Closely linked to Il Chamus clans are totems. To certain clans are ascribed 
certain ritual functions depending on the stake they claim to have in the Il 
Chamus universe. These ritual functions are then symbolized by totems, 
which are highlighted and observed both in daily life and on special 
occasions. Totems also serve as a constant reminder of affiliation to 
particular clans and their observance serve to cement clan relations and 
in some cases regulate the use of environmental resources. According to 
Spencer, clans also serve to provide security, constrain behaviour and 
accumulate reputation which can enhance or diminish marriage ability 
(Spencer 1998:159).  
 
Totems anchor individuals to clans, but they also play an important part 
in the regulation of daily life and are taken quite seriously by the Il 
Chamus. The import of Il Chamus clans and totems was brought home to 
me one Sunday morning on a boat ride from Kiserian to Island Camp, 
where a group of local Christians were going to celebrate Sunday mass. 
With the boat ready to leave and the driver already revving the engines, 
some keen observers in the delegation determined that the trip could not 
start until a certain condition was met. A couple then proceeded to 
disembark and wade back to dry land from where they came back some 
time later with a third gentleman and happily declared the boat ready to 
go. In what must surely be a controversial observation at the expense of 
the Christian faith of most of the delegation, it turned out that the boat 
could not leave without the “blessing” of a member of the Il Toimal clan 
                                               
17 Term used by Little (Little 1992: 27) to denote cultural assimilation of an in-coming 
group by the Il Chamus. 
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and specifically of the Leparsere family who had to be fetched on this 
occasion. This gesture of deference to a clan-specific obligation 
(symbolized by totem) was a very specific demonstration of the significant 
meaning attached to clan and totem, showing in this case the blending of 
Il Chamus totemic obligation and Christian faith. Below is a table 
summarizing Il Chamus clan totems and their significance as existing at 
the time of my field-study.  
 
 
Clan Totem Explanation 
IlToimal (Leparsere lineage) Fish (Supore). Have ritual power over the lake 
and can bless it to facilitate 
good fishing or to cure illness. 
A sick person intending to 
bathe in the lake as part of 
some treatment has first to 
seek the blessings of a 
member of this clan. 
Il Masula Thorn (Lkukwei). A person suffering any form of 
injury inflicted by thorns would 
seek the blessings of a 
member of this clan for quick 
recovery. 
Il Parasero Tick (Lmacheri). A member of this clan can cure 
tick related afflictions usually 
by applying their saliva on the 
point of the tick bite. 
Loimisi Syphilis (Mirika). Using the fruit of the Lapsekei 
plant, members of this clan are 
claimed to have the power to 
cast a syphilis causing spell on 
a perceived wrongdoer. 
Il Kesiani Aloe Vera (Sukuroi), Nose 
(Nkume), Sneeze (Nkising’at), 
wild dog (Suyan). 
Have the power to curse using 
Aloe Vera. A sneeze by an Il 
Kesiani during a conversation 
signifies a lie by the speaker. 
They can also cast a spell to 
divert wild dogs and protect 
their animals from danger. 
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Lwara Fire (Nkima) Can cure injuries and illness 
related to fire, usually by 
applying saliva on the affected 
area. 
Lukumwae Throat (Lgoso). Have power to cure all manner 
of afflictions of the throat such 
as sore throats, persistent 
coughs and the like. 
Sakaam Land (Nkupoore e nkop). Mediate on matters of land 
purification, soil fertility, 
pasture and rainfall 
(rainmaking). 
Il Mae Crane (Nkaitole), Millet 
(Ntapa), Soil (Nkuluponi), 
Earth-crack (Lbaat). 
Members of the Il Mae clan are 
the earthly protectors of the 
crane. A person found to have 
killed a crane must undergo a 
cleansing ritual overseen by an 
Il Mae, during which they are 
smeared over the whole body 
by a mixture of curd and blood 
before taking a bath. Il Mae 
women are especially pure and 
are may offer prayers to 
cleanse irrigation canals of 
such impurities as may be 
caused by human faeces for 
instance before sowing of 
millet. 
Parsaina Crocodile (Nkinyang’). Can cast a spell to cause a 
crocodile attack on a perceived 
offender. 
Il Kapis Millet (Ntapa, share totem with 
Il Mae), Mair (a green, grain 
eating bird), Spleen (Ntanun). 
A millet field blessed by an Il 
Mae daughter is assured of a 
bountiful harvest. Spleen 
related illnesses can be cured 
by an Il Mae, usually by laying 
of hands or patting ribs or the 
affected area. Il Mae are said 
to have been eaters of the Mair 
bird at some point in history 
and thus adopted it as their 
totem.  
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Loibuor Kichu (Letiren and 
Lekateiya lineages) 
Snakes (Lasurai), Witchdoctor, 
prophesy. 
They can curse and cast spells 
that cause perceived offenders 
to suffer snake bites. Also have 
power to foresee and are 
especially useful in advising on 
measures to be taken to 
forestall disasters.  
Il Kung’uan Rope (Nkopit). They have special powers over 
the rope. Traditionally, rope 
made from the Rrapai plant 
could be used to cast both 
good and bad spells. A knot of 
such a rope could be tied to 
cast a spell to cause mental 
retardation on a perceived 
offender, or untied to reverse 
the spell. A rope attached to 
the belt of a Moran (guard) 
could also help protect animals 
from theft or help recover 
stolen animals. 
Il Pasikir Rain (Nchan), Thunderstorm 
(Ndarata), Lightening 
(Nkiwang’ata). 
Il Pasikir women especially, 
have dominion over the skies 
and may offer prayers to calm 
lightning and thunderstorms. 
Il Murtanat Mosquito (Nkojong’oni), 
Elephant (Lkanjaoi). 
During better times when 
elephants were plenty, Il 
Murtanat were ordained to 
hunt and kill them or bless 
such hunts. Today, Il Murtanat 
are said to be immune from 
any afflictions caused by 
mosquito bites such as Malaria 
and can be called upon to cure 
it.  
Long’eli, Il Kapsaang’, Leleboo, 
Il Matiyon 
These clans have no 
recognized totem. 
 
Figure 2: Il Chamus clan totems  
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3.2.1 Il Chamus clans and leadership positions 
 
As already alluded to above, Il Chamus age group and community 
leadership positions are strongly influenced by clan membership. In as 
much as the Il Chamus community has an open ended nature (Little 
1998:451), acceding to important positions of leadership is dependent 
upon clan membership. Thus, while anyone can potentially be welcomed 
into the fold and become nominal Il Chamus, not everyone can become 
an Il Chamus leader.  
 
The positions of Launoni (age group leader), Loboru-nkeene (assistant 
group ritual leader), Long’ichaa (age group ritual leader) and Loiboni are 
among the most important within the Il Chamus society as they maintain 
the age group system upon which societal control rests. 
 
The Launoni is chosen from the Il Kapis clan and principally acts as a 
leader, mediator and judge of sorts on matters concerning his age group. 
He is assisted in his duties by the Loboru-nkeene, who is chosen from 
either Il Murtanat or Loibuor Kichu clans. The Long’ichaa relates 
specifically to the circumcision ceremony through which adolescent boys 
graduate into Morans (field-notes).  
 
The Long’ichaa is selected from the Il Toimal clan and is the first of his 
age group to face the knife, after which circumcision is open for the age 
group. At the close of Moranhood, during the Unoto ceremony, the 
Long’ichaa takes a leading position and is the first to slaughter an Ox 
followed by the Launoni, Loboru-nkeene and then the other Morans. In 
the hierarchy of Il Chamus age group leadership positions, the Long’ichaa 
ranks third after the Launoni and Loboru-nkeene. 
 
Another very important leader is the Loiboni. Traditionally, the Loiboni in 
Il Chamus community is well respected and is both a prophet and a 
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healer. Like many other leadership positions in Il Chamus society, clan is 
paramount and the Loiboni can only come from the Loibuor-kichu clan 
and specifically the Lekateiya lineage. While the Loiboni is much 
respected, Il Chamus do not consider themselves bound to his services, 
and in fact many Il Chamus today would seek out the services of an 
external Loiboni or equivalent from the Samburu or even Pokot depending 
on their reputations. This could be partly because of the perceived 
dominance and success of those communities in raiding, which tends to 
be directly linked to the prowess of the Loiboni concerned. 
 
Outside of the age group, in matters considered weighty enough to 
involve the whole community, a Lamaal council is usually constituted. 
Unlike older times like when the Il Chamus irrigation enterprise was at its 
peak and the Olamal was a permanent feature with real executive and 
ritual powers, Olamal councils of today are more ad hoc and less resolute. 
Any age group can constitute an Olamal council to deal with a particular 
issue after which it is dissolved. It will be seen in Chapter 5 that violent 
regulation has had a negative impact on the efficiency of social 
institutions such as the Olamal councils as well on administrative 
institutions.  
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Chapter 4: Livelihoods and environmental change in Lake Baringo. 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the livelihood profile of the lake Baringo basin 
within the context of rapid environmental change. It looks at the social 
and ecological characteristics of the basin and analyses the processes of 
environmental change that have been observed in the basin over time. 
Within the context of profound environmental change, it analyses the 
competing narratives of this change and sets the stage for an analysis of 
the Il Chamus vulnerability context in chapter 5. 
4.1 A physical and social profile of Lake Baringo 
Lake Baringo is a shallow inland fresh water lake within the Kenyan rift 
valley drainage basin. It has a surface area of 108km2, and lies at an 
altitude of 1,000m above sea level.  Situated at 0°36′N and 36°04′E, the 
lake is within the Gregory Rift Valley system extending northwards from 
Lake Malawi and passing through Tanzania, Kenya, and Ethiopia. (Kiage 
and Liu 2009: 61). Its drainage basin extends to a total area of some 
6,820 km2 (Ballot et al. 2002: 3). Its main sources of water come from 
several rivers including Ol Arabel, Mukutan, Tangulbei, Endao, Chemeron, 
Perkerra and Molo.  
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Map 3: Drainage into Lake Baringo 
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The water has a brownish, dirty appearance as a result of the high rates 
of sedimentation resulting from high rates of soil erosion in the 
catchment, a condition known as turbidity. The water is also characterized 
by low transparency and a relatively high PH value due to the high 
alkalinity of the hot spring discharge from Kokwa Island. Turbidity results 
in the brown coloration of the lake and limits light penetration, resulting 
in low biomass production and increasing the level of toxins (Ballot et al. 
2002: 1, Odada et al.2006: 34). 
 
 
 
Picture 1: The brown coloration of Lake Baringo is caused by high levels of turbidity. 
The lake has also been found to contain a high fluoride content, which has 
been attributed to volcanism arising from the tectonic activity that formed 
the rift system. Because of this, all the major Kenyan Rift Valley lakes 
including Turkana, Baringo, Borgoria, Nakuru, Elementaita, Naivasha and 
Magadi contain high levels of fluoride. Water consumed directly from 
these lakes cause dental discoloration, caries, dental fluorosis and skeletal 
abnormalities (Gaciri and Davies 1993: 396).  
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Picture 2: Fluoride effects go beyond the cosmetic and also affect bone and dental 
structure, causing abnormalities. 
The Lake Baringo basin has a highly variable annual rainfall of 500-
1000mm that is concentrated on a few days of sporadic downpours 
following a bi-modal pattern occurring in the months of April to May and 
October to November. This rainfall is however offset by high day-time 
temperatures averaging 250C leading to very high evaporation rates of 
1,650-2300 mm, leaving the above mentioned rivers as the main source 
of recharge. Even with the low recharge potential of these sporadic 
downpours, they are principal agents of soil erosion, which is a major 
cause of sedimentation and turbidity in Lake Baringo, with serious 
consequences for its ecological viability. (Odada et al 2006:31; Kiage and 
Liu 2009: 61).  
While it is principally a fresh water lake, salty inflows feed into the lake 
from hot-springs on fault-lines at Ol Kokwa Island (Oduor 2000; Odada et 
al 2006: 31, 34; Beadle 1932). It has no known terrestrial outlet, but its 
freshness relative to other lakes in the Rift Valley which are alkaline 
suggests a strong possibility for the existence of one or more 
underground outlets for the lake (Beadle 1932, also quoted in Ballot et al. 
2002: 3). 
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Gully erosion is a widespread and visually evident phenomenon in the 
Lake Baringo basin and gives it the look of a highly degraded 
environment.  
 
Picture 3: Gulley erosion 
 
Despite its arid nature and highly degraded appearance, however, the 
lake Baringo basin also offers an important livelihood resource base for its 
users, and for the Il Chamus, resources associated with Lake Baringo and 
its basin provide an important source of livelihood.  
The lake provides fish for food, reeds for construction of boats, water for 
human and livestock consumption and irrigation. Irrigation by private 
individuals is mainly used to support plots under maize production.  
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Picture 4: Maize crop under irrigation  
Lake Baringo is also an important tourist attraction famous for its varied 
bird species and is well known as a bird-watchers paradise. Major hotels 
catering for tourists in this area include Robert’s Camp, Island Camp, Soi 
Safari Lodge and Lake Baringo Block Hotel. According to Gichuki, there 
are between 400 and 500 different bird species in Lake Baringo (Gichuki 
2000, quoted in Odada et al 2006: 34). Among these bird species include 
the Fish Eagle, a number of which have been trained for tourist 
entertainment. Experienced Chamus handlers call out to the Fish eagle 
which then come and go on command, and this spectacle is offered as 
part of a boat-ride experience in the lake (field notes). Hippos and 
crocodiles are also found in the lake, as well as snakes, ostriches and 
other fauna and flora.  
The lake is also useful as a transport system, connecting Kampi ya 
Samaki to Kiserian, as well as to several Islands on the lake. Boat rides 
offered to tourists are an important source of employment for locals, as 
several community groups are dependent on this activity 
The lake Baringo basin is at the same time an area experiencing dramatic 
changes in its ecological status, due to both natural and human causes 
(Kiage et al 2007). As a result, the above mentioned livelihood resources 
93 
 
are all subject to ecological and social processes of change that represent 
an ever increasing risk to their established livelihood patterns based on 
agro-pastoralism, tourism and fishing. The next section looks at the social 
ecological profile of Lake Baringo, describing degradation of these 
resources within the context of profound ecological change.  
4.2 Environmental change and degradation in Lake Baringo 
Numerous studies carried out on the Lake Baringo basin observe 
increasing trends of degradation in this environment. This degradation is 
manifested by fluctuations in the lake surface area and depth, loss of 
vegetation cover including trees and grazing, loss of aquatic biodiversity, 
loss of fisheries, increased soil erosion and sedimentation, water turbidity, 
changes in precipitation and a general loss in ecosystem robustness. 
For instance, according to Odada et al. (2006), fluctuations in the lake 
depth have ranged from an average of 8m between 1969 and 1972, to a 
low of 1.7m observed in 2003. In 2006 it was at an average depth of 
2.5m, reaching a maximum of 3.5m at its deepest points.  
Similarly, the lake surface area has also revealed a general decreasing 
trend: 219km2 in 1976, 136km2 in 1986, 114km2 in 1995, and 108km2 
in 2001, projecting a 50% reduction in surface area by 2025 based on 
these trends (Odada et al. 2006:32, quoting Onyando 2002). Contrary to 
this general trend, however, a sudden surge in lake levels was noticed 
between 2011 and 2013. 
Between 2011 and 2013, a general trend among lakes within the Eastern 
African Rift Valley saw significant increases in water levels. Onywere et al. 
have mapped the extent of flooding in four Kenya lakes at Naivasha, 
Nakuru, Borgoria and Baringo. The four lakes are all listed as RAMSAR 
sites because of various threats to their bio-diversity (Onywere et al. 
2014). 
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Map 4: the four RAMSAR lakes: Naivasha, Nakuru, Borgoria and Baringo 
Their analysis revealed that at Lake Naivasha, the area under water 
increased from a low of 107.7 Km² in January 2010 to a high of 169.9 
Km² in October 2013. At Lake Nakuru, the area under water increased 
from a low of 31.8 Km² in January 2010 to a high of 54.7 Km² in Sept 
2013. At Lake Borgoria, the increase in the area under water was from 
32.6 km2   in January 2010 to 41.1Km² in September 2013. At Lake 
Baringo, the area under water rose from 143.6 Km² in January 2010 to a 
high of 231.6 Km² in September 2013. The table below shows the net 
percentage increase in the area under water experienced over the four 
lakes.  
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Lake  area (km2) 2010  area (km2) 2013 Net increase (%) 
Naivasha 107.7 169.9 57.8 
Nakuru 31.8 54.7 72 
Borgoria 32.6 41.1 26 
Baringo 143.6 231.6 61.3 
Figure 3: net percentage increase in area under water for four RAMSAR lakes. 
The main source of flooding in Lake Baringo has been increased surface 
recharge from Rivers Molo and Perkerra rather than from increased 
precipitation at the Lake itself, and with this increased recharge has been 
an increase in the sediment load deposited into the Lake. Increased 
sedimentation poses serious environmental degradation problems for 
Lake Baringo, not least of which are increased turbidity and its associated 
problems of reduced productivity in the lake. 
Other immediate effects of the increased flooding include displacement of 
the riparian community and livestock by the flood waters. This was 
evident in Salabani, Logumgum, Loiminange, Ngambo, Nosukorro, Loruk 
and Kokwe Island. The water not only took over residential, agricultural 
and grazing land but also interfered with the balance of flora and fauna in 
the basin. Fish, crocodiles and hippos have invaded former villages. The 
migration of snakes towards drier areas also poses more danger. There 
was also substantial damage to buildings including hotels and schools, 
with some being rendered unusable as they went under water. Further, 
there was loss in terms of lost employment opportunities and increased 
water-borne diseases.  
These trends represent significant levels of environmental degradation 
and are indeed a worrying prospect for the future of Lake Baringo. The 
highly degraded images of the basin as well as its unique physical 
features that seem to enhance this image have led to contested notions of 
the exact cause and nature of environmental degradation here. 
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While the fact that the Lake Baringo basin is a highly degraded 
environment is clearly evident, notions and ideas about the causes of its 
degradation are highly contested, and dominant perspectives can be seen 
as a reflection of power relations between different actors. For instance, 
both colonial and post-colonial governments in Kenya blamed traditional 
land use and animal husbandry methods for the environmental 
degradation in Baringo and used them as justification for intervening in 
the local environmental management processes.  
Other perspectives see the annexation of African rangeland resources and 
the diminished access to pastoral space and resources as being the chief 
cause of degradation in African areas. Proponents of this thesis therefore 
linked degradation with the advent of colonialism. It has been argued that 
in fact much of the so called overstocking during the colonial period had 
other causes such as deprivation of pasture through annexation of land 
and generally restrictive policies of the same colonial authorities 
(Anderson 1984). The following section looks at the development of the 
environmental degradation narrative in Baringo as a background to the 
general policy on intervention in the environment by the state that 
eventually saw the introduction of Prosopis Juliflora as an ecological 
intervention measure. Prosopis juliflora 
4.3 The environmental degradation narrative and environmental 
interventions in Baringo 
In contrast to a pre-colonial image of Baringo as a beautiful land of 
relative plenty in the midst of desert-like conditions related by the very 
early European explorers such as Thompson and Van Hohnel (Thompson 
1887: 229, Van Hohnel 1892, quoted in Gregory 1896: 265), later 
descriptions of Lake Baringo portray it as a land in serious ecological 
decline. 
In the early 1880s, Thompson, on arriving at Lake Baringo, described it in 
very positive terms:  
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”Best of all, there was the mysterious Lake Baringo, gleaming apparently 
at our feet, though several thousands of feet below. I have now looked 
upon many striking and wonderful lake scenes in Africa… not one of these 
spectacles approaches in beauty, grandeur, and variety the landscape 
that now spread out before me on the edge of the Lykipia plateau” 
(Thompson 1887:228-229). 
Only about thirty years later in 1921, lake Baringo is described as an 
“agricultural slum” (Burnett and Rowntree 1990: 160, quoting an 
anonymous scientist in 1921). By 1951 Elspeth Huxley describes Baringo 
as "One of the saddest sights in Kenya…Scarcely a blade of grass 
remains, only stunted scrub” (Huxley 1951: 336). 
By 1990, Burnett and Rowntree describe Lake Baringo and its environs as 
“an archetypical example of landscape degeneration” and “a useful 
laboratory where scientists can study the causes, consequences and cures 
of land abuse in the semi-arid tropics” (Burnett and Rowntree 1990: 160, 
161). These quotes reflect the development of the Baringo environmental 
degradation narrative in which much blame has been put on African 
traditional methods of pastoralism and agriculture.  
A stereotype that associated African pastoralism with a wanton 
accumulation of cattle driven not by economic considerations but by 
primitive cultural belief and practice, supported by such influential 
academic scholars as Herskovits (1926), was fundamental to the 
emerging discourse of overstocking and overgrazing that linked East 
African pastoralism in general directly with environmental degradation 
(Anderson 2002: 136).  
This negative view of African pastoralism in relation to the environment 
was subsequently perpetuated by conservationists and ecologists 
(Brockington 2002) who had a strong influence on the mentality of both 
the colonial and subsequent Government.  
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Recent scholars such as Odada have carried forward this view. For 
instance, he says, referring to Il Chamus: “As pastoralists, they keep 
large numbers of cattle, which overgraze the catchment vegetation 
leading to enhanced soil erosion, sedimentation in streams and the lake, 
and frequent flash floods”.(Odada 2006: 31). Also: “Livestock overgrazing 
is a major problem in this area, since the pastoralists are not willing to 
reduce the number of their herds to conform to the available food 
biomass” (Odada 2006: 33). 
The Colonial government took it as a given fact that African livestock 
husbandry practices were responsible for a general trend in environmental 
degradation that would culminate in “desertification”. The Kenya Land 
Commission Report of1934, for example stressed the link between African 
pastoralism methods, overstocking and the great risk of desertification. 
Measures to reduce African stock and improve range conditions were 
suggested. Desertification was presented as an ongoing threat:  
"We have heard in evidence that 20 years ago the Kamasia Reserve was 
still a well-grassed country, and the Suk were moving their grazing areas 
every year with a view to controlling the grass…conditions in the Kamba 
Reserve and in the drier parts of the Masai Reserve were still tolerable. 
Now, in many parts where there used to be grass, there is nothing but 
bare earth” (KLC 1934: 3)18.  
This framing of the environment as being in a formerly good state but 
now threatened with desertification was of course being used as a basis 
for a proposal to enforce a policy of forced culling of African stock: “We 
therefore recommend, with all the emphasis at our command, that action 
be taken with the least possible delay to inaugurate the culling of surplus 
stock and to pursue unremittingly a policy of controlling the cattle 
population within the limits which the grazing facilities available from time 
to time dictate”(KLC 1943: 4). 
                                               
18 The Kenya Land Commission (KLC) Report 1934. The National Archives, Catalogue 
Reference: CAB/24/248. 
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In Baringo, in the middle of a drought at the beginning of the 1930s, 
desertification was seen as already evident, as the following extract from 
a report dated 13th June, 1933, from the Provincial Commissioner, Rift 
valley Province, states:  
“Baringo District (Kamasia, Njemps and Suk) is a complete desert. The 
only feed is thorn trees and bushes. The cattle mortality is very heavy, 
and the ground round the Bomas is strewn with carcasses. It is impossible 
to estimate the mortality, but it may easily reach 50 per cent. ” (KLC 
1934: 584). 
Overstocking was seen as the main reason for the degraded state of the 
land. The concept of overstocking was based on the idea that land had a 
fixed carrying capacity which could be optimized or even improved 
through certain management practices. Working within the parameters of 
the carrying capacity would then constitute an “equilibrium system”. Once 
exceeded, however, overstocking occurs and the consequence would be 
inevitable degradation in the quality of the land (Anderson 2002: 139). 
The scientific rigor of the carrying capacity thesis was however 
challenged, and controversy over the relationship between pastoralism 
and environmental degradation has defined the ensuing debates since 
colonial times, and consistent with the contested nature of knowledge 
about environmental change processes, other researchers suggest that 
the use of definite measures of carrying capacity for various environments 
is mistaken and ignores flexibility and change in human ecosystems over 
time (Mortimore, 1998; Niemeijer, 1996). Indeed, the few existing long-
term records of cattle populations in East Africa indicate that populations 
fluctuate according to climate, diseases, and other factors. Thus, over 
time, cattle densities are adjusted and rarely have a sustained and 
widespread impact on soil and vegetation (Brockington and Homewood 
2001; Mungongo 1995:14, 15).  
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Nevertheless, in colonial Baringo, carrying capacity and equilibrium 
system models informed government environmental and development 
decisions (Anderson 2002: 137-141 analyses trends in colonial livestock 
figures for Baringo). These resulted in policies that had far reaching 
implications and justified the designation of Baringo as place in 
environmental decay due to mismanagement by African pastoralists, a 
designation which spawned “paternalistic attitudes that saw “vigorous 
measures” needed to enforce the “correct way for herdsmen to behave” 
(Sobania 1988: 227). 
This led to direct government involvement in trying to manage the local 
rural environment. The adoption by the colonial government of a more 
direct interventionist approach was also informed by the need to get the 
colonies more productive on the back of the depression and a genuine 
fear fed by the catastrophic events of the “dust bowl” in the American 
Southern plains. Images from this part of the world that showed how soil 
erosion could transform an agriculturally productive belt into a wasteland 
created concern but were also used to support arguments for the need for 
intervention. The drought in many parts of East Africa could thus quite 
reasonably be seen as a natural progress progression to arid and desert-
like conditions, and therefore drastic measures had to be taken to stem 
the tide (Anderson 1984: 322-323, 327). 
However, considered over the longue durée, fluctuating environmental 
change in general and environmental degradation in particular has always 
been part of the ecological profile of the Lake Baringo basin as both 
historical and contemporary observations show. 
Kiage and Liu (2009), for instance, have analysed Paleo-environmental 
records derived from pollen, fungal spores, and microscopic charcoal from 
Lake Baringo, which show that while it has known both wet and dry 
environmental conditions, the Lake has been to a large extent an arid 
environment since at least AD 1650. Their evidence also shows that Lake 
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Baringo suffered two major episodes of intense aridity including two 
intense dry episodes that led to drying out of the lake around AD 1650 
and AD 1720 (Kiage and Liu 2009: 67). These episodes pose particular 
questions on the link between traditional pastoralist methods and the 
process of desertification.  
Moreover, Kiage and Liu also showed that the environment showed a 
rapid and remarkable, if brief recovery from the first dry episode without 
a deliberate anthropogenic intervention. Also, their evidence, as 
corroborated by oral history sources, suggest a strong correlation 
between modern episodes of drought and the invasion of locusts. Other 
scholars, such as Pratt and Gwynne (1977: 33), also support this 
contention, stating that: “the locust is the little appreciated ultimate 
cause of land degradation at Lake Baringo”. Without further 
problematizing the possible causes of environmental degradation in Lake 
Baringo, it is safe to say that over time, both nature and human impact 
together enhanced soil erosion and led to environmental degradation 
here. 
Various competing theories and explanations of environmental change 
processes should therefore be considered with caution, and this thesis, 
rather than focus on causal relationships between various agents, looks at 
the dominance of some theories over others as part of a political 
contestation processes. 
Current trends of erosion and degradation, therefore, cannot be 
interpreted as leading towards an environmental catastrophe or end point 
since these phenomena, while quite obviously linked to human action, 
also respond to climate variability and have been part and parcel of the 
Lake Baringo environmental landscape at least for the last 350 years ( 
Kiage and Liu 2009: 69, 70).  
It is a fact that some traditional land use practices have initiated or 
exacerbated degradation of the environment. But so have certain 
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intervention measures undertaken in “good faith” to try to uplift the living 
standards of the local communities. For example, the construction of 
dams upstream such as the Kindirich dam with an area of 2km2, and the 
Chemeron dam, with an area of 1km2 is bound to have profound effects 
on the Lake Baringo SES, as does the Perkerra Irrigation Scheme which 
has, since its inception in the 1950s, diverted a huge volume of water 
from the Perkerra River. Molo and Ol Arabel rivers also suffer diversions, 
and the net effect is reduced water flowing into the lake, increased 
sedimentation and turbidity, reduced fisheries, and other negative effects. 
(Odada 2006: 35). 
Similarly, the introduction of Prosopis Juliflora into Baringo ostensibly to 
curb the rate of desertification and environmental degradation has had 
profound effects on the SES, which have contributed to the vulnerability 
context of the Il Chamus.  
The next chapter sets out the vulnerability status of the Il Chamus, 
focusing on three main aspects: Prosopis juliflora, violent regulation and 
marginalization.  
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Chapter 5: the vulnerability context of the Il Chamus: Prosopis, 
violence and marginalization. 
Introduction 
This chapter brings together aspects of the Il Chamus SES that define its 
vulnerability context. The social ecological system (SES) of the Lake 
Baringo basin is a complex system defined by the interaction between 
various physical and social elements related to each other in a series of 
forward and backward linkages that connect various aspects of its 
environmental governance.  
Prosopis juliflora; violent regulation; and social and political 
marginalization are identified as key sources of vulnerability within the 
process of social ecological change in the Baringo basin. Their interaction 
with other variables determine the social ecological profile of the basin, 
and for the Il Chamus, these key drivers exacerbate their already poor 
livelihood status. This enhanced state of vulnerability can be seen as 
stemming from unfavourable outcomes of environmental governance 
linked to both the physical environment (Prosopis juliflora) and the social 
political environment (violence and marginalization). 
Environmental governance in this context is an inherently political process 
that determines the ability of Il Chamus to command an effective access 
to resources, which in turn determines their adaptive capacity and 
resilience. The chapter begins with an analysis of Prosopis juliflora, 
exploring its role as an agent of vulnerability for the Il Chamus, and goes 
on to consider violent regulation as well as marginalization. 
 
 
 
 
104 
 
5.1 Environmental intervention gone wrong: Prosopis juliflora 
This section deals with the issue of Prosopis Juliflora in the Lake Baringo 
basin, highlighting its history and the contested narratives that have 
defined its presence in the basin. 
Particular interpretations of the processes of degradation have provided 
the background for government and NGO intervention in the management 
of the Lake Baringo SES. Intervention measures premised on particular 
narratives of environmental degradation provide a very good example of 
the contested nature of knowledge, ideas and related power dynamics. It 
shows how certain ideas and formulations of knowledge are used as a 
political tool to exercise authority and domination by certain groups (the 
state) over others (the society). For instance, it is in response to the 
images of Baringo as a highly degraded environment coming from a 
condition of fertility and environmental prosperity that colonial 
environmental policy in Baringo was formulated. Narratives justifying this 
policy sought to present African environmental management practices as 
destructive and therefore liable to change.  
Similarly, intervention by subsequent government and NGOs is justified 
on the need to arrest the process of degradation and to do so urgently. 
According to Odada, intervention achieves this in one of two ways: by 
reducing pressure on resources through the provision of alternative 
sources of income; and by applying direct conservation measures. He also 
suggests that, being located in a semi-arid, fragile environment with low 
natural life-sustaining properties, the basin is in urgent need of 
conservation attention (Odada 2006: 33). 
Both the colonial and post-colonial governments sought to exert control 
by perpetuating the narrative that African pastoral practices were 
incompatible with the sustainable use of the environment. Prosopis 
juliflora was introduced into Baringo in a similar context of intervention 
into the environmental management of Baringo and the next section is a 
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contemporary environmental history concerning Prosopis juliflora, starting 
with its origins. 
5.1.1 The origin of Prosopis 
Prosopis Juliflora is today the dominant vegetation in several parts of the 
Baringo Basin. It is, however, native to Central and South America, and 
may have been introduced to Africa about two Centuries ago through 
Senegal (1822), South Africa (1880) and Egypt (1900) (Pasiecznik et al. 
2001, also quoted in Bokrezion 2008: 14). 
The Il Chamus claimed in their case against the government that Prosopis 
juliflora was first introduced into Baringo around 1982. This was done by 
the he Government of Kenya through the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources in conjunction with the 
Food and Agricultural Organization (F.A.O.) under a partnership 
agreement. The reason advanced for the commission of the project was 
to control desertification and to provide fuel wood. This claim by the Il 
Chamus is supported by credible studies conducted in the area. 
These studies show that Prosopis Juliflora was first introduced to Kenya at 
a Bamburi quarry in Mombasa for rehabilitation purposes in the early 
1970s (Ebenshade & Grainger 1980, Maghembe et al. 1983). As an 
intervention measure designed to restore degraded land and provide fuel 
wood, the Kenya Government in conjunction with the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), introduced Prosopis Juliflora to the 
Baringo area as part of the Fuel wood Afforestation Extension Project in 
the early 1980s (Kariuki 1993, Lenachuru 2003, Andersson 2005: 7). 
Further, the Il Chamus claimed that no member of their community was 
consulted on the introduction of the plant into their territory. Some 
members of the community were, however, engaged as casual labourers 
for the project under government supervision. 
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Moreover, they claimed that Prosopis was originally planted in three large 
plots from where it eventually spread to other parts. This claim by the Il 
Chamus is also corroborated by independent studies in the region. In a 
recent study on the extent of Prosopis invasion in Baringo, Andersson 
determined that Prosopis seedlings were planted in experimental plots at 
various sites in Baringo and identified a total of 37 initial Prosopis planting 
sites created under the above mentioned project (Andersson 2005:11). 
These were distributed in Loruk, Kapthurin River, Salabani, Chemeron 
Dam, Ng’ambo, Marigat, Eldume, Logumgum, Sandai, Loboi, Ildepe, 
Sintaan, Kapkuikui and Loboi. 
 
Map 5: distribution of initial Prosopis planting sites 
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Initially, Prosopis was well received because it could flourish in areas 
where no other plant was known to grow. It was also quite easy to plant 
and its benefits were readily visible, such as the provision of green cover, 
prevention of soil erosion and sandstorms, provision of shade and fodder 
for livestock (Lenachuru 2003).  
After a ten year time lag (Andersson 2005: 6) Prosopis started to exhibit 
invasive tendencies. Spreading from the planted sites, Prosopis has now 
invaded other areas of the Baringo Basin, most notably in Kampi ya 
Samaki along the shores of the Lake and along the road to Marigat, on 
both sides of the road away from Chemeron Dam and sporadically in 
Sandai, Logumukum, Darajani and Kiserian (Andersson 2005: 18).  
5.1.2 Noxious weed or saviour plant? 
A major point of contestation between the Il Chamus and the government 
is on whether the effects of Prosopis on the environment are good or bad. 
The arguments by both sides on this issue are considered in chapter 6, 
and these are generally supported by reports and studies that portrayed 
Prosopis either as a problematic weed or as an important agent of 
environmental regeneration. As “an aggressive invader”, or alien species, 
Prosopis Juliflora is associated with the loss of Pasture, disappearance of 
native plant species, harm to livestock and humans. As an environmental 
regeneration agent its positive attributes such as the provision of fodder, 
fuel wood and building materials are highlighted. 
In a study on the attitudes of Il Chamus residents of Baringo towards the 
Prosopis plant, Aboud, Kisoyan, and Coppock (2005: 1-3) found the Il 
Chamus to be very knowledgeable about its botanical and ecological 
features. They were able to identify positive features of Prosopis as 
including: fodder for livestock, nectar for white honey, wood for 
construction and furniture making. However they also showed awareness 
of its negative effects, and considered Prosopis to be: highly aggressive 
and invasive; crowding out other plants by forming impenetrable thickets 
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that choke them; clogging waterways and thus affecting irrigation; 
encouraging soil erosion by eliminating alternative ground cover; affecting 
goats teeth by its chemical contents; creating digestive problems and 
even death for all livestock and causing allergic reactions, asthma and 
lung infections to humans through its pollen. The overall perception 
among the Il Chamus people was therefore that Prosopis was detrimental 
to their livelihood, and that it had been their “worst enemy” over the past 
20 years. The Il Chamus called for the complete eradication of prosopis, 
failing which they would sue the government, a threat which resulted in 
the Prosopis case considered in chapter six below. 
This study recognizes the existence of both positive and negative 
attributes of Prosopis, and the prosopis case, as we see in chapter six, 
brought out contested ideas and information about Prosopis. Even outside 
of the legal setting, there have been contradictory studies on the effects 
of Prosopis Juliflora on the environment, and this phenomenon has been 
referred to as the “Prosopis Paradox” (see here Bokrezion 2008). The next 
section presents some known facts about Prosopis, and as it will be seen, 
some claims are contradictory and add to the so called Prosopis Paradox. 
5.1.3 Characteristics of Prosopis juliflora 
Prosopis Juliflora is a perennial, fast-growing, ever-green and drought 
resistant plant that thrives in wet, arid and semi-arid conditions alike. 
(Bokrezion 2008: 17, Andersson 2005:6). It can grow to a potential 
height of between 12 and 15 meters, is usually thorny with thorns of up 
to 5cm in length. It has nitrogen fixing properties and has potentially 
beneficial uses including wood fuel, animal fodder, human food, and 
timber for construction and furniture, shade, wind-breaking, bee-keeping, 
ropes, medicines and as living fences. (Bokrezion 2008:17, 18, 20).  
Prosopis leaves have high tannin content (Pasiecznik et al. 2001) and are 
unpalatable except for their tender, newly sprouting shoots. Prosopis 
seeds are contained in pods that have very high sugar content (Batista et 
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al 2002). Ripe pods are palatable and a mature Prosopis tree can produce 
40 kg of pods per year, containing up to 60 000 seeds (Alban et al 2002, 
quoted in Andersson 2005: 6). The consumption of ripe pods by grazing 
and browsing animals leads to a very high propagation rate, making 
Prosopis a highly invasive plant. Despite its well-known invasive 
properties, Prosopis Juliflora is considered an important agent in 
combating desertification and environmental degradation and its 
introduction in many parts of the world has been justified on this basis 
(Laxen 2007: 17). 
The Prosopis plant is said to be difficult to eradicate since it can survive 
cutting by coppicing and its shrubs form impenetrable thickets; its sugary 
pods are harmful especially to goats’ teeth, leading to tooth rot and loss 
and eventually starvation and death for the goats; Prosopis thorns cause 
injuries on people and livestock that are sometimes so serious as to lead 
to amputation; Prosopis thorns are a menace to motor car and cycle tyres 
(Lenachuru 2003). 
To add to the Prosopis paradox, there are contradicting studies on the 
effect of Prosopis on soils. For instance, Maliwal et al (1991) and Singh 
(1995) suggest that Prosopis has a positive effect on soil fertility and 
crops by reducing soil pH, soil electrical conductivity and soil salinity; 
Bhojvaid et al (1996) and Bhojvaid & Timmer (1998) suggest 
improvement to the soil quality through increases in soil organic Carbon, 
total Nitrogen, available Phosphorous and exchangeable Potassium, 
Calcium and Magnesium. Maliwal (1991), Singh (1995), and Bhojvaid & 
Timmer (1998) show improvements in soil water movement, moisture 
holding capacity and hydraulic conductivity due to root penetration in soils 
planted with Prosopis Juliflora. 
On the contrary, Nakano et al (2003) showed leaching of the allelopathic 
substance L-tryptophan from the leaves of Prosopis Juliflora. This 
particular study seems to lend credence to the claim by the Il Chamus 
110 
 
that Prosopis has some negative chemical effects on the soil that 
discourages the growth of other vegetation.  
In a separate study on herbaceous plant species and soil properties in the 
lowlands of Njemps Flats, Baringo District, Kahi et al. (2009) conducted a 
comparative research to evaluate the effects of the alien invasive Prosopis 
juliflora and the indigenous Acacia Tortilis trees. While they found lower 
total biomass production under both tree shades than in open areas, a 
fact indicating that canopies in general inhibit production of under-storey 
plant species, Prosopis Juliflora had more negative effects than Acacia 
Tortilis. The deeper root system of Prosopis juliflora crowns led to a more 
shade and therefore a reduction in photosynthesis for the under-storey 
herbaceous plants, as well as a higher moisture intake, resulting in lower 
biomass production (Kahi et al. 2009: 445).  
Elsewhere, it was found that Prosopis Juliflora leaves further limit the 
growth of under-storey plant species due to phytotoxic and allelopathic 
effects of their leaves (Sen and Sachwan (1970), Sankhla et al. (1965) 
quoted in Kahi et al. 2009: 445). These observations support the claim by 
Il Chamus pastoralists that Prosopis Juliflora limits the growth of pasture. 
For example, Mwangi and Swallow (2005) reported Il Chamus residents of 
the Baringo area claimed that Prosopis had “killed off other important and 
useful native trees such as Iltepesi, Ilkiloriti, Ilwai, Kalalia (Euphorbia 
spp.) (Mwangi and Swallow 2005: 44). 
Pasiecznik et al (2001) and Pasiecznik (1999), also quoted in Mwangi and 
Swallow 2005: 13), provide a comprehensive account of the generic uses 
of Prosopis juliflora, the principal one of which is that Prosopis plays a 
leading role in the afforestation of arid lands. Their capability of growing 
on degraded land under arid conditions has made them especially suitable 
for this purpose. Being a multipurpose tree, prosopis fits very well into 
dry land agroforestry systems, controlling soil erosion, stabilizing sand 
dunes, improving soil fertility, reducing soil salinity, providing fuel energy 
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resources, supplying feed and forage for grazing animals, furnishing 
construction timber and furniture wood, supplementing food for humans, 
and promoting honey production. Prosopis juliflora produces good quality 
fuel of high quality calorific value, which burns well even when freshly cut. 
It also produces high quality charcoal and its heartwood is strong and 
durable. It branches are widely used as fencing posts, while its pods 
which are high in protein and sugars may be important fodder for 
livestock, and food for humans. 
However, the pods have also been reported to result in facial contortions, 
impacted rumen and constipation among livestock. These ill effects may 
sometimes result in death. Prosopis juliflora has also been used to shelter 
agricultural crops from wind and to reduce the movement of soil and 
sand. Its leaves contain various chemicals known to affect palatability to 
other trees (Mwangi and Swallow 2005: 13). 
As the above instances show, Prosopis Juliflora as a phenomenon 
presents a very mixed bundle of qualities, and further complicates the so 
called Prosopis paradox (Bokrezion 2008: 5). This ambiguous state of 
affairs provides fertile ground for the contestation and politicization of 
issues surrounding Prosopis. In this connection, the Prosopis case 
provided an important arena for the Il Chamus to articulate their own 
understanding and basis of the Prosopis problem. This was particularly 
important given dearth of research that takes into account subjective 
perceptions of farmers and pastoralists who are directly affected by 
Prosopis Juliflora, and whose perceptions are often dismissed as 
scientifically invalid and ignorant (Bokrezion 2008:192).  
Prosopis juliflora has had such a major impact on the vulnerability of Il 
Chamus livelihood that they felt it necessary to take legal action against 
the government. The Prosopis case was therefore an opportunity to bring 
out the politicized nature of the narratives surrounding Prosopis and 
highlighted some of the claims articulated by the opposing sides. Before 
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an analysis of the Prosopis case is undertaken in chapter six, an outlook 
of the vulnerability context of the Il Chamus is completed in the next 
sections by considering violence and marginalization respectively. 
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5.2 Violent regulation in the Lake Baringo Basin  
“Living free from the threat of armed violence is a basic human need. It is 
a precondition for human development, dignity and well-being”- The 
Geneva declaration on armed violence and development.19 
 
Introduction 
This section on violent regulation in the Baringo Basin complements the 
previous one on Prosopis Juliflora in portraying a fuller picture of the 
vulnerability context of the Il Chamus. The production of Prosopis Juliflora 
through state intervention and that of violence through violent regulation 
are seen as unfavourable outcomes of environmental governance 
processes that operate to enhance the vulnerability of the Il Chamus. This 
section analyses violence as social practice within the context of 
environmental change in Social Ecological Systems (SES).  
This section aims to show the role of violence in driving social ecological 
change in the Lake Baringo wetland. We have seen in the preceding 
section the role of the invasive plant Prosopis Juliflora acting as a direct 
driver of change by physically dominating the ecology of Lake Baringo 
basin. It will also be shown that as a result of litigation, the classification 
of Prosopis Juliflora as a noxious weed has led to the growth and 
development of a charcoal based economy. This section will show that in 
the interaction between the physical ecological component of the SES 
driven by Prosopis Juliflora and the social component driven chiefly by 
violence, the social component emerges as the dominant force: by 
capturing the developing economy of charcoal, violence has become the 
main driver of social ecological change in the Baringo basin SES. 
The Lake Baringo Basin is typically a pastoralist zone that has had a 
continuous history of violence documented since the pre-colonial and 
                                               
19 http://www.genevadeclaration.org 
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colonial period (Chapter 3). Violence here has been so rampant that it is 
considered normal and in a metaphorical sense has become part of the 
description of the landscape, so that it is described as being violent in the 
same sense that one might describe it as arid, in the sense that this is 
taken as a given fact and a normal state of affairs. 
This state of affairs has led to little interest in violent events that take 
place not only in Baringo but also in other peripheral areas of Kenya 
occupied by pastoralists such as the North Eastern province and the Tana 
delta. As well noted by McCabe (2004: 90), violence in such areas only 
occasionally grabs media attention when they occur in such a shocking 
scale that they are rendered newsworthy. Thus, violent events such as 
the Kanampiu20, Tana Delta21 and Baragoi22 massacres received global 
media coverage due to their scale and capacity to shock. For similar 
reasons, the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007/8 received huge 
international attention and triggered an unprecedented political, legal and 
academic interest. 
In normalizing the violence, however, popular discourse in Kenya has 
relegated violence occurring in pastoralist zones to cultural practice and 
war-likeness necessitated by the demands of the pastoral enterprise, 
creating a stereotype that suggests that pastoral communities are 
inherently violent and as such lead a routinely violent way of life. This 
discourse typically reduces such violence to a simple conflict over scarce 
pastoral resources.  
Violence as an expression of conflict over scarce resources, however, has 
to be understood in context. Evident from its description as an arid 
                                               
20 The Kanampiu massacre took place on 15th of September 2009 in the Kanampiu area 
of Samburu Central, with 32 deaths in one night. This was reported as a revenge attack 
by the Pokot of Baringo East on the Samburu community (IGAD: The Conflict Early 
Warning and Response mechanism, Country updates September-December 2009).  
21 On 12th September 2012, an attack on the Tana Delta left a trail of 38 dead 
(http://www.kelvinbrown.net/tana-delta-massacre). 
22 On November 10 2012, 42 police officers were killed in an ambush in Baragoi in the 
Suguta valley of Baringo District (Greiner 2013: 1). 
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wetland (Lwenya and Yongo 2010) , the SES of the Lake Baringo basin is, 
from an ecological perspective, a relatively unstable wetland subject to 
climatic extremes but one that becomes an invaluable resource in an arid 
and unpredictable climatic zone during periods of climatic stress. During 
drought, the lake provides water, fish and grazing resources. During 
periods of exceptionally high rainfall, however, flood waters encroach 
upon riparian Il Chamus settlements, driving them to higher ground in 
such of shelter and sustenance.  
To the peril of the Il Chamus, at such times the basin and its catchment 
become more attractive to their Pokot and Tugen neighbours. As such, it 
provides an unmitigated potential for conflict among a diverse set of 
users, each seeking to realize their own agenda for the available 
resources. One obvious aspect of the nature of the conflict is that with the 
resources being highly contested, it often expressed as violence. Clearly, 
here is an instant where violence can be directly linked in a causal 
relationship to resource scarcity. As a matter of fact, quite a number of 
situations here can be explained to a large degree as being related to 
resource scarcity, such as when Pokot herders violently enforce access to 
grazing and water on the southern shores of Lake Baringo, or when Tugen 
and Il Chamus Moran clash violently over the lush Il Mania grazing fields 
in Salabani location.  
However, when brazen gangs attack in broad daylight, indiscriminately 
maiming and killing humans and driving away livestock, the focus must 
shift from a superficial lens that views all violence as a primordial contest 
for scarce resources or even an innate belligerence to one that targets a 
deeper reality.  
Violence in this setting is a much more complex affair with multiple 
factors coming into the picture. One has to look at issues of resource 
competition within the broader context of environmental governance 
where power relations between differently situated actors results in 
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instances of social, political and economic domination and marginalization 
that create space for violence to thrive. 
This study, therefore, seeks to go beyond stereotype and generic 
explanations of violence in pastoral areas as typified by the Lake Baringo 
Basin and takes a more nuanced approach that locates violence in the 
political processes of governance and access to resources. Before 
proceeding with an analysis of violent regulation, the next section briefly 
looks at some existing studies of violence. 
5.2.1 Theorizing violence 
As already suggested above, popular impressions of violence in Kenya’s 
pastoralist areas are largely informed by stereotype and political rhetoric. 
Additionally, the role of the media and academic commentators in 
representing these violent episodes as particular forms of normalized 
expressions feeds the present popular discourse surrounding the whole 
issue of violence in pastoral areas. Much of this violence is attributed in 
varying degrees by different commentators to several factors that 
include: cultural factors that point to a pastoralist love for cattle and a 
penchant for violence that is entrenched in  moral and cultural ideals that 
include cattle raiding, bride wealth and ritualized initiation into adulthood, 
as well as a strong sense of ethnic identity; environmental factors that 
highlight climate change and the harsh realities of pastoral landscapes as 
well as the limited nature of land available for pasture and water and the 
ensuing violent competition for these scarce resources; demographic 
factors that point to a Malthusian trajectory of exponential population 
growth leading to the subjugation of the weak by the strong through 
inevitably violent means; socio-economic factors including poverty, 
income inequalities and marginalization; a proliferation of small and light 
weapons that both derive from and sustain violence (Mkutu 2007). 
Between cultural and political ecology, environmental security, peace and 
security studies, economics, political science and numerous other fields of 
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study, various combinations of these explanations have spawned a 
sizeable amount of academic and political literature, a complete review of 
which is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
However, some highly visible research on violence and the environment is 
much focused on a causal relationship between environmental factors and 
violent conflict, with a heavy focus on the identification of intervening 
variables and the feedback loops between them. Prominent researchers in 
this field including Homer-Dixon and Galtung have problematized the 
causal chain between environmental scarcities and violent conflict (see for 
instance Homer-Dixon 1991). Galtung has specifically linked 
environmental degradation to “more war over resources” (Galtung 1982: 
99).  
Raleigh on the other hand links the probability of increased communal 
conflict in African states to what he refers to as the political and economic 
vulnerability of groups to climate change. While acknowledging the 
important role of environmental pressures in conflicts, he sees these 
rather as catalysts in a process primarily driven by the extent of political 
and economic marginalization. Thus, small and politically insignificant and 
marginalized ethnic groups experience most conflicts related to 
environmental pressures (Raleigh 2010: 69). 
It is evident that research based on the supposed link between 
environmental scarcity and violent conflict follows a common Malthusian 
trajectory that links climate change pressures on population growth in 
particular to increasing resource scarcity and an inevitable risk of 
violence.  
In the context of security studies, Kahl (1998) has linked Population 
growth, environmental degradation and violence in developing countries 
and pointed this out as a threat to American interests. He cites the 
example of water hyacinth plant in Lake Victoria that caught the interest 
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of the United States Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)   as a potential 
trigger of conflict and political instability.  
In theorizing violence especially among pastoral societies, Schlee (2004) 
has sought to complement the purely resource conflict driven theories of 
violence with a social account that incorporates the importance of cross-
cutting ties. Accordingly, the decision to engage in violence is not simply 
a rational economic decision but one that is also influenced and limited by 
social structures and how they are recognized and represented. Identity 
plays an important role as a distinguishing factor that determines who is 
friend or foe and provides the basic structure upon which alliances are 
made or broken. 
In this scheme, social structures become important “conceptual 
instruments of exclusion and inclusion as social categories and their 
overlapping relations”. Cross-cutting ties play a crucial role in this 
formulation, helping to ensure some level of internal peace but sometimes 
also escalating conflict. In other cases cross cutting ties help in coping 
with the consequences of violent conflicts also play an important role in 
helping to cope with the consequences of violent conflict (Schlee 2004: 
143-145). 
Bollig (1993) has used a multi-causal model to analyse violence among 
the pastoral Pokot of Kenya. In this multi-causal model, variables interact 
with each other in various combinations to explain different modes of 
conflict. Bollig shows for instance that competition for scarce resources on 
its own is insufficient to explain violent conflict behaviour, but rather the 
mode of distribution mediating scarcity. An analysis of institutions that 
control access to key resources would therefore be instrumental in 
explaining conflict behaviour. Social relations, reciprocal ties and the 
motivations to accumulate social; material and symbolic capital (prestige) 
by actors within these networks; conceptualization of emotion; legitimacy 
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of tension resolution mechanisms and international supply and demand of 
lethal weapons are all important variables to consider in this analysis. 
Local studies on violence in Kenya stress ethnicity and competition for 
access to and control of the state and resources as a key driver of 
violence. For instance, according to Osamba (2001), violence and conflicts 
arise from “unresolved problems of citizenship and statehood in Kenya”.  
Osamba finds the state complicit in the violence through abdication of its 
obligations as the custodian of legitimate violence, and even as a direct 
perpetrator, in which case land disputes, ethnicity and cattle-rustling are 
used to hide government complicity and participation in violence23.  
Similarly, Greiner has noted the profound change in the nature of 
livestock raiding among northern Kenya’s pastoralists. Now involving 
modern lethal weapons, it has become increasingly instrumental in 
politicized conflicts over land, boundaries and electoral turfs. Greiner thus 
views these violent conflicts as a turbulent expression of Kenya’s political 
development and in this context identifies violent cattle raiding as “a 
specific form of violent regulation: a well-adapted, dangerous, and 
powerful political weapon” (Greiner 2013: 1, 2). The next section further 
explores this instrumental use of violence as a political tool encapsulated 
within the concept of violent regulation. 
5.2.2 Violent regulation 
This section uses the concept of violent regulation to explain the dynamics 
of transformation of the socio-ecological system (SES) of the Lake 
Baringo wetland within the context of human-environment relationship. 
Specifically, it deals with how the physical and socio-political 
environments interact under a regulatory regime temporarily driven by 
                                               
23 For an analysis of ethnic violence and the privatization of state violence, see  Roessler, 
Philip G, Donor-Induced Democratization and the Privatization of State Violence in Kenya 
and Rwanda, Comparative Politics, Volume 37, No. 2 (January 2005), pp. 207-227. 
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conflict and violence to extract benefit from the available set of 
environmental entitlements, a processes we call here violent regulation. 
Violent regulation is understood here as a process that pits various actors, 
each with a stake in highly contested environmental entitlements, against 
each other in a violent tango that plays out in the backdrop of a rapidly 
changing socio-ecological environment. As socio-ecological systems 
undergo rapid transformation, new regulatory regimes defining the 
human-nature interaction in a particular context emerge in which certain 
actors resort to direct physical and/or structural violence to secure their 
own interests (Bohle & Füngfleld 2007).  
The violent regulation results in a physical dislocation of the environment 
as a resource giver. In the social realm the stronger actors subject their 
victims to economic and political dominance, creating in the process 
enhanced economic and social status for the winners and disentitlement 
and new vulnerabilities for the losers. 
Violence is in this sense localized and entrenched in the social institutions 
that regulate human relationships as they contest for environmental 
entitlements, a process that is dependent on the history as well as 
cultural meanings and expressions of political power relations. This idea of 
violence takes from that described by Peluso and Watts, who consider 
violence as a “site-specific phenomenon deeply rooted in local histories 
and social relations but also connected to transitional processes of 
material change, political power relations and historical conjecture” 
(Peluso and Watts 2001: 30) 
This study posits that instances of rapid socio-ecological changes provide 
the opportunity for the re-ordering of regulatory factors that determine 
the distribution of environmental entitlements. It is during this process of 
re-organization that violent regulation finds an entry point.  
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This situation is compounded by the impending fundamental land-use and 
land tenure reforms heralded by a new constitutional dispensation24and 
land law regime, bringing to bear an increased pressure on the whole 
spectrum of entitlements to the existing natural resources. It also presents 
an opportunity to reconfigure claims particularly on land based resources 
and in some cases even redefine physical borders. 
These profound socio-ecological changes provide the context for the search 
for new forms of regulation in the human-environment relationship. 
Leading social actors in this system increasingly find the prospect of 
resorting to violence both a viable and an attractive option.  
Violent regulation then emerges as a major contender within the new 
order of things, and in the Lake Baringo case acquiring a banality and 
notoriety that finds legitimacy in the local lexicon via such terms as ‘cattle 
rustling’, ‘raiding’, ‘stock theft’, ‘war-likeness’, ‘cultural practice’, or 
sometimes more dismissively as ‘pastoralist violence’, a term often 
understood to embody fighting over scarce resources, also dubbed 
‘resource wars’ in some academic literature. 
In reality, what may be benignly referred to as “cattle-rustling” has taken 
a heavily militarized turn and is now performed, not with crude weapons 
but with automatic assault rifles and is no longer the preserve of youths 
or Morans (Mkutu 2007, Osamba 2001, and Greiner 2013). 
High political stakes have seen more organized and lethal forms of 
violence being visited upon the riparian communities. The violence exerts 
a huge toll on livelihoods and leaves, in the major part, a weakened and 
desolate society in its wake, and paradoxically, a select group who do well 
on the violence and bask in a perverted sense of economic thrift. It would 
seem that this so called pastoralist violence was transplanted into and has 
since outgrown existing social structures that tolerated stealing and 
                                               
24 Kenya promulgated a new constitution in August 2010, in anticipation of which event a 
lot of conflicts on land issues took place. 
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counter stealing of cattle among some pastoralist communities. With 
weak legal and administrative institutions further exacerbating the 
situation, violence has seen its principal agency gradually slipping from 
the hands of traditional actors to powerful and ruthless political 
operatives, and it now seems to thrive with an apparent cloak of 
impunity.  
This research, therefore, concerns itself by how violence affects the 
governance of environmental entitlements, and stresses the processes 
and outcomes rather than the aspects and/or links of causality. Access to 
environmental resources is predicated upon social, political and economic 
power, and one’s position in this scheme can be enhanced or diminished 
by the application of violence. Violence in turn affects the resource base 
both directly and indirectly. By focusing on violence as socio-political 
contestation, this research seeks to improve the understanding of the 
phenomenon of violent regulation.  
5.2.3 The nature of violence against the Il Chamus 
Violent events in the Lake Baringo basin against the Il Chamus are 
frequent and range from armed cattle rustling, highway robbery to deadly 
mass attacks. While extremely traumatic episodes of violence such as 
deadly mass attacks may be few and far between, the negative effects of 
violence on their livelihood is massive. The fear brought about by the 
spectre of violence is real and ever present and next to the occurrence of 
physical violence itself, further contributes to the general insecurity of the 
area. I present below a vignette on a particular episode of violence that 
took place on the 28th of June 2009. 
This episode was reported by Nation Tele-Vision (NTV)25 on the 30th of 
June 2009.  
                                               
25 A clip of the report is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dts9al4wsi8. 
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The caption accompanying the video clip notes that “a primary school 
head teacher was shot dead and more than 200 cattle stolen after armed 
raiders attacked a village in the newly created Marigat District. Another 
person is admitted to Kabarnet District hospital after he sustained 
injuries. Seven cows were shot dead”.  
The report further goes to say that “learning activities in 3 primary 
schools have been interrupted after pupils fled the area following the 
attack. The affected schools include Mukutani, Rugus and Nosukuro 
primary. Students of Kiserian Secondary also fled their institution 
following the attack. Suspected Pokot raiders attacked Kiserian area on 
Sunday, which is mainly occupied by the Il Chamus community. Fearing 
more attacks, they are all on the move in search for peace. In this village, 
children and the elderly sit together. This has been the safest place since 
they fled. They stay together to give one another comfort, and perhaps 
that much needed security…The head-teacher of Mukutani primary died 
on the spot after he was shot, while another person sustained injuries. At 
least ten students from Kiserian secondary sustained slight injuries, 
following commotion that ensued as they fled the battle scene… Seven 
cows were shot dead during the Incident. Baringo police boss Peter 
Njenga confirmed the attack, noting that a team of security personnel has 
been deployed to pursue the raiders. More than 3000 families have been 
displaced following the attack and are camping at the Kiserian trading 
centre. The victims have appealed for relief supplies and a disarmament 
exercise to recover illegal guns” (see Map 2). 
Two members of the Il Chamus communities were also interviewed. One, 
an old man, had this to say26: 
“During the raid, they started shooting at the cattle, and they drove more 
than 100 away. I cannot give the exact number, but we had more than 
100 cattle, and they drove them away, killing seven. If we are suffering 
                                               
26 English transcription by Author 
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like this, we don’t know where we shall turn to. These cattle are my 
livelihood. I have no Shamba. My Shamba is now lying on the ground, 
finished, even you are witnesses. Now dogs have started eating some 
carcasses, and our children have no food from now on…” 
The other interviewee, a primary school pupil, had this to say: 
“I was out fetching water, when I suddenly heard the sound of gunfire. 
On looking, I saw about 15 people. Then I saw cattle being shot. I almost 
got shot as well, only God saved my life because I ran into the forest. 
What I would like to know is, do we children have rights? We are 
competing with other pupils elsewhere in the country and we are going 
through these dangers, yet we are waiting to sit the same examinations. I 
feel sad, it is painful because the government has abandoned us, and it is 
as if we are out of Kenya.” 
This attack which took place on the 28th of June 2009 highlights the 
nature of violence affecting the Il Chamus community. The NTV report 
quoted above put no names to the people affected. However, the short 
clip reflects a snapshot of the narratives surrounding these type of violent 
activities: The impersonal nature of the reporting, as no names are 
attached to the figures; the strong association of cattle theft with 
violence; the devastating impact of gun related violence, leading to death 
mass displacements and disruption of social activities including education; 
destruction of livelihoods, destruction of social organization structures. It 
also highlights the extent of marginalization in the area as the injured 
have to be transported all the way to Kabarnet as the dispensary in 
Kiserian has no effective facilities, and neither does the hospital in 
Marigat; the ineffectiveness of the Police forces in tackling the violence; 
the helplessness of the community from lack of a political voice and the 
appeal for relief supplies reflecting the inadequacy of their livelihood 
capacity to cope; the danger from mainly Pokot neighbours, and the 
destruction of the environment. 
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During my field research, I managed to track down the family of the 
school teacher who was killed in the attack, and on this occasion I was 
able to not only put a name to the figures mentioned by the NTV report 
but to have a very close encounter with the effects of violence on the lives 
of ordinary Il Chamus. 
The victim was a school teacher, a father of four and a breadwinner to an 
extended network of dependents. Given the generally low levels of 
education among the Il Chamus, he was a valuable resource and his 
death had a direct and profound impact on his family and dependents. 
However, a fading photocopy of the burial program is what remains in 
memory of the deceased. Needless to say, the attackers have never been 
brought to book, leaving the victims with no justice, closure or 
compensation. In line with Il Chamus traditions, there was no monument 
or visible grave, and the family could only point to a general direction to 
indicate the final resting ground of their departed kin. His name was 
Joshua Kamangora Ole Kodoom. At the time of his death, he was the 
headmaster at Mukutani Primary School. An extract from his eulogy by his 
family taken from the burial program details his last moments: 
“The late met his death during a Pokot raid on 28-6-09 at 5:00 p.m. in 
Kiserian after a gunshot that killed him instantly 300m from Kiserian 
Primary School. The late was alerting the pupils who were fetching water 
in the lake that the Pokot were approaching to where they were. His body 
was taken to Kabarnet District Hospital mortuary, where it is brought 
today to Mochongoi for burial. MAY GOD REST HIS SOUL IN ETERNAL 
PEACE, AMEN”. 
While it is difficult to determine the exact scale of violence related 
damage suffered by the Il Chamus, the nature and effects of these 
damages are diverse and include physical assaults, displacement, 
psychological suffering and death. Quantifying the effects of violence is 
also made more difficult by the fact that the Il Chamus are generally 
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averse to counting of property, livestock and children and usually prefer 
to give vague answers like ‘many’ or ‘few’ rather than exact numbers. 
Official records, especially those relating to deaths from violence are hard 
to come by, and officially, the nearest police station at Marigat does not 
keep such data. Traversing the extent of the area occupied by the Il 
Chamus also reveals a deceptive absence of symbols recording or 
commemorating death such as marked graves or plaques.  
This is because traditionally, the Il Chamus do not keep conspicuous 
graves or any elaborate monuments for the memory of the dead. Apart 
from the simple and functional event of burial, death among the Il 
Chamus is traditionally not commemorated and neither is the spirit world 
of ancestors that is revered in many African societies part of the Il 
Chamus world view. Yet the absence of visual signs of memory to death 
in the lake Baringo basin should not obscure the deadly impact of violence 
on the livelihood of the Il Chamus. Absent too are any protracted rites of 
mourning. For the Il Chamus, therefore, in the absence of mitigating 
factors embodied in mourning rituals and the commemoration of death, 
an encounter with violent death is both fatal and final, and no bigger loss 
can be imagined (See here Kawai 2008: 125, 126). 
The vignette described above represents a sample of violent attacks on 
the Il Chamus. It is impossible to track down all such attacks. Below is a 
compilation of some Il Chamus who lost their lives to violence on diverse 
dates between 2001 and 2011. 
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1. Lerrinyal Letaglaa, a donkey trader (Il Miricho age group) was shot in Mukutani, date 
unknown, estimated year of event 2001. 
2. Two boys, sons of Lebene Lesaron and Lekirerio Kenyi, shot dead at Rukus dam while 
watering cattle, estimated year of event 2001. 
3. Mzee Motor Lekai shot dead at Noosidan while out in his compound taking tea, 3rd of 
April 2003. 
4. Jackson Lekuroito, then Board chairman Kiserian Primary school, shot at Mosuro on 
his way home, 4th of April 2005. 
5. Nkiririo Lekosek, shot dead at Sokotei by Pokot raiders, 9th of April 2005. 
6. Nkilip Leparteneu, shot dead at Kiserian by Pokot raiders, 9th of April 2005. 
7. Lenkires Lenoolmae, shot dead at Kiserian by Pokot raiders, 9th of April 2005. 
8. Dominic Lemanki, shot dead at Sokotei by Pokot raiders, 9th of April 2005. 
9. Lakarang’an Lekateiya, shot dead at Sokotei by Pokot raiders, 9th of April 2005. 
10. Lelesepei (Administration Police officer), shot dead at Kiserian by Pokot raiders, 9th 
of April 2005. 
11. Joseph Murumbi, shot dead at Kiserian by Pokot raiders, 9th of April 2005. 
12. Mzee Lenapurda Long’orkoben, shot dead at Meisori during daytime raid by Pokot, 
3rd of May 2005. 
13. Nauroo Lekosek, Standard six pupil at Lorrok Primary School, shot dead at Mpaach 
by Pokot, 17th of May 2005. 
14. Joseph Leparkolwa, shot dead by Pokot at Leswaa, 19th of May 2005. 
15. Long’olemuge Leng’ochaile, shot dead by Pokot at Noosukuro in cattle Boma at 7am 
in the morning, 25th of March 2007. 
16. Wesley Lemaitano, shot dead at Lekirricha dam by Pokot while watering cattle at 
1pm in the afternoon, 29th of March 2007. 
17. Joshua Letiren, shot dead at Lekirricha dam by Pokot while watering cattle at 1pm in 
the afternoon, 29th of March 2007. 
18. Lekitima Lorreng’ei, shot dead by Pokot at Nkasotok, 30th of June 2007. 
19. Lemunken Lesikamoi, shot dead by Pokot at Nkasotok, 30th of June 2007. 
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20. Leng’arua Lokortobong, shot dead by Pokot at Kiserian, 30th of June 2007. 
21. Edwin Lekichep, student, shot dead by Pokot at Tikalug while carrying examination 
papers, 15th of July 2007. 
22. Long’orrok Lenkarrari, shot dead by Pokot at chief’s compound in Mukutani, 31st of 
July 2007. 
23. Robert Leleserlei, shot dead by Pokot at Noosukuro while fishing, 2007. 
24. Nicholas Lenachuk, shot dead at Nkasotok, 24th of December 2007. 
25. Wilson Lengochaile, form four school leaver, shot dead at Ndorot while bringing back 
recovered cattle from a previous Pokot raid, 30th of October 2008. 
26. Joshua Kamangora Lekodoom, former headmaster at Mukutani Primary School, shot 
dead at Kiserian while alerting pupils about Pokot raiders, 28th of June 2009. 
27. Loisosion Lenapunya, shot dead at Tikalug by suspected Tugen attackers at 7a.m in 
the morning on his way to the market. 
Figure 3: List of Il Chamus who died as a result of violent attacks 
5.2.4 The effect of violence on the livelihood status of the Il Chamus 
The worst hit area or hotspot of violence in the Lake Baringo basin are the 
Rugus, Kiserian and Mukutani locations, all found in Mukutani division. As 
the above table suggests, the Il Chamus have felt the brunt of the violent 
events in the Baringo in the recent past. Today, the impact of the 
phenomenon of violence on their livelihood is clearly visible: 
There is a perceptible air of fear, tension and the expectation of attack. 
Travel between Kiserian and Mukutani shopping centres is especially 
affected as this stretch of the road has become notorious for attacks and 
is dangerous to travel even in broad daylight as armed youths patrol the 
area and attack with impunity, robbing, injuring and in a few cases killing. 
Recent trends show a reduction in the cycle of attacks and counter 
attacks between the Pokot and the Il Chamus as ethnic entities. 
Increasingly, independent units of perpetrators with little or no allegiance 
to community are observed; 
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A new form of pastoralism has emerged, which has seen the development 
of an overcrowded settlement in Kiserian. A common Kraal in the midst of 
a dense concentration of Manyattas reminiscent of a refugee camp now 
dominates the scenery. This emerging trend has had devastating effects 
on water points and pasture which are quickly rendered dry and/or 
unusable due to overuse and hoof damage. The spread of contagious 
animal diseases also affects herd sizes and quality; 
Abandoned homesteads owing to relocation of scores of families to 
relatively safe areas such as Eldume and Ng’ambo create the image of an 
economic wasteland while at the same time crowding up the receiving 
areas; 
Economic desolation is clearly visible with under-stocked or empty kiosks 
and cafes doting what remains of the shopping centre. A cattle auction 
market built with the help of World Vision has hardly been used and lies 
abandoned. With the Marigat cattle auction also suspended for most of 
the year and a fishing moratorium in place, there are little signs of 
economic activity and an air of desperation chokes the land. There is as a 
result, a very high rate of dependence on food aid and reliance on 
resident missionaries; 
 
Picture 5: This cattle auction shed for the Kiserian cattle Market had not been used from 
the time it was built with help from World Vision. 
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There is evident loss of administrative control. Mukutani Division lacks a 
visible administrative presence. A well-developed former Chief’s residence 
lies abandoned and one is referred to Marigat for any administrative 
services. The current Chief’s office has only recently resumed operations 
from a makeshift structure and most Il Chamus residents who fled earlier 
violent attacks are yet to return; 
Weakening of social regulatory institutions can also be observed. A 
regime of violence has led to a weakening in both the administrative and 
social institutions. Kiserian is virtually a bandit’s jungle and the Olamal 
(elders’ council) as previously constituted is no longer influential. This 
social institutional failure coupled with administrative failure along with an 
insecure environment has led to the erosion of a previously existing moral 
economy and the demise of any traces of a proper market based 
economy. We now see an emergence of a new political economy of 
violence where powerful actors thrive and livelihoods are subjugated to 
their agendas, creating a warped picture of economic ‘development’; 
 
There is also an emergence of new centres of power within the 
community as protection gains an increased premium. Because of the 
high level of insecurity, people are more and more willing to pay for 
armed escort services through identified danger zones such as the stretch 
of road between Kiserian Mukutani up to and including the Mukutani 
River. Armed youth from Pokot, Tugen and Il Chamus communities 
provide “security” services and Brokers (Wanjurusi) have risen in 
prominence. Wanjurusi combine all sorts of trading activities such as the 
charcoal trade between Marigat and Nakuru, cattle trading at Loruk and 
Marigat cattle markets. Most are conspicuously wealthy and maintain 
connections of influence with powerful people such as politicians and 
businessmen. 
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It is not just the actual realization of violence but also the fear and 
insecurity engendered by its prospect that adversely impacts on the 
livelihood strategies of the affected communities.  
As the community grapples with changing roles of its various member 
groups, individuals develop own strategies according to the real and 
perceived risks of violence. As a group, the Il Chamus reach out to 
external agencies and institutions for assistance. They seek to exploit a 
“victim” status through existing cultural, administrative and legal 
institutions, as a strategy to protect a lifestyle-sustaining wetland 
resource that gains an increased premium during periods of 
environmental stress such as drought.  
The Il Chamus have been to court twice27 and also recently appeared 
before the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC)28 to 
articulate their grievances as a community. Such efforts to appeal to legal 
and administrative institutions for redress have resulted in a heightened 
sense of ethnic identity as they strive to reinforce the narrative of a 
“marginalized” minority community.  An increased awareness of political 
rights is clearly discernible, and the Il Chamus are seen to gradually 
coalesce around an ethnic identity consistent with internationally 
recognized notions of indigeneity.  
The next section completes the vulnerability context of the Il Chamus by 
looking at the issue of marginalization. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
27 See Rangal Lemeiguran & others v Attorney General & others (2006) eKLR and 
Charles Lekuyen Nabori & 9 others v Attorney General and 3 others (2007) eKLR. 
28 Public hearing held on 25th October 2011 at Government Training Institute, Kabarnet.  
See www.tjrckenya.org for more details. 
132 
 
5.3 Marginalization of the Il Chamus 
Introduction 
Marginalization and exclusion from political process of governance have 
resulted in an enhanced state of vulnerability for residents of Kenya’s Arid 
and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) generally, and the Il Chamus in particular. 
This study links the marginalization of the Il Chamus to government 
economic and development policy; the limited capacity of the Kenyan 
state to govern effectively; and environmental pressures. 
It will be shown that official government policy deliberately diverted state 
economic resources for development away from the pastoral areas of 
Kenya generally by concentrating efforts and resources on areas seen to 
have agricultural potential. Additionally, the unique structure of the 
Kenyan state characterized by ethnically based networks of patronage 
and a general lack of accountability to administrative institutions has 
negatively affected its capacity for effective governance. The result is an 
economy dominated by a coalition of bigger and stronger ethnic groups at 
the expense of smaller groups such as the Il Chamus. 
This chapter will also show how the Il Chamus have made use of a legal 
process conducted by the Truth and Justice Reconciliation Commission 
(TJRC)29 of Kenya to articulate their perceptions of marginalization and 
                                               
29 The Kenya TJRC was set up in 2008 in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 post- election 
violence in Kenya. It was part of a peace deal that led to the formation of a grand 
coalition government made up of the two major opposing sides to the conflict. It was felt 
that a TJRC would be able to address the cause and effects of historical injustices and 
gross violations of human rights and therefore contribute towards national unity, 
reconciliation, and healing. The Commission is established by an Act of Parliament (Truth 
Justice and Reconciliation Commission Act no. 6 of 2008) to investigate the gross human 
rights violations and other historical injustices in Kenya between 12 December 1963 and 
28 February 2008. The judicial powers of the TJRC were however only limited to the 
investigation, analysis, and making a report on what happened between 1963 and 2008 
in regards to gross violations of human rights, economic crimes, illegal acquisition of 
public land, marginalization of communities, and ethnic violence. It could not prosecute 
but could recommend prosecutions, reparations for victims, institutional changes, and 
amnesty in exchange for truth for perpetrators who did not commit gross human rights 
violations (www.tjrckenya.org). The Il Chamus were among many groups of Kenyan 
communities who appeared before the TJRC to testify on their marginalization. 
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the subsequent findings and recommendations of the commission that has 
led to gradual but profound changes in the government policy and 
development programs in the ASAL as a whole. First, we consider a 
theoretical framework of marginalization in the context of contested 
power relations in Africa. 
5.3.1 A theory of marginalization 
Raleigh (2010: 70) captures the context of marginalization of weaker 
groups in Africa through his explanation of the concept of “political 
relevance” (see also Scarritt and Mozaffer 1999). According to this theory, 
the political constitution of African states such as Kenya is explained by 
the political power of ethnic communities. Based upon this political power, 
ethnic groups are then classified as either ‘‘politically relevant’’ or 
‘‘politically irrelevant.’’ Whether a community is politically relevant or not 
depends on the level of their influence in politics at the national level.  
Politically relevant ethnic communities derive their power from their 
numerical and structural capacity to influence national politics in general, 
and electoral contests in particular. In contemporary Kenya this translates 
to the ability to convert population numbers into voting blocs, and it 
explains why the Kikuyu and Kalenjin for instance are politically relevant 
ethnic communities. They are able to deliver, as a bloc, votes that are 
crucial to the winning of a national presidential election contest. They also 
occupy geographically productive areas of Kenya and therefore have 
structural advantages in the generation of wealth. Following this logic, a 
group like the Il Chamus, because of their small population and also their 
geographic location, command little attention from the state. They are too 
small to constitute either a viable voting bloc or a potential threat; neither 
do they have at their command any significant resources to attract the 
political class.  
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Communities with little national political clout are therefore ‘‘politically 
irrelevant’’ and are discriminated and excluded from the political decision 
making arena. This exclusion and discrimination then sets the basis for 
the social and economic marginalization of weaker groups (see also Gurr 
1993 and Scarritt 1994).  
Because such politically irrelevant areas do not pose a direct threat to the 
viability of the government, they can be ignored without fear of 
immediate harm to the government. A government such as Kenya would 
therefore prefer to concentrate its resources on maintaining powerful 
networks that sustain the political class rather than invest in the provision 
of public service goods to areas occupied by the smaller, weaker groups. 
Marginalization has several effects that weaken a community’s adaptive 
capacity to environmental changes. For instance, it increases the risk of 
conflicts escalating into violence especially where access to resources and 
political power is dependent upon ethnic considerations. Indeed, Raleigh 
posits that violent conflict over access to critical livelihood resources in 
politically irrelevant areas is often chronic and a product of absent or 
hostile governments (Raleigh 2010:71). This would explain the chronic 
nature of ethnically motivated violence in Baringo. 
The marginalization of Kenya’s arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) in general 
and that of the Il Chamus in particular can be can be perceived of in 
terms of the political relevance classification discussed above. 
Government development policy adopted at independence reflected an 
effort to institutionalize the perception of the ASAL areas of Kenya as 
politically and economically irrelevant, resulting in their marginalization. 
The next section gives the background to the marginalization of the Il 
Chamus through official government policy.  
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5.3.2 Economic policy background to marginalization 
Since gaining independence, economic policy in Kenya has been 
articulated by long term policy plans and shorter five-year development 
plans. Long term economic plans are laid out in Sessional Papers, and so 
far Kenya has had three sessional papers setting out its long term policy 
objectives: Sessional Paper Number 10 of 196530 which aimed to 
incorporate features of African socialism and democracy into economic 
planning, Sessional Paper Number 1 of 198631which incorporated the 
structural adjustment programs and Vision 2030 of 2008 which laid out 
Kenya’s policy objectives up to the year 2030.It was Sessional Paper 
Number 10 of 1965, however, that provided the blue print that was used 
to drive the government’s development and intervention agenda in 
Kenya’s ASAL. As will be seen below, this policy paper effectively 
institutionalized the marginalization of Kenya’s arid and semi-arid areas. 
Sessional Paper Number 10 of 1965 outlined the new post-colonial 
government’s blue print for development policy in the ASAL of Kenya. The 
paper introduced the new government’s theory of Democratic African 
Socialism, which provided the theoretical framework and logic within 
which the government’s objective of ensuring rapid economic 
development and social progress for all citizens would be achieved. 
One of the central tenets of the paper dealing with the right to property 
was that under African Socialism, the power to control resource use 
resides with the state, and that “the right of the state to guide, plan and 
even order the uses to which property will be put is universally recognized 
and unquestioned” (ROK 1965: 10) 
This blue print also described traditional agricultural practices as 
outmoded farming techniques that were wasteful and dangerous for the 
                                               
30 Republic of Kenya: Sessional Paper Number 10, 1965: African Socialism and its 
Application to Planning in Kenya (ROK 1965).  
 
31 Republic of Kenya: Sessional Paper Number 1 of 1986 on Economic Management for 
Renewed Growth. 
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environment. Burning of vegetation was seen as potentially turning fertile 
ground into desert, destroying forests and eliminating important water 
supplies. These practices were therefore to be curbed through education 
and legislation (ROK 1965: 24). 
It also went further do declare the preference for agriculture over 
pastoralism as the economic activity identified to be beneficial to the 
country’s development objectives. According to the paper, agriculture was 
the dominant sector of the economy and therefore its development of 
would be given first priority in the African areas (ROK 1965:36, 37). The 
economic logic behind this policy was explained and justified thus: 
 “One of our problems is to decide how much priority we should give in 
investing in less developed provinces. To make the economy as a whole 
grow as fast as possible, development money should be invested where it 
will yield the largest increase in net output. This approach will clearly 
favour the development of areas having abundant natural resources, good 
land and rainfall, transport and power facilities, and people receptive to 
and active in development” (ROK 1965:46). 
Even though the policy paper declared the government’s commitment to 
rapid economic development and social progress for all citizens, it set out 
a plan that effectively marginalized the ASAL until very recently, and it is 
therefore not surprising that to date, the so called ASAL of Kenya remain 
the least developed and marginalized in the country. Post- independence 
Kenya has, in line with this policy paper, provided little in terms of direct 
investment in the ASAL. This policy paper thus sets out the background to 
the marginalization of Kenya’s ASAL generally, and that of the Il Chamus 
in particular. This marginalization has been manifested in several ways, 
but of particular importance within the vulnerability context of Il Chamus 
livelihood are lack of political representation; denial of identity or mis-
identification; non-recognition of title to land, and other structural forms 
of marginalization that are manifested as lack of basic social services 
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including health and education, as well as poor infrastructure. The next 
section looks at particular instances of marginalization of the Il Chamus. 
5.3.3 Lack of political representation 
Kenyan politics, viewed from a Western political thought (Marxist) 
analysis, displays no common class or ideological basis that could unite 
any of the disparate groups of society in a common cause. As a result, 
politics in Kenya is largely personalized. Political power is concentrated in 
a powerful executive and state resources are distributed through 
patronage networks built upon the basis of ethnic affiliation. Access to the 
state is facilitated by powerful regional politicians rather than political 
parties, and ethnic mobilization is key to voting patterns (Wa Githinji and 
Holmquist 2009: 106-107). Orvis has gone further to describe Kenyan 
politics as among the most ethnically defined in Africa (Orvis 2001: 1).  
Elected office is the key to accessing the centre of the state resource 
distribution mechanism, and brings with it economic rewards in terms of 
remuneration as well as a link to the money making networks that exist 
at the heart of the executive. An elected member of parliament is 
therefore a key player in the access to state resources by his 
constituents, and given that Kenyan MPs are reputed to be among the 
best paid in the world, members of parliament provide a very important 
source of patronage in addition to being able to articulate the particular 
concerns of their constituents in parliament.  
Elective politics in Kenya is consequently a high-stakes activity that takes 
a lot of organization, manipulation and investment. Kenya is classified by 
the World Bank as a low income country with a per capita annual income 
of $860 in 2012 (about $2.3 per day). Members of parliament (MPs) earn 
huge amounts of money in basic salaries, allowances, mortgages, loans, 
car and other attractive benefits32.  
                                               
32 Since the start of the new parliamentary session following elections in 2013, salaries 
and remuneration for Members of Parliament (MPs) are set by the Salaries and 
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Most importantly, MPs are also in charge of the Constituencies 
Development Fund (CDF).  The Constituencies Development Fund was 
created by the Constituencies Development Fund Act, 2003 with the 
primary objective of addressing poverty at grassroots level by dedicating 
a minimum of 2.5% of the Government ordinary revenue to grassroots 
development and the reduction of poverty, and has been instrumental in 
alleviating poverty at the grassroots for instance through initiation of 
development projects and provision of scholarships to poor students33. 
However, because they are controlled by MPs, access to CDF funds is 
dependent on having a representative MP.  
The Il Chamus fall under Baringo Central constituency who’s MP for over 
40 years until his retirement from politics was former president Daniel Moi 
(1966-2002), a Tugen. Moi’s son, Gideon Moi, took over as the MP for 
Baringo Central from 2002 to 2007, when the current MP, Sammy Mwaita, 
also a Tugen, took over. As is shown in the legal analysis of the Identity 
Case in Chapter Eight, under the current mapping of electoral boundaries, 
it will be theoretically impossible for an Il Chamus to be an MP unless 
provisions catering for special interest groups are invoked. These are 
discussed at length in Chapter seven. 
5.3.4 Lack of recognition 
The Il Chamus, as with other indigenous groups in Kenya, have suffered 
from non-recognition both as a distinct ethnic community and also as an 
indigenous group. The government of Kenya has been keen to represent 
the Il Chamus as a sub-clan of the greater Maasai and therefore not 
                                                                                                                                                  
Remuneration Committee (SRC). This has seen some reduction in the rates. Ordinary 
Members of Parliament now get between $80,000 and $ 106,500 per annum in basic 
salaries exclusive of other benefits such as mortgages, car, sitting, entertainment and 
other allowances (Gazette Notice 2885 dated 28 February 2013). Previous rates for MPs 
were set by themselves through the National Assembly Remuneration Act. In the 
previous parliament, ordinary MPs got a financial package including a yearly basic salary 
of between$126,000 and $176,000. (See also Iqbal, Z: Fix the Roads: Kenya’s MPs and 
the Audacity of Greed, International Institute for Justice and Development, 
http://iijd.org, 8 July 2010). 
33 See www.cdf.go.ke 
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culturally distinct (Chapter 7). Such mis-identification has led to 
ambiguous and sometimes erroneous classification in official statistics 
with further repercussions for the marginalization of the Il Chamus. For 
Instance, in the last census for 200934 the Il Chamus were coded as 
though they were two different communities: Njemps (code 607, and Il 
Chamus code 612). Given that these were the instructions given to 
enumerators, the eventual figures ascribed a lower figure for the Il 
Chamus.  
Furthermore, the concept of indigenousness is highly contested in Kenya 
and the government does not recognize any community as being 
indigenous. The official position of the Kenya government is that “all 
Kenyans of African descent are indigenous to Kenya”35. It has explained 
its position by stating that identifying certain communities as indigenous 
would amount to discrimination on a tribal basis. These positions have 
nevertheless been conclusively rebutted both by local courts and the 
ACPHR (Chapter 7). To underscore its resistance to the concept of 
indigeneity, the Kenya government has to date not ratified ILO convention 
number 169 on indigenous and tribal people in independent countries, 
and, along with Burundi and Nigeria, abstained from voting in 2007 at the 
historic adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People (UNDRIP). 
The Kenya government instead prefers to “recognize the vulnerabilities of 
minorities/marginalized communities”36. While this gives some latitude for 
groups such as the Il Chamus to claim certain rights and protections, it 
attempts to exclude them and other groups that desire to be identified as 
indigenous the very extensive and substantive rights reserved for 
                                               
34 See Republic of Kenya: 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census 24th/25th August, 
2009: Enumerator’s Instructions Manual. 
35 See Human Rights Council/UPR, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review Kenya (2010e) §109: 23. 
36 Ibid; the Constitution of Kenya 2010. The Constitution also recognizes the concept of 
self-determination as set out in the UNDRIP by recognizing the need or desire of these 
communities to preserve their unique cultures and identity. 
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indigenous people globally. This denial also has the intention of keeping 
them out of the global network of the indigenous rights movement. 
Despite the government position, the Il Chamus, along with over 25 other 
communities37 in Kenya currently self-identify as indigenous. 
5.3.5 Lack of recognition of customary rights and title to land 
The marginalization of the Il Chamus if further exacerbated by a lack of 
recognition of their traditional and customary rights to land. While land, 
as a factor of production and as the basic foundation of all social 
ecological systems is central to economic well-being, land ownership in 
Kenya is governed by a complex set of laws that have, since the colonial 
times, applied to different parts of the country. This has made it possible 
to abuse the laws as well as the institutional authorities that govern them, 
creating space for land grabbing and irregular allocation of public land to 
powerful and influential people (Njuguna and Baya 1999). The land 
occupied by the Il Chamus was originally designated as a native reserve 
whose administration then devolved to local councils under the Trust land 
system. All the communal land used by the Il Chamus therefore is 
designated as trust land, which means that its care and management has 
been placed under the County Council of Baringo. The fact that no 
individual titles are recognized has diminished the economic value of Il 
Chamus land as a factor of production since they have no power to use it 
as a form of credit guarantee, thereby losing out on a major source of 
financing from private financial institutions which recognize individual title 
deeds as a guarantee for credit. The role of trust land in the 
marginalization of the Il Chamus and other indigenous groups in general 
was considered extensively by the TJRC and is discussed further in 
Chapter six, section 6.1.8 below. 
 
                                               
37 IWGIA 2012: Country Technical Notes on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues, The Republic of 
Kenya, at page 1. 
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5.3.6 Other sources of marginalization 
This section considers other sources of marginalization of the Il Chamus 
which can be grouped together as emanating from insufficient capacity for 
effective governance. The sum total of the interaction of these factors has 
been to increase the levels of poverty among the Il Chamus, further 
reducing their adaptive capacity to SES changes.  
Inappropriate environmental intervention measures such as the 
introduction of Prosopis juliflora, effects of violence from neighbouring 
ethnic groups, especially the Pokot (see section 5.2 above), exclusion 
from participation and decision making in local development projects have 
all led to undesirable outcomes such as lack of sufficient social amenities, 
health centres, schools and public infrastructure. These issues are 
considered in the next chapter within the context of a legal process of 
adjudication presided over by the Kenya Truth and Justice Reconciliation 
Commission (TJRC), before which the Il Chamus also appeared to seek 
resolution to their grievances against the state. This process showed the 
legal articulation of marginalization and its effects. 
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Chapter six: confronting marginalisation: appearance of the Il 
Chamus before the TJRC 
In order to articulate their grievances as a marginalized community, the Il 
Chamus appeared before the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission (TJRC)38. In addition to the two Il Chamus cases analysed in 
chapters six and seven of this thesis, the appearance before the TJRC and 
the resulting consideration, findings and recommendations of the TJRC 
provide another useful forum for the analysis of litigation as a resilience 
building mechanism. While reactions from the government to the finding 
and recommendations of the TJRC were not immediate, gradual changes 
in government policy are being observed. The next sections analyse the 
political marginalization of the Il Chamus in light of the TJRC legal 
process39.  
6.1 The TJRC consideration of the marginalization of the Il Chamus and 
other indigenous groups of Kenya 
The Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission provided another 
arena for the legal articulation of issues considered oppressive by the Il 
Chamus and other indigenous groups. The overall mandate of the TJRC 
was wide in scope, and this section focuses on the issue of 
marginalization. Here we shall see how political questions were 
formulated as legal and human rights issues. The TJRC findings and 
recommendations on the question of marginalization will also be looked at 
in this section. The next sections proceed as follows: First, we consider 
the statutory mandate of the Kenya TJRC, looking at the grounding of its 
authority in an act of parliament, as well as the definition and scope of its 
duties. This is followed by an analysis of specific issues raised by the 
various indigenous groups, including the legal formulation of 
marginalization in human rights terms as well as the duties and 
                                               
38 Public hearing held on 25th October 2011 at Government Training Institute, Kabarnet.  
See www.tjrckenya.org for more details. 
39 This analysis is based on the report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission, Volumes IIB, IIC and IV. 
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obligations of the state in ensuring the enjoyment. Lastly, the findings of 
the TJRC on marginalization and their recommendations are considered. 
6.1.1 Statutory mandate of the TJRC 
The Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) was 
mandated by parliamentary statute40 to inquire into and establish the 
reality or otherwise of perceived economic marginalisation of communities 
and make recommendations on how to address the marginalisation. 
This mandate required it to investigate, document, and make 
recommendations in relation to human rights violations of civil and 
political rights as well as social and economic rights. In relation to socio-
economic rights, the Act required the Commission to establish an 
accurate, complete and historical record of violations and abuses of 
human and economic rights inflicted on persons by the state, public 
institutions and holders of public office, both serving and retired. In doing 
this, the Act further required the commission to establish as complete a 
picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations 
of human rights and economic rights committed between 12 December 
1963 and the 28 February 2008.  
As part of its mandate therefore, the TJRC dealt with economic 
marginalisation and violations of socio-economic rights. Its report 
provided an analysis of the perceptions, narratives and reality of 
economic marginalisation. It documented marginalization at two levels: 
that of regions and that of particular groups of society. Its regional 
analysis was focused on the pre-2010 provincial administrative units, 
focusing on the North Eastern, Nyanza, Coast, Western, and North Rift 
Valley (which includes Baringo). These perceptions were then weighted 
against the documented extent to which residents of the selected regions 
enjoyed and accessed social and economic rights in reality.  
                                               
40 The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act. 
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In arriving at their finding and recommendations, the TJRC took 
testimonies from members of affected communities during hearings it 
held across the country; interviews with key actors, personalities and 
experts; memoranda submitted by individuals and groups; and reports of 
focus group discussions on economic marginalisation conducted in 
January and February 2012 in all the eight regions of the country. 
Secondary sources relied on include academic writings and reports by 
governmental and non-governmental actors or agencies. 
The TJRC therefore had to define in legal and human rights terms the 
elements of marginalization; make a finding as to whether these rights 
were violated, by whom and how; and make recommendations to remedy 
the situation. 
According to the conclusions of the TJRC, economic marginalisation was 
indeed a national and cross-cutting theme in so far as the poor and other 
disadvantaged groups such as women, ethnic minorities and indigenous 
groups are concerned.  
6.1.2 The TJRC formulation of the elements of marginalization in human 
rights terms 
The TJRC used a legal human rights based approach that construed the 
freedom from poverty as a human right and marginalisation as a breach 
of economic and social rights. In this formulation, the government is 
looked as having an obligation to guarantee the enjoyment of these rights 
by all its citizens on a principle of equality and non-discrimination. The 
TJRC therefore had to adopt a legal definition of marginalization as well as 
define the nature and scope of government obligations towards its citizens 
in the provision of the said rights.  
The commission approached human rights in a holistic way that did not 
distinguish between bodily integrity rights and social and economic rights. 
Since it was required to focus on “gross” violations of rights, such a 
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conceptualization of rights meant that a gross violation of bodily integrity 
rights was also a violation of social and economic rights, and vice-versa. 
The mandate of the TJRC to investigate gross violations of social and 
economic rights was especially significant in Kenya because these were 
not mentioned in the old constitution. Because Kenya is a dualist 
country41, these treaties, even where they provided clear rights to 
individuals and groups, local courts were unable to adjudicate over 
alleged breaches of these rights. All claims of violation of rights had to be 
formulated in terms of existing local sources of law. This meant that 
economic and social rights could not be adjudicated in Kenyan courts of 
law as they were not catered for in the old constitution. The TJRC 
therefore provided a unique forum for the consideration of violations of 
social and economic rights. 
6.1.3 Standard applied in determining state obligation and responsibility 
Since there was no local standard by which to hold the state to account 
for the violation of social and economic rights, the TJRC used the standard 
defined by the United Nations Committee on Economic and Social Rights 
in determining whether the state had met its obligation relating to socio-
economic rights. The ESR Committee issued General Comment Number 3 
to clarify the nature of a state’s obligations under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), establishing 
a ‘minimum core’ of obligations in relation to socio-economic rights: 
“A minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very 
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon 
every state party. Thus, for example, a state party in which any 
significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of 
essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most 
                                               
41 Being a dualist state means that international treaties to which Kenya is a party 
cannot be applied directly in the country and only become effective when local enabling 
legislation is passed to give effect to the provisions of the treaty. On the contrary, 
international treaties entered into by monist countries become effective immediately 
they are ratified and no further legislation is required for local effect. 
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basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations 
under the covenant. If the covenant were to be read in such a way as not 
to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived 
of its raison d’être. By the same token, it must be noted that any 
assessment as to whether a state has discharged its minimum core 
obligation must also take account of resource constraints applying within 
the country concerned. Article 2 (1) obligates each state party to take the 
necessary steps “to the maximum of its available resources”. In order for 
a state party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its 
minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it must 
demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are 
at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those 
minimum obligations. 
The new constitution of Kenya (2010) which itself was the product of 
political agitation, negotiations and litigation, does recognize social and 
economic rights42 and defines the nature of the state’s obligations 
towards the realization of those rights43. 
6.1.4 The TJRC’s legal definition of marginalization 
The TJRC, in executing its mandate, therefore adopted the following 
working definition of marginalization44. 
“Marginalisation is the social process of becoming or being made marginal 
(especially as a group within the larger society). ‘Marginality’ is seen in 
two dimensions: societal and spatial. While spatial marginality relates to 
geography – existence at the fringes, or at a distance from the centre – 
                                               
42 Under Section 43. 
43 Section 21(3) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 states that the state shall take 
legislative, policy and other measures, including the setting of standards, to achieve the 
progressive realization of the rights guaranteed under Article 43 on economic and 
social rights. In the achievement of these rights, the state is required to use maximum 
resources available (funds, people, skills, good management and other assets) 
and in an effective and accountable way, to ensure the attainment of 
maximum levels of enjoyment of rights for all.  
44 With acknowledged reference to Gurung G and M Kollmair. 2005. Marginality: 
Concepts and their limitations. 
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societal marginality ‘focuses on human dimensions such as demography, 
religion, culture, social structure (e.g. caste, hierarchy, class, ethnicity, 
and gender), economics and politics in connection with access to 
resources by individuals and groups” 
The TJRC recognized three dimensions of marginalization: political, 
economic and social-cultural. It described political marginalization as a 
disempowering outcome of social and political processes that exclude 
certain sections of society in the participation in decision making, 
representation and participation in the democratic process of governance. 
Political marginalization then leads to social and economic 
marginalization, since politically disempowered groups cannot by 
definition gain access to other social and economic rights and privileges. 
Social marginalization restricts access to social resources such as 
education, health services, housing, income and work. Poverty then 
becomes an unavoidable consequence of political and social 
marginalization. In practical terms then, this legal formulation of 
marginalization corresponds to the political ecology formulation that sees 
marginalization as an unfavourable outcome of governance inherent in 
unequal power relations.  
6.1.5 TJRC’s findings on economic marginalization 
According to the commission, various regions, groups and communities in 
Kenya have experienced economic marginalization since independence. In 
its view, this marginalization can be explained by historical, socio-
economic and political factors, including: the over-centralization of state 
power and resources; the ethnicization of politics; an all-powerful 
‘imperial’ presidency marked by lack of accountability; lack of judicial 
independence, weak rule of law and personalization of power; bad 
governance and rampant corruption; a patronage based economy reliant 
on state resources and an ineffective land tenure regime characterized by 
unresolved historical land conflicts. 
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The Commission traced the genesis of inequality and marginalization to 
the colonial administration, whose construction of ethnic boundaries as a 
strategy of government, land acquisition by European settlers and the 
massive relocation of communities to designated reserves set the 
conditions for marginalization of certain regions and communities. 
Subsequent post-colonial governments then failed to correct the resulting 
injustices, and this is seen as one of the root causes of land conflicts in 
Kenya. New government elites simply took over the land formerly 
occupied by settlers rather than restore it to its original owners, leading 
to the massive inequalities in land ownership and access witnessed today. 
As noted above, the commission also found that Kenya’s first formal 
economic blueprint, the Sessional Paper Number 10 discussed above was 
responsible to a large extent for the marginalization of certain regions in 
Kenya, most of which are occupied by pastoralists. While presented in 
terms of inclusion, human dignity, brotherhood and social justice, the 
policy prioritized investment in agriculturally viable areas at the expense 
of the more arid areas. It also prioritized private title to land as a 
necessary driver of economic growth. Thus, in communities where 
communal land tenure under customary law was present were 
immediately at a disadvantage. Customary land tenure was moreover 
limited by Trust land regulations which, rather than protect or promote 
their interest in land, became a source of dispossession and fraudulent 
excision of land from weaker communities. 
Further, the first post-colonial Kenyan government under Kenyatta went 
blatantly against the African tenets of claimed by the original policy by 
systematically weakening the constitution, increasing executive 
presidential power at the expense of the other arms of government and 
instituting a de facto one party state through repression of democratic 
dissent and opposition. The resultant state was powerful yet 
unaccountable and over time has come under the control of ethnically 
based patronage networks. 
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In the following sections, we consider certain elements of government 
practice and policy that were identified by the TJRC process as forms of 
marginalization. 
6.1.6 Lack of reliable data as marginalization 
The TJRC noted that the Kenyan state has displayed a general lack of 
accountability in relation to the availability of data on its development 
record. It was virtually impossible to gauge the extent of state 
development expenditure relating to different regions and groups. There 
is a general lack of reliable historical data regarding financial expenditure 
by the state on social programs and infrastructure in the regions identified 
as economically marginalized.  
Specifically, the TJRC expressed the view that the state’s lack of data and 
collection of data in respect to North Eastern and North Rift (including 
Baringo) only served to perpetuate the marginalisation of these regions. 
By failing to provide statistics tracking development in these regions, 
there was neither a basis upon which the state could assess the economic 
needs of these regions nor a standard by which the state’s performance 
could be measured. The net result was a further marginalization of 
already marginalized regions. 
In addition to the lack of cogent data relating to the political and 
economic marginalization of certain communities, the TJRC also noted the 
deliberate non-recognition of certain communities in the available 
government statistics. For instance, the notion that Kenya is a nation of 
42 ethnic groups or tribes amounts to a denial of the existence of certain 
groups, which are often assumed to be part of larger groups.  
The persistence of this arbitrary limit on the number of ethnic 
communities in Kenya to 42 was noted by the TJRC as being of major 
concern to minority and indigenous communities in Kenya. This statement 
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was taken to disregard existence of many smaller, perpetuating the idea 
that they were irrelevant to the national political discourse. 
6.1.7 Systematic Discrimination 
The TJRC also identified systematic discrimination of minority and 
indigenous as another form of marginalization. This discrimination was 
informed by established state policy such as the Sessional Paper Number 
10 already referred to above, lack of formal recognition of certain groups, 
denial of citizenship rights, negative public portrayal of minority and 
indigenous people and the differential application of certain laws, 
specifically that relating to trust land. 
6.1.8 Trust land laws and marginalization 
The TJRC noted that Kenya’s constitutional law before 2010 was not 
designed to resolve questions arising from colonial and post-
independence land ownership policy. For instance, communities that had 
lost land due unjust colonial laws such as the Crown Lands Ordinance 
could not rely on any existing constitutional provisions for redress. 
Ironically, the only category of land dealt with under the old constitution 
was Trust Land. Section 114 of that constitution defined Trust Land as 
including “the areas of land that were known before 1 June 1963 as 
Special Reserves, Temporary Special Reserves [or] communal reserves.” 
And further, at section 115: 
“All Trust Land shall vest in the county council within whose area of 
jurisdiction it is situated […] Each county council shall hold the Trust Land 
vested in it for the benefit of the persons ordinarily resident on that land 
and shall give effect to such rights, interests or other benefits in respect 
of the land as may, under the African customary law for the time being in 
force and applicable thereto, be vested in any tribe, group, family or 
individual: Provided that no right, interest or other benefit under African 
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customary law shall have effect for the purposes of this sub-section so far 
as it is repugnant to any written law”. 
According to the Commission, this definition excluded those minority 
ethnic communities such as the Ogiek, Sengwer, Boni and coastal 
communities that were previously not recognized and vested with 
‘reserve’ land. Further, there was no reliable system of division of land 
under the custody of county councils between the various communities 
resident in them. 
County councils were vested with enormous power in respect of Trust 
Land under their authority, and rules for acquisition by the state of Trust 
Land were ambiguous as to the rights of minority communities.  
Protection of customary land tenure under Trust Land laws was so weak 
that minority and indigenous communities covered under these laws were 
left vulnerable. The rights of communities under Trust Land were limited 
to the “use of the land subject to customary laws of that community”. 
However, statutory law took judicial precedence over these customary 
laws. The commission noted that the protection accorded to customary 
land tenure under such conditions was weak and inadequate to protect 
the rights of communities. 
The Trust Land system was also amenable to abuse by county councils as 
had indeed been the case in many parts of the country, where councils, 
contrary to their obligations as custodians of the land, have used their 
authority to fraudulently and irregularly dispose of Trust Land. 
The transformation of the Trust Land regime in Kenya by the new 
constitution is therefore one of the most important achievements of legal 
regulation in Kenya, including litigation by groups such as the Il Chamus, 
political agitation and lobbying by human rights groups and a democratic 
expression of popular will through a referendum. This issue is discussed 
further in chapter 7 under outcomes of Il Chamus litigation. 
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6.1.9 Violence in pastoral areas as marginalization 
The commission noted that violence in pastoral areas of Kenya is endemic 
and it defined the responsibility of the state in terms of the international 
legal norm known as “Responsibility to Protect”. This norm was affirmed 
by the UN General Assembly and the commission deemed it applicable in 
the Kenyan context to ensure that the state protects pastoralists and 
other communities from mass killings and other atrocities. 
The concept of “Responsibility to Protect” applies to all situations where 
citizens’ lives and property are at risk from violence, and as the 
commission noted, the fact that the violence is classified as inter-
communal in nature or grounded in a long-standing, culturally-based 
practice does not exempt it from the reach of the state “Responsibility to 
Protect” obligation. Quoting a recent statement on inter-communal 
violence in Nigeria by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 
the commission noted that: 
“This responsibility requires preventing massacres before they are 
perpetrated and halting them should they begin. It involves ensuring that 
... military, police and government officials - local, state and federal - do 
not commit ‘Responsibility to Protect’ crimes and take appropriate 
measures to prevent and halt atrocities committed by non-state actors” 
The commission acknowledged that it had received reports from multiple 
communities including the Il Chamus of assistance being sought from 
authorities to address impending raids but. Such calls for assistance have 
regularly been met with total failure or delayed response from state 
security forces, sometimes arriving days after deadly attacks have been in 
progress. Some reports did suggest the collusion of security forces in 
political and economic based raiding, and the commission noted this as a 
major barrier to the effective provision of security. 
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6.2 Some specific findings and recommendations of the TJRC 
-The TJRC, in its final observations, found that certain communities in 
Kenya had been marginalized because of their status as indigenous 
people. In so doing, it declared that there had been sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that minority and indigenous communities in Kenya have 
suffered specific gross violations of human rights on account of their 
membership in these communities. 
-Accordingly, the TJRC found that throughout the period it was mandated 
to investigate (from 12 December 1963 to 28 February 2008), the state 
had failed to recognize the existence, unique culture and contributions of 
many minority and indigenous communities in Kenya, including the Il 
Chamus. 
-The Commission also found that the state had, since independence, 
consistently discriminated against minority and indigenous communities, 
specifically those residing in North Eastern, Upper Eastern, Rift Valley and 
Coast provinces, by the use of emergency laws and regulations in 
violation of their rights to equality and due process of law. 
-In relation to violence in predominantly pastoralist areas, the TJRC found 
that the state had failed in its responsibility to protect its citizens as 
defined in international law. As a result of this failure, there was gross 
violation of personal integrity and economic rights in the form of 
thousands of deaths, injuries, forced displacement, sexual violence, loss 
of property and destruction of entire homesteads and villages over a 
period of more than 40 years. 
-Rather than protect its citizens, the TJRC observed that the state had 
engaged in security operations in these areas that were so oppressive 
that they amounted in some cases to crimes against humanity. 
Specifically, the commission made reference to the so called “Wagalla 
Massacre” targeting the Degodia Somali community, attacks on the Pokot 
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community, bombings of Samburu communities, as well as multiple other 
operations45. 
-The state had also failed in addressing boundary disputes among 
pastoralist communities such as the Turkana, Pokot, Borana and Somali 
clans, resulting in unresolved conflicts, violence, murder, displacement of 
thousands of communities, loss of livelihood and generally interfering with 
the economic and social development of the communities concerned. 
-Regarding the administration of land, the commission found that laws 
and regulations governing the various categories of land in Kenya, 
including Trust Land, Government land, or Group ranches, has created a 
situation of de facto discrimination, leading to the massive dispossession 
of pastoralist and hunter-gatherer communities by expulsion from their 
ancestral lands. 
-The commission also found that development policies adopted by the 
state have failed to protect the rights of minorities and indigenous 
peoples and have been implemented without their free, prior and 
informed consent as required by law. Rather than create conditions that 
would enhance the quality of the lives of minority and indigenous 
communities, a big majority of the projects have exacerbated the 
marginalization and exclusion of these groups. 
-Finally, the TJRC found that the state had failed in its obligations by 
consistently refusing to implement important judicial decisions related to 
promoting and protecting the rights of minority groups, such as the those 
emanating from litigation by the Il Chamus and Endorois communities. In 
the light of these findings, the TJRC made the following 
recommendations: 
                                               
45 The Wagalla massacre took place on 10 February 1984 at the Wagalla Airstrip in Wajir, 
North Eastern Province. Kenyan troops called in to quell inter-ethnic violence stand 
accused of rounding up, detaining at brutally murdering at the Wagalla Airstrip about 
5,000 Somali men. The TJRC declared the Wagalla massacre the worst human rights 
violation in Kenya's history. 
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-That within two years of the issuance of its final report, the government 
ratifies the following international and regional instruments: ILO 
Convention 169; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide; Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; Convention Against 
Discrimination in Education; and Statelessness Conventions. 
-That within six months of the issuance of this report, the president of the 
Republic of Kenya issues an official, public and unconditional apology to 
minority and indigenous communities in Kenya for the state’s systematic 
discrimination against these groups and communities during the mandate 
period. 
-That the Kenya Law Reform Commission examines all Kenyan legislation 
to ensure that it does not result in de jure or de facto discrimination 
against minority groups.  
-That the relevant government institutions, in consultation with minority 
and indigenous groups, develop national legislation governing state-
sponsored or private development programs that requires free-prior and 
informed consent of affected communities and that includes specific 
guidelines as to how to engage in a process of consultation with 
communities. 
-That the government develops a plan on data collection and 
disaggregation on minority and indigenous communities, with special 
attention to ensuring disaggregation of data related to minority and 
indigenous women. The process shall incorporate the principles of the 
United Nations Expert Workshop on Data Collection and Disaggregation 
for Indigenous Peoples. 
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Picture 6: members of the Il Chamus community talk to the press after making 
representations before the TJRC public hearing held on 25th October 2011 at 
Government Training Institute, Kabarnet. 
 
Conclusion 
The legal process by the TJRC, white not directly instigated by the Il 
Chamus, did provide another forum for the articulation of legal rights, and 
particularly those concerning marginalized groups. 
As a highly valued legal process with an international audience, the 
process was instrumental in making authoritative analyses and definitions 
of issues affecting indigenous communities and as such lessened the need 
for future government resistance. 
While its powers of prosecution are limited to making recommendations, 
such recommendations do create another standard for holding the 
government to account as far as its obligations and duties are concerned. 
Already, government policy and attitudes can be seen to be changing in 
response to the sum total of political and legal processes including that of 
the TJRC and the two discussed in the following chapters. 
157 
 
The next two chapters focus on litigation and the agency of the Il Chamus 
in responding to their conditions of vulnerability described in the 
preceding sections of this chapter.  
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Chapter 7: Challenging environmental intervention: the Prosopis 
case. 
Introduction 
Together with the last section of the previous chapter, the next two 
chapters in this thesis focus on legal processes involving the Il Chamus 
and the government. They aim to show the use of litigation in a politicized 
environment (Bryant 1998) and its role in resilience building. Litigation is 
presented here as a useful mechanism of contestation to access, gain 
control and maintain rights over resources. An analysis of the court cases 
is employed as a tool to bring out the salient aspects of contestation 
inherent in the political nature of environmental governance. In chapters 
six and seven, two Il Chamus cases, each targeting different aspects of 
their vulnerability are presented and analysed.  
The first case considered is a reaction by the Il Chamus to an 
environmental intervention by the government which saw the introduction 
of Prosopis juliflora into Baringo and which had profound effects on the Il 
Chamus SES. Prosopis juliflora has already been discussed in chapter 
three above as part of the vulnerability context of the Il Chamus. Here it 
will be considered in the light of contested versions of its nature and 
effects on the environment presented by the opposing parties. 
The case of Charles Lekuyen Nabori and 9 others versus Attorney General 
and 3 others [2008] eKLR, hereafter the Prosopis case, was brought by 
the Il Chamus against the government of Kenya, seeking remedy for 
damages suffered as a result of the Prosopis plant. A legal analysis of this 
case will show, in a general sense, the process of transformation of 
politically articulated concepts such as sustainable development into legal 
rights. More specifically, it will show: how the Il Chamus made use of 
elements of environmental law such as the right to a clean environment 
and the right to sustainable development to prove government liability; 
how the Il Chamus linked the invasion of Prosopis juliflora to breaches in 
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constitutional principles of right to life and right to property; and how the 
Il Chamus deployed strategies of dramatic spectacle and traditional dress 
to reinforce their cases against the government while invoking elements 
of their ethnic identity.  
Before entering into a legal analysis proper, this chapter will first offer an 
analysis of the process involved in enjoining the actors in both cases. This 
analysis is based on the actor network theory, and, since the actors in the 
two Il Chamus cases were all drawn from the same pool, the process 
depicted here applies to both cases. 
7.1 An Actor Network Theory approach to Il Chamus litigation 
In order to better understand how the Il Chamus managed to organize 
themselves to take advantage of local and international legal concepts 
and convert their political grievances into legal issues, this section makes 
use of Callon’s actor network theory, or sociology of translation (Callon 
1999). 
Callon describes the sociology of translation as a means of production of 
knowledge and construction of a network of relationships in which social 
and natural actors control both who they are and what they want (Callon 
1999: 68). During the process of translation, the identity of the actors, 
the conditions and scope of their interaction are negotiated and decided 
upon (Callon 1999: 68). Identifiable in this process are Callon’s four 
moments of translation, namely: problematization, interessement, 
enrolment and mobilization. 
7.1.1 The primary movers and the problematization 
In this specific case we see the role played by a small group of primary 
movers consisting of well-educated Il Chamus elite and some elders who 
used legal knowledge and other resources at their disposal in structuring 
a network of actors based on a particular form of power relationship. 
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This small group of primary movers was the main driver of the process of 
translation and the movement of the process through Callon’s moments of 
translation is clearly discernible. First, they go through a stage of 
problematization, where they formulate the problem at hand and 
determine the actors. Occupying an integral position in the process, they 
frame the problem in such a way that they are indispensable in its 
resolution. The primary movers were the same for the two Il Chamus 
cases and was a small group consisting of Il Chamus students, a legal 
practitioner and some elders. They became indispensable by framing the 
problem as one of transforming narratives of marginalization and 
indigenous identity into political capital. They also presented litigation as 
a means to this end. Litigation would provide answers to pertinent 
questions such as: whether the government has an unqualified right to 
determine the terms of environmental governance and whether they 
could be held liable for breaches thereof; whether the Il Chamus could be 
recognized as an indigenous and vulnerable group in Kenya, and whether 
the rights and protections associated with indigenous identity and enjoyed 
by others elsewhere in the world could also be realized by the Il Chamus.  
The primary movers possessed between them the legal knowledge 
(through the legal practitioner), the social capital (through the traditional 
influence of the elders) and other resources (through links to a local NGO 
and the international indigenous group movement). They were thus 
indispensable to the process. 
The primary movers also determined the group of actors who were to be 
involved in the process of litigation, including the petitioners who would 
put their names forward as representing the whole of the Il Chamus 
community, administrators, local activists, the legal representatives, the 
legal exhibits as well as the list of respondents. These included: Thomas 
Letangule, the Il Chamus legal practitioner who also was to act as their 
main advocate in court; Pheroze Nowrojee, a well-celebrated human 
rights lawyer based in Nairobi; some students; a local NGO known as the 
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Mainyoito Pastoralist Integrated Development Organization46 (MPIDO); 
elders drawn mainly from the Il Medoti age group, and a goat which was 
presented as a live legal exhibit at the high court in Nairobi. Through the 
formulation of the legal claim, they also determined who their legal 
adversaries were to be in court (the Attorney General and the other 
respondents). Thus, through formulating the problem legally and 
determining the actors, the process of problematization to which the 
primary movers were indispensable was complete. A full list of actors is 
provided in figures 5 and 6 below. 
7.1.2 Interessement, enrolment and mobilization 
Once the problematization was complete, various devices were used to 
ensure the participation and cooperation of the Il Chamus as a 
community. Elders of the Il Medoti age group, being the patrons of the Il 
Kiapu age group who were the Moran at that time, led the efforts to 
persuade the community to support the cause. The appeal to the wisdom 
and authority of the elders from the Il Medoti age group was used to 
legitimize the process in the eyes of the community, as well as to 
dissuade or even suppress any dissenting voices. Negotiations and 
discussions were centred on a common ethnic identity and experiences of 
suffering as well as presentation of evidence of marginalization and the 
strong possibility of success in court. Il Medoti women were also 
instrumental in fund-raising to meet part of the legal costs and 
transportation of the petitioners and supporters to Nairobi. Every 
household was asked to contribute 1000 Kenyan Shillings.  
Once the commitment and cooperation of a large section of the 
community was reached, mobilization followed. Since the processes of 
translation and litigation involve a small group claiming to represent the 
larger society, mobilization has to do with the legitimacy of the 
representatives or spokesmen. Whether the spokesmen are truly 
                                               
46 http://mpido.org/ 
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representative of the group depends on how well controversies 
challenging this relationship are resolved (Callon 1999). As we shall see in 
the legal analysis below, this question was also tackled and positively 
resolved in court, when it was decided by the judges that indeed the few 
nominated petitioners could claim to represent or speak on behalf of the 
whole Il Chamus community. 
 
 
NAME AGE-GROUP OCCUPATION 
1. Thomas Letangule Il Mopoiye Legal practitioner 
2. Amos Lempaka Il Kiapu Human Rights Activist 
3. Charles Lekuyen Nabori Il Medoti Senior Chief 
4. Joel Ole Saaya Il Medoti Councillor 
5. Clement Nashuru Il Mopoiye Legal scholar, MPIDO 
6. Wesley Kakimon Il Mopoiye Councillor, Il Chamus ward 
7. Edward Tamar Il Kiapu Teacher 
8. Ngamia R. Lemeiguran Il Medoti Elder 
9.Shaolin Leriche Meguran Il Kiliaku University student 
10.Samson Lereya Kakimon Il Mopoiye Teacher  
11. Samantita S. Lengigaa Il Mopoiye Elder 
12. Stanley Leterewaa Il Medoti Retired teacher 
Figure 5: The Il Chamus actors 
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NAME REMARKS 
13. Pheroze Nowrojee Leading Kenyan human rights lawyer and 
senior counsel. 
14. Mainyoito Pastoralist Integrated 
Development Organization (MPIDO) 
                                                         
See below ⃰. 
15. The Honourable Attorney General Main respondent in both cases and is the 
face of the government in court. 
16. The Minister for Environmental and 
Natural Resources 
Respondent, chief government officer in 
charge of environment and natural 
resource issues in Kenya.  
17. National Environmental Management 
Authority 
Respondent, government agency in charge 
of environmental management. 
18. The Country Council of Baringo 
 
Respondent, chief trustee of Il Chamus 
land. 
19. Electoral Commission of Kenya Respondent, in charge of delimiting 
electoral boundaries as well as regulating 
nominated members of parliament under 
special interest group category. 
Figure 6: other actors 
 
⃰ The Mainyoito Pastoralist Integrated Development Organization47 
(MPIDO) is a non-governmental organization (NGO) established in 1996 to 
fight against the marginalization of Maa-speaking pastoralists in Kenya. It 
is headquartered in Nairobi but conducts field activities in Kajiado North, 
Narok, Naivasha, Nakuru and its environs. MPIDO has, as one of its main 
objectives, to promote and secure the rights of Maa speaking pastoralists 
with regard to land and natural resources, and they seek to achieve this is 
through lobbying, advocacy and the engagement of communities in public 
interest litigation. Through financial and legal advice as well as civic 
education and awareness creation, they assist communities such as the Il 
Chamus to take their cases to court. 
                                               
47 http://mpido.org/ 
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The Il Chamus got connected to MPIDO through an Il Chamus legal 
scholar who was linked to MPIDO during its formative years. Through 
MPIDO, the Il Chamus are connected to the global network of indigenous 
movements. MPIDO is the current Chair of the World Alliance for Mobile 
Indigenous Peoples. Locally, MPIDO is part of the Kenya Land Alliance. 
The Kenya Land Alliance (KLA) is an umbrella network of Civil Society 
Organizations and Individuals committed to effective advocacy for the 
reform of policies and laws governing land in Kenya48. MPIDO also has 
observer status with the African Commission for Human and Peoples' 
Rights (ACHPR) and is an active participant in this Commission's periodic 
sessions. They also are linked to the United Nations human rights system 
through the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples Issues and the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The Il 
Chamus are thus well connected to the international indigenous rights 
movement and are able to align themselves to current and emerging 
discourses relating to the human rights of indigenous peoples. The next 
section is devoted to an analysis of the Prosopis case. The case will also 
look at the strategies employed by the Il Chamus to influence public 
opinion to their favour, for example by the use of dramatic effects in the 
performance of litigation. 
7.2 Case analysis 
The case of Charles Lekuyen Nabori and 9 others versus Attorney General 
and 3 others [2008]eKLR (Petition 466 of 2006), hereafter also referred 
to as the Prosopis case, was brought against the government of Kenya 
and its agents by the ten Il Chamus residents of Ng’ambo location49 
acting on behalf of the entire Il Chamus community. The suit, lodged as a 
constitutional reference, named as respondents the Attorney General of 
Kenya in his capacity as the principal legal advisor of the Government of 
                                               
48 http://www.kenyalandalliance.or.ke/ 
49 Drawn from the list of participants in section 6.3.1 above, they were Charles Lekuyen 
Nabori, Joel Ole Saaya, Clement Nashuru, Wesley Kakimon, Edward Tamar, Ngamia 
Rangal Lemeiguran, Shaolin Leriche Meiguran, Samson Lereya Kakimon, Samantita 
Samaria Lengiyaa and Stanley Leterewaa 
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Kenya (first respondent), the Minister for Environment and Natural 
Resources (second respondent), the National Environmental Management 
Authority (third respondent) and the County Council of Baringo (fourth 
respondent). The Il Chamus community was represented by one of their 
own,  Thomas Letangule, identified earlier as one of the primary movers 
and who also acted as lead counsel in the case (see figure 5 above). The 
case was argued in front of three judges: Honourable Lady Justice K. H 
Rawal, Honourable Lady Justice Mary Ang’awa and Honourable Justice D. 
K. S Aganyanya. 
It will be noted here that the filing of the Prosopis case was not the first 
time the Il Chamus were attempting to go to court about Prosopis. In 
2006 they filed a complaint against the Attorney General and the Minister 
of Environmental and Natural Resources50. This plaint was however hastily 
withdrawn because of technical and procedural objections raised by the 
Attorney General. In order to by-pass these procedural difficulties, the Il 
Chamus opted, as a tactical move, to file a case based primarily on 
constitutional rights instead. 
As will be seen in the following sections, the execution by the Il Chamus 
of their case against the government was ingenious because it deployed 
legal arguments that linked the negative effects of Prosopis on the 
environment to breaches of the constitutionally guaranteed rights to life 
and property as well as to fundamental principles of environmental law 
and international conventions. The Il Chamus used the court as a platform 
to demonstrate to the world not only their perceptions about the ill effects 
of the Prosopis plant on their livelihood, but also the unjust nature of their 
relationship with the government as a key player in the environmental 
governance of the Lake Baringo Basin.  
An additional dimension to Il Chamus strategy was the dramatic 
performance of their legal arguments, involving the use of highly emotive 
                                               
50 This complaint is filed in the court records with Reference number Hccc115/06. 
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language, readily recognizable accessories such as traditional dress and 
public performance of traditional songs. For added dramatic effect in the 
Prosopis case, the Il Chamus brought a toothless goat to court. This was 
meant to show the judges a living example of what Prosopis can do to the 
teeth of a goat. While the toothless goat was eventually never admitted in 
evidence as an official exhibit of the court, its impact on the publicity of 
the Il Chamus predicament was immense, and it became an iconic 
representation of the detrimental effects of Prosopis juliflora. 
The analysis in the next sections will bring out contested versions of the 
origins, characteristics and effects of Prosopis juliflora on the livelihood 
profile of the Il Chamus community. To support their various positions, 
both sides presented affidavits and oral declarations under oath. 
7.2.1 The Il Chamus complaint 
The precise nature of the Il Chamus complaint against the four 
respondents was that due to administrative failures and negligent 
intervention on the environment by the government and its agents, they 
caused the invasive weed Prosopis juliflora to grow and colonize a large 
part of the Lake Baringo Basin environment. For these failures and the 
resulting injury, the Il Chamus sought remedy from the court in the form 
of specific compensation, exemplary damages, costs of the suit and any 
other remedy the court would deem appropriate to the injury suffered. 
 They anchored their legal claim to the land affected by the Prosopis plant 
to their status as communal land owners with a long and continuous 
history of occupation; an ancestral link to the land; and by virtue of heavy 
dependence on the land for their livelihood and subsistence. They also 
pointed to the fact that they had laid out a significant investment in the 
land by building schools and other social amenities. 
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7.2.2 The legal framing of the Prosopis case 
The Prosopis case, as already noted, was lodged as a constitutional 
reference. As such, it was framed in terms of breaches to fundamental 
constitutional rights, specifically the right to life, the right to a clean 
environment, and the right to property. Anchored on these constitutional 
rights were statutory functions defined by two acts of parliament, the 
alleged breach of which defined the full scope of the Il Chamus case. 
These were the Noxious Weeds Act (NWA) and the Environmental 
Management and Coordination Act (EMCA). As will be seen below, this 
combined approach that appended statutory obligations to constitutional 
rights was a clever legal strategy by the Il Chamus to by-pass the 
procedural difficulties of a purely statutory track.   
From a legal perspective, the Il Chamus had two tracks open to them for 
the ventilation of their concerns about Prosopis Juliflora. The first was to 
follow the channels laid down under the statutory provisions of the 
Environmental Management Act. The second was to bypass the statutory 
process and present a suit directly to the constitutional court. The 
technicality to be overcome in this case was that the constitutional court 
only dealt with “constitutional” matters, and a casual reading of the Il 
Chamus case would readily suggest that this matter was indeed subject to 
statutory rather than constitutional adjudication, which is why framing it 
as they did was an ingenious move. 
Further, as it would emerge during the hearing, the Il Chamus had indeed 
already tried following the statutory option, and had in fact raised a 
complaint to the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) as 
required by statute on the negative effects of Prosopis on their 
livelihood51.   
                                               
51 This petition, done with the assistance of the Community Museums of Kenya (an 
NGO), was registered by the Public Complaints Committee of NEMA as PCC Complaint 
Number 67 of 2005 and was lodged against the Kenya Forestry Research Institute 
(KEFRI) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (F.A.O.). 
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The NEMA committee consequently carried out investigations into the 
effects of the weed and upheld the claims by the Il Chamus, 
recommending, among other steps, that Prosopis be declared a noxious 
weed under the Noxious Weeds Act and eradicated. These 
recommendations were, however, not implemented, and this is why the Il 
Chamus opted for a constitutional reference: the statutory procedure 
conferred no powers on the statutory body concerned to implement its 
own recommendations or remedies upon the infringement of 
environmental rights. On the contrary, the constitutional court had 
powers to implement its own decisions through the issuance of 
appropriate orders. Further, the constitutional court had a wider scope to 
award damages and other more specific remedies as sought by the Il 
Chamus. Thus the tactical decision by the Il Chamus to institute 
proceeding before a constitutional court was a pragmatic decision based 
on the fact that the court, as opposed to the statutory body, had in place 
mechanisms to enforce its decisions. 
7.2.3 Case analysis: preliminary issues 
Before the case could proceed to a full hearing, the court had to respond 
to certain issues relating to the competence of the application and the 
jurisdiction of the court to hear the matter. 
The respondents in the case all raised preliminary objections on two main 
procedural issues. The first related to the choice by the Il Chamus to file a 
constitutional reference rather than a statutory based claim. The 
government side argued that since there were sufficient statutory 
provisions catering for the concerns of the Il Chamus, the application was 
not properly before a constitutional court and was therefore an abuse of 
process and a waste of the court’s time. 
Secondly, the respondents claimed that the Il Chamus had not indicated 
in the title of the petition, the specific provisions of the constitution which 
they alleged to have been violated.  
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The court however observed that these were general guidelines only and 
in this case the alleged violations were so clear to the court that it was 
not in difficulty to know the extent of the petitioners’ case and their 
claims. This was a sensible and pragmatic approach that upheld the 
interests of justice in the face of formulaic and procedural obstacles 
calculated to frustrate the flow of justice. The court admonished the 
respondents for dwelling on inconsequential technical issues not worthy of 
the gravity of the constitutional matters they were called upon to 
adjudicate. 
The respondents also claimed that while the petitioners were required to 
provide adequate evidence to prove their allegations, they had not shown 
what specific loss and damage they had suffered. The court replied that 
the sufficiency or otherwise of the evidence is an issue of proof of the 
claims and cannot by itself be a ground to make the matter incompetent 
or an abuse of the court process. 
The court noted that the government was attempting to rely on 
technicalities to defeat the course of justice and declared that access to 
justice is a constitutional right which cannot be restricted by procedural 
technicalities (statement of Justice Rawal). 
The government argued that only two issues raised by the Il Chamus had 
constitutional status thus meriting the consideration of the court: one 
touching on the breach of the right to life as protected and envisaged by 
section 70 and 71 the Constitution, and the other relating to the breach of 
right to property. They contended therefore that the rest of the claim 
ought to be struck off. 
However, by admitting that at least two declarations were of 
constitutional status, the respondents fatally injured their objections to 
the proceeding of this case in a constitutional rather than a statutory 
court. In the event, the judges affirmed their jurisdiction on account of 
170 
 
the two constitutional issues, but broadened the scope of their judgment 
to include virtually all the points made by the Il Chamus. 
Having disposed of the preliminary issues, the court proceeded to 
consider the substantive issues of the case. 
7.2.4 Substantive issues: prayers by the Il Chamus 
As already mentioned above, the Il Chamus filed their petition invoking 
provisions of sections 60, 70, 71 and 75 of the then Constitution of Kenya 
and Provisions of Environmental Management and Coordination Act 
(EMCA) and the Noxious Weed Act (Cap 325 Laws of Kenya). These 
provisions relate to the right to life, the right to property and the right to 
a clean environment. 
Specifically, the Il Chamus sought the following declarations: 
- A declaration that the fundamental right to life as protected and 
envisaged by Section 70 and 71 Constitution of Kenya, comprises, 
consists and translates to the right and entitlement to a clean and healthy 
environment free from pollution of any kind that is detrimental to human 
health, wealth and/or socio-economic well-being and ultimately the 
human life. 
- A declaration that the right to a clean and healthy environment is a 
fundamental attribute of people and the aggression to the environment 
occasioned by the weed Prosopis Juliflora amounts to a breach of this 
right, which this Honourable Court is empowered to address and remedy 
accordingly. 
- A declaration that the Petitioners right to life, as set out in section 71 of 
the Constitution has been compromised by the introduction of the weed 
Prosopis Juliflora to warrant this Honourable Court’s intervention. 
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- That the weed Prosopis Juliflora be declared a noxious weed in the same 
category with other weeds set out in the suppression of Noxious Weeds 
Act Cap 325 Laws of Kenya. 
- A declaration that the failure by the Respondents to take affirmative 
steps towards eradication of the weed/plant Prosopis Juliflora amounts to 
breach of the right to own property and from compulsory denial of that 
right as set out in Section 75 of the constitution of Kenya, due to the 
invasive nature of the weed. 
- A declaration that the introduction of the weed Prosopis Juliflora to 
Ng’ambo location of Marigat Division of Baringo District of Kenya in or 
about 1982 and the continued unabated spread of the weed was and is a 
clear contravention of the three fold statutory and internationally 
acknowledged principles on protection and conservation of environment 
namely the Sustainable Development Principle, the Polluter pays principle, 
and the Precautionary principle. 
- A declaration that the introduction of the weed Prosopis Juliflora 
amounted to and still amounts to a breach of the petitioners right to 
sustainable development as envisaged and set out in the Environmental 
Management and Coordination Act 1999. 
Additionally, the Il Chamus sought orders of total eradication of Prosopis 
Juliflora and the appointment of a Commission to assess and quantify the 
loss visited upon the environment and to residents of Baringo District by 
the Plant, as well as orders for compensation and Exemplary Damages. 
The Il Chamus claimed in their petition that the Prosopis plant had been 
shown to be a harmful plant wherever it had been planted. Specifically, 
they claimed that it had caused particular injury to them as a community 
and to their environment as follows: 
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- That owing to its invasiveness, Prosopis forms extensive and 
impenetrable thickets that gradually choke up all other indigenous plants 
and grasses leaving much of the soil bare and prone to erosion. 
- That it suppresses the growth of other vegetation thus leading to the 
loss of pasture important for livestock. 
- That the Prosopis thorn is poisonous and has led to the loss of livestock 
impeded human movement and damaged machinery. Specifically, 
Prosopis thorns have caused paralysis of limbs leading to amputation of 
affected limbs, resulted in massive punctures to machinery, caused 
blockage of roads and footpaths. 
- That Prosopis has also caused the blockage of rivers, causing flooding. 
- That Prosopis has grown into homes and schools, causing displacement 
of people and loss of playing fields. 
- That Prosopis has had a negative psychological effect on the residents, 
causing anxiety and fear. 
- That by directly destroying the pastoral enterprise which is the economic 
bedrock of the Il Chamus, Prosopis has caused massive poverty in the 
area. 
The Il Chamus went on to show that not only was the Prosopis plant 
harmful to them, but that the government, the Ministry of Environment 
and Natural Resources, the National Environmental Management Agency 
and the Baringo County Council were all responsible to various precise 
degrees. 
7.2.5 Alleged government responsibility 
In the Prosopis case the Il Chamus alleged that the Government of Kenya 
together with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) introduced a 
noxious weed known as Prosopis Juliflora within the Ng’ambo location, 
Marigat Division area of the Rift Valley Province in the early 1980’s. 
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Because of its status as a UN body enjoying diplomatic immunity in 
Kenya, the FAO was omitted from the suit. 
According to the Il Chamus, the government had not been forthright in 
their intentions and actually misled them that the plant would be of 
benefit to them, only for it to wreak havoc on their livelihood. They 
claimed that within a period of about 20 years, the plant had colonized 
their living space and was still spreading. It had caused loss of pasture by 
crowding out indigenous plants, loss of livestock, and blockage of roads, 
foot paths and rivers. Prosopis also had poisonous thorns that were 
harmful to human beings and livestock. Because of these effects, the 
plant had destroyed the economic basis of their livelihood. 
Specifically, the Il Chamus accused the government of:  
- Knowingly allowing the introduction of the weed while knowing or ought 
to have known its impact on the environment in the long term; 
- Failing to take measures to safeguard further damage and/or address 
the problem of the weed on the environment or the people; 
- Lacking a policy to eradicate Prosopis despite loud complaints from the 
affected communities; 
- Introducing the weed without a contingency plan to manage its adverse 
effects; 
- Failing to monitor the spread and impact of Prosopis and prevent further 
spread and damage. 
- Failing to compensate the affected communities for losses suffered; 
- Being reckless by introducing Prosopis without carrying out proper 
research on its effects; 
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- Ignoring available evidence from countries of origin on the highly 
negative effects of Prosopis and proceeding nevertheless to sanction the 
introduction of Prosopis on the petitioner’s land. 
- Failing to institute environmental management measures to stop the 
further spread of Prosopis. 
The Il Chamus contended that because of these failures or negligence of 
the Government, they were holding it liable for the loss, suffering and 
massive damage to the environment and their livelihood. The government 
was also acting in contravention to its obligations as a signatory to the 
convention on Biological Diversity 1992. The government’s negligence, 
according to the Il Chamus, was further demonstrated by their failure to 
act on the recommendations of the report of the public complaints 
committee which had outlined specific steps for the government to take in 
dealing with the Prosopis problem. 
The government, on its part, denied responsibility for the presence of 
Prosopis in the area and countered that the petitioners must prove their 
allegations that the government introduced the said Prosopis Juliflora to 
the area and that the same has adverse effect on the environment. 
In opposing the claim by the Il Chamus that their right to property had 
been breached, the government argued that the relevant sections of the 
constitution cited by the Il Chamus only dealt with trust land (see chapter 
six, section 6.1.8), and since the Il Chamus had not shown that they held 
trust land, they could not therefore have a right to claim and hold land 
under the constitution. Further, the government reminded the court that 
since the Il Chamus had earlier field and withdrawn a suit (see footnote 
52 above) based on the same issue of Prosopis juliflora and which made 
no claim to property, there was no justification for the Il Chamus to make 
a claim for property under this constitutional reference. Moreover, they 
argued that loss of property was governed by the Land Acquisition Act 
which dealt with compulsory acquisition of property. The fact therefore 
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that Prosopis has taken over the petitioners’ land did not amount to 
compulsory acquisition, and since the said land was still there, it was 
therefore not true that the Government acquired the land for the last 20 
years. This argument was defeated when the court declared that in the 
modern context the right to property can be breached in other ways than 
compulsory acquisition, including the taking over of Il Chamus land by 
Prosopis. The fact that they could not use their land as they wished due to 
the presence of Prosopis amounted to a breach of the right to property. 
On the report of the Public Complaints Committee, the government 
suggested that it was a policy matter under section 5 of EMC Act and as 
such should not have been placed before the constitutional court for 
interpretation. 
The government argued that in any case, it was practically impossible to 
eradicate Prosopis Juliflora, but that it could nonetheless be used on a 
positive way to sustain development, control climate change and reduce 
green- house gasses in the atmosphere. As such, exploitation of the plant 
was the best possible management option. 
On the their obligations to respect and uphold provisions of international 
treaties and conventions to which they were a party, the government  
claimed that the international instrument referred to by the Il Chamus did 
not fall under customary international law, was soft law and therefore not 
binding on the government.  
On the demands by the Il Chamus that a commission be set up to enquire 
to the losses incurred by the community, they claimed that none should 
be set up because no evidence of any losses has been demonstrated by 
the Il Chamus. 
For their part, the National Environmental Management Agency (NEMA) 
was accused of failing in its statutory duties as laid down in its 
establishing act, The Environmental Management and Coordination Act, 
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1999 (EMCA) and failing to advise the government appropriately 
regarding the effects and management of Prosopis. 
Further, the Il Chamus alleged that as a result of this statutory failure by 
the NEMA, the government had not addressed the plight of the petitioners 
and all other affected groups, causing them irreparable harm.  
The National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA) claimed that 
they had been wrongly enjoined into the proceedings. Not only was the 
introduction of Prosopis done before the enactment of EMCA which they 
were being accused of failing to act upon, the proper procedure for the 
petition would have been to pursue the provisions of the statute and not 
the Constitution. They further argued that fundamental rights can only be 
guaranteed and secured by the state, and therefore a statutory body such 
as the NEMA cannot be sued for the same. 
However, enjoining the third respondent (NEMA) to the petition served 
another very important function for the Il Chamus from a legal strategic 
point of view. Any proof provided by the NEMA to substantiate what steps 
they had been taking to fulfil their mandate would invariably introduce 
into the court record the findings by their Public Complaints Committee 
and thereby compel the court to consider it. As already mentioned earlier, 
though the recommendations of this Committee had been favourable to 
the Il Chamus, they were never implemented, and their introduction into 
the court record would be a second opportunity to have them 
implemented. In the event, this was indeed the case and the court, in its 
recommendations, made a specific order that the recommendations of the 
Public Complaints Committee be implemented. This was a significant 
result for the Il Chamus given that under the governing Act, NEMA had no 
powers to enforce their own recommendations and this was an effective 
way to give biting force to the said recommendations of the NEMA 
commission. 
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In their defence, NEMA also contended that while they had no obligation 
to do so, they nonetheless visited the sites of Prosopis invasion and 
carried out research and conducted a public awareness campaign. 
They also argued that though the right to life was important, it was not a 
priority given “the country’s’ stage of development”. They also imputed 
that the right to a clean environment was subject to “availability of 
funds.” These statements predictably drew the ire of the court and the 
NEMA was admonished accordingly. 
To them, the plant was introduced with good intentions since it could not 
be eradicated completely, it was sufficient that something is being done 
about the problems and their actions so far had proved that they were 
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7.2.6 Legal contestations: two sides of Prosopis 
We have already seen in Chapter five different and sometimes 
contradicting narratives about Prosopis juliflora. In the Prosopis case, the 
narratives about Prosopis juliflora were put to legal contestation by both 
sides of the case, and this section takes a look at a cross section of topics 
that were subject to this contestation. 
Contrary to the above evidence from academic researchers as well as eye 
witness accounts, the government, through its agents and legal 
representatives in court attempted to deny that it was responsible for the 
introduction of the Prosopis Juliflora plant not just in Baringo but 
anywhere in Kenya for that matter. For example, Professor Kivutha 
Kibwana, then Minister for Environment and Natural Resources, claimed 
under oath that records available to him showed that the Government did 
not introduce or sanction the introduction of Prosopis juliflora in Ng’ambo 
Location, and that Prosopis Juliflora was available in some parts of Kenya 
already in the 1930’s, and that by 1970’s it was commonly found in many 
places in Kenya. Subsequently, it was dispersed by human and animal 
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activity as well as by natural phenomena. This attempted denial was 
remarkable given that before the court was a Ministerial statement52 
issued by the same Professor Kibwana to Parliament on the 20th June 
2006, part of which stated: 
“I wish to inform you that my Ministry introduced the Prosopis Juliflora 
tree, a native of Southern America in the 1970s. The main reason for this 
introduction was to assist in the rehabilitation of the arid and semi-arid 
lands. In addition, it was meant to provide fodder, shade, firewood and 
building poles. It was also to assist in honey production and act as wind 
breakers in arid areas which include Turkana, Baringo, Tana River, 
Garissa, Isiolo Mandera, Meru and Taita Taveta districts among others” 
Mr. Njoroge Mwangi, counsel for the government, said that to claim that 
the government was responsible for introducing Prosopis to Ng’ambo was 
to mislead the court: this was simply not true. Both Professor Kibwana 
and Mr. Mwangi then went on to state that even though the government 
had not been responsible for the introduction of Prosopis Juliflora, they 
had assumed responsibility to deal with the matter out of a general 
concern for its citizens. 
Despite the attempts by the government to deny that they introduced the 
plant, the court found that they in fact did introduce the plant, but 
absolved them of improper motive in doing so. Their good intentions in 
introducing Prosopis were said to be: to curb soil erosion; to provide wood 
fuel; to provide poles for the construction industry; to reclaim areas 
destroyed by quarries. By introducing vegetation, it was believed that soil 
                                               
52 Ministerial statements are usually issued by Ministers on the floor of parliament in 
response to questions by interested Members of Parliament. A ministerial statement is 
usually given where the official position of the government and specific details on 
government actions are required as part of an answer to a question asked in parliament. 
Because they are usually detailed in nature, Ministers concerned are usually given some 
notice in order to research the question and come back with a detailed answer. A 
ministerial statement thus issued reflects the official position of the government on the 
matter. 
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binding would be improved, hence reducing the rate and effects of soil 
erosion. 
The court, after a perusal of all the evidence before it including 
submissions from the parties, sworn affidavits, publications and letters 
annexed to the petition and responses to it, rejected the claims by the 
government and its agents that they were neither aware of nor 
responsible for the introduction of Prosopis Juliflora into Baringo 
(statement by Justice Ang’awa at paragraph 84 of the judgment). 
The court took as proven beyond reasonable doubt that Prosopis was 
introduced to Baringo in 1980’s with an agreement signed in 1982 
between the Government of Kenya and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (statement by Justice Ang’awa at paragraph 81 of the 
judgment). 
The court next heard from both sides arguments presenting two different 
sides of Prosopis. The Il Chamus introduced evidence to prove the 
detrimental effects that Prosopis has had on their livelihood. On the other 
hand, the government had the difficult task of refuting some of the claims 
by the Il Chamus and highlighting the potential and benefits of Prosopis. 
As it will be seen in the following section, however, evidence showing the 
negative effects of Prosopis by the Il Chamus was overwhelming and the 
supporting material provided were very persuasive to the judges. 
The Il Chamus, to demonstrate the ill effects of Prosopis, led evidence to 
show that: Prosopis had impeded their access to the resources of Lake 
Baringo by clogging the shores and making it difficult to fetch water; 
livestock feeding on the pods of the plant developed problems with their 
teeth and digestion, affecting their ability to feed and causing death. 
Consumption of Prosopis was also said to lead to bad tasting meat from 
the animals. The Il Chamus also presented as evidence research studies 
claiming that the plant causes allergy, asthmatic conditions and 
inflammation of the lungs in human beings. Their health was at risk due 
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to this plant. The Prosopis thorn was so poisonous that it had led to 
immobilization and even amputation of limbs. 
These claims by the Il Chamus were supported by some very persuasive 
pieces of evidence, including affidavits, photographs, correspondences, 
minutes of meetings and reports from important personalities. For 
instance, one Dr. Wellington K. Kiamba, a graduate of Bachelor of 
Medicine and Bachelor of surgery, University of Nairobi and Medical 
Practitioner based at Nakuru, swore an affidavit detailing how he treated 
three of the petitioners on the 5th of July 2006 after they developed 
medical complications following encounters with Prosopis thorns. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, part of the strategy employed by the 
Il Chamus in arguing their case was the use of highly graphic and 
sometimes incredible statements, and their use of a report by Professor 
Ratemo Michieka, former director of the National Environment 
Management Authority (NEMA), is an example. The report stated in parts: 
“Mention the word ‘Prosopis’ to anyone from the arid and semi-arid areas 
(ASAL) of Kenya and you will create chills down his/her spine. It creates 
agony, poverty and curses to anyone who has encountered with the 
Plant…Livestock numbers have been reduced tremendously. The 
allelopathic effects of prosopis have reduced pasture (grass species) to 
naught. Once the canopy establishes, no vegetation grows under and 
locals must vacate the invaded areas!! They migrate in search of pasture. 
If an animal is trapped in the weedy enclosure, no one dares rescue it, 
the animal might starve to death in there, reason, the owner might be 
pricked and have his limb amputated. No one gets out at night, chances 
of stepping on a thorn or being scratched are high; no one can go for 
anybody’s help in case of fire or any assistance, they will be pricked. 
Water channels, rivers and streams have their courses changed by 
prosopis. Goats, which eat the plant, have had their teeth fall off, their 
mouth disoriented and their stomachs swollen as there is no 
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regurgitating, which takes place. Loss of cattle and goats is a problem 
now. In extreme instances the seeds “start germinating” inside the goats’ 
stomachs!! When they die and intestines opened, accumulated sprouting 
prosopis seeds are found inside”. 
In the final analysis, the Il Chamus were able to overwhelmingly 
demonstrate to the court the negative effects of Prosopis as well as its 
impact on their livelihood. The court rejected the government’s attempts 
to dissociate itself from the introduction of the plant into Baringo and 
found that the Il Chamus had sufficiently demonstrated the nature and 
extent of Prosopis injury to their livelihood. It held that the government 
was responsible. 
7.3 The judgment 
By a majority decision, the judges found in favour of the Il Chamus and 
addressed themselves to the following issues respectively. 
7.3.1 On jurisdiction 
The court declared that by virtue of the fact that at least two 
constitutional provisions, namely the right to life and the right to property 
were up for interpretation, the constitutional court had jurisdiction to hear 
the matter. Further, the Petitioners’ reliance on the EMCA section 3(1) is 
embodied in section 84 of the constitution. Therefore, they were entitled 
to introduce statutory provisions into a constitutional interpretation. 
These statutory provisions embody the environmental justice principles of 
sustainable development, and the polluter pays principle. 
7.3.2 On the polluter must pay principle 
The court decided to uphold the principle of polluter must pay and held 
the government of Kenya accountable for its decision and actions to bring 
Prosopis Juliflora into Baringo twenty years earlier, whether the resulting 
effects were known to it or not. They found that there was a duty of care 
and accountability by the Government of Kenya towards the Il Chamus, 
182 
 
and that the government erred in introducing a noxious plant. Though 
their intentions may have been good they had to remedy the negative 
effects of Prosopis occasioned by their actions. 
7.3.3 On the right to life 
The court observed that both section 84 of the Constitution of Kenya and 
Section 3 of the Environmental Management Coordination Act (EMCA) 
refer to the same bundle of rights, namely that every Kenyan is entitled 
to the right of life, and the right to a clean and healthy environment.  
Whereas the government had claimed that the Il Chamus in their 
application had failed to clearly identify what rights had been violated or 
breached and by whom, the court observed that the Il Chamus had 
convincingly shown how the Prosopis Juliflora had interfered with their 
development and social life style. The court therefore concluded that the 
government had failed to put in place a management program or elevate 
the crisis to a national issue. The court ruled that from the submissions 
and affidavits before it, it had been established that the plant Prosopis 
Juliflora had so injured the lives of the Petitioners and others as to 
deprive them of sustainable development and the right to life. 
In arriving at this ruling the court adopted a broad interpretation of the 
rights to life. In the view of the court, the constitution must be given a 
broad meaning and not interpreted literally as called for by the 
government. This right includes the right to be free from any kind of 
detrimental harm to human health, wealth and or socio economic well-
being. The fundamental rights protected by the constitution therefore 
extend to those breached by the existence of Prosopis Juliflora. 
7.3.4 On the right to property 
The court held that Prosopis had affected the right of the Petitioners to 
access their property, amounting to a breach of the right. Responding to 
the claims of the government, the court held that the right to property did 
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not only mean right from compulsory acquisition by any person or organ 
of the Government. The constitution also grants rights to the security of 
home and that of other property. In this connection, the court observed 
that in this modern age there are other means by which the fundamental 
human right of property and its protection can be breached. For example, 
rendering the land unusable for its original purpose in the way Prosopis 
had done was another way of breaching the right to property. 
7.3.5 On the right to sustainable development 
The court held that each and every Kenyan is entitled under the 
constitution and under the environmental Act EMCA to a right to life, as 
well as a right to a clean and healthy environment. The Prosopis Juliflora 
plant has displaced the petitioners and curtailed their social lifestyle and 
development. Their right to develop and improve their life style has been 
curtailed by the introduction of this plant. The government has failed in its 
task to put in place a management program or made it a national issue, 
and therefore the Petitioners have had their rights infringed when they 
have been deprived of the sustainable development.  
7.4 Final determination 
In the final result, and in recognition of the fact that the Il Chamus’ case 
had been substantially vindicated, the petition was allowed accordingly, 
and the court made the following orders: 
-That a right to a clean and healthy environment free from pollution of 
any kind that is detrimental to human health, wealth and/or socio-
economic well-being and ultimately the human life is a fundamental right 
to life as enshrined in Section 70 of the Constitution of Kenya. 
-That the right to a clean and healthy environment is fundamental 
attribute of people and the aggression to the environment occasioned by 
the week Prosopis Juliflora amounts to a breach of this right which this 
Honourable Court is empowered to address and remedy accordingly. 
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-That the introduction of the weed Prosopis Juliflora has caused and 
continues to cause more harm than good to the environment and its 
harmful effects and damages far surpass any reasonable and beneficial 
use that it could be put to and it thus ought to be eradicated and/or 
managed with expediency. 
-That the Petitioner’s right of life as set out in above is compromised by 
the introduction of the weed Prosopis Juliflora to warrant the intervention 
by a constitutional court. 
-That the failure by the Ministry for Environment and Natural Resources to 
take affirmative steps towards eradication of the weed/plant Prosopis 
Juliflora amounts to breach of the right to own property. 
-That a commission comprising of technical and local experts be 
appointed by the Government under terms and reference to be set out by 
this Honourable Court inter alia to: 
-Assess and quantify the loss visited upon the environment and to the 
residents of Baringo District by the weed Prosopis Juliflora. 
-Assess and quantify the loss resulting from the introduction and non-
action by the Government. 
-Assess injury to persons and commensurate and make a finding and 
report to court its assessments and findings. 
-Assess and ascertain the injuries occasioned to individuals resident in the 
areas affected by the weed Prosopis Juliflora and recommend 
commensurate monetary compensation thereto. 
-Complete its task within sixty (60) days of appointment. -The first and 
second respondents to implement the Public Complaints Commission 
recommendations with respect to the complaint on Prosopis Juliflora in 
PCCC No.67 of 2005 (see section 6.2.2 above) between Community 
Museum of Kenya and Kenya Forestry Research Institute and Food 
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Agricultural Organization. The recommendation referred to here was that 
Prosopis juliflora be declared a noxious weed under the Suppression of 
Noxious Weeds Act (Chapter 325 of the Laws of Kenya). 
-The Costs to the Petitioners by the first and second Respondents. This 
meant that the government through the Attorney General and the 
Minister for Environment would meet the financial costs of the case. This 
was quite an important victory for the Il Chamus as legal costs are usually 
quite high and this is one of the main reasons hindering access to justice 
by the poor.  
In legal terms, the case was a major victory for the Il Chamus, as all their 
prayers were granted. It proved that all their efforts had not been in vain 
and it was quite a good result for their morale as a community. Most 
importantly, the government was ordered to meet the legal costs of the 
petition.  
Evidently, the government has been slow to implement some orders of 
the court and it is expected that the full impact of the judgment will take 
longer to unfold. However, one aspect of the judgment that had an 
immediate impact on the resilience of the Il Chamus was the order that 
Prosopis be declared a noxious weed. This was done quite expeditiously 
after the judgment. The judgment was handed down on the 11 December 
2007 and one year later, the then Minister for Agriculture, Mr. Noah Arap 
Too, declared Prosopis juliflora a noxious weed under the Noxious weeds 
Act in the whole of Kenya with effect from 30 December 200853. 
The Noxious Weeds Act is an Act of Parliament aimed at the suppression 
and possible eradication of weeds that are deemed to be harmful. When 
the responsible Minister declares a weed noxious he may specify the area 
within which the order is to be implemented. This may be within a certain 
district or defined boundaries, or the whole of Kenya. In the case of 
                                               
53 This declaration was announced by Gazette Notice Number 184 of 2008, dated 17 
December 2008. 
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Prosopis the Minister made the declaration to apply in the whole of Kenya, 
meaning that wherever Prosopis was found in Kenya, it was to be treated 
as a noxious weed. 
According to the said Act, the presence of a noxious weed creates an 
obligation on every person responsible for the land within a declared area 
to clear the noxious weed, or cause it to be cleared from that land. 
Clearing in this context is defined to mean digging up or pulling up and 
burning, or employing other authorized means of destruction. The Il 
Chamus were thus under an obligation to destroy Prosopis, including by 
burning. 
The obligation to destroy a noxious weed is perhaps one of the most 
important reasons why the Il Chamus wanted Prosopis juliflora declared 
as such, because it could then legally be destroyed by burning. Burning of 
Prosopis to produce charcoal has made it easier for Il Chamus households 
to access a cheap source of household fuel and provided an extra source 
of livelihood for those members of the Il Chamus community who engage 
in the trade. 
Classification as a noxious weed meant that the very strict rules 
regulating the charcoal burning trade in Kenya54 are ignored. This has 
made it easy for people living on land occupied by Prosopis to engage in 
the charcoal trade. Because only mature Prosopis trees are suitable for 
charcoal burning, better off people who are able to invest in chain-saw 
                                               
54 The Minister for Forestry and Wildlife, under section 59 of the Forests Act 2005, has 
made the so called Forests (Charcoal) Regulations 2009. These regulations apply to 
forestry, sustainable charcoal production, transportation and marketing. Under these 
regulations, all persons engaged in burning and selling of charcoal must obtain a license 
or permit from the Kenya Forest Service (KFS). Further, all commercial charcoal 
producers shall organize themselves as business firms or charcoal producer associations 
to be registered under the Societies Act. Producers are expected to undertake an 
environmental impact assessment, have a reforestation/conservation plan and a 
management plan for woodlands where wood is harvested. Before any charcoal is 
transported, the transporter must apply to the KFS for a charcoal movement permit for 
any amount exceeding three bags. In addition, they need a certificate of origin and 
purchase receipts from the producer. A seller of charcoal is required to have a copy of 
the certificate of origin, a copy of the movement permits and a business license/permit 
from the local authority.  
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cutters or to employ manual labour have been able to efficiently exploit 
the charcoal. There are also quite high transportation costs involved and 
commercial trading in charcoal is therefore dominated by only a few 
people.  
 
Picture 7: Prosopis logs being prepared for charcoal burning. 
The impact of charcoal, whether at household subsistence level or at a 
commercial level has definitely contributed to the resilience of the Il 
Chamus. The next chapter considers the second Il Chamus case, after 
which a joint evaluation is made of the consequences of both cases. 
 
Picture 8: Charcoal sacks awaiting pick up and onward transportation to Nakuru. Small 
producers of charcoal usually leave out sacks of charcoal at strategic points. These are 
then picked up by Lorries belonging to charcoal merchants from Nakuru. In 2011 a sack 
of Charcoal was sold at Ksh. 250 in Salabani while in Nakuru a similar sack would go for 
between Ksh. 700 and 1000. 
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Chapter 8: Legal contestation of identity: the case of Rangal 
Lemeiguran and others versus the Attorney General and others. 
Introduction 
This chapter is focused on the analysis of a second case brought by the Il 
Chamus against the government. This case was in response to political 
marginalization and disenfranchisement of the Il Chamus and was framed 
by them as a claim for parliamentary representation. It was premised on 
their status as a special interest group and linked to their identity as an 
indigenous community. The case of Rangal Lemeiguran and Others v 
Attorney General & Others [2006] eKLR, hereafter the Identity case, was 
initially filed on 12 March 2004 and was lodged against the government 
through the Attorney General and the Electoral Commission of Kenya 
(ECK), which is the government’s principle agent in the management of 
elections in Kenya. 
Within the general framework of governance, the analysis in the following 
sections will explore the legal nuances of political contestation inherent in 
adversarial litigation. By demonstrating the positive effect of litigation for 
the Il Chamus in the process of governance, this chapter shows the 
importance of litigation as a resilience building mechanism. In this 
analysis we see the political utility of identity and the appropriation by the 
Il Chamus of global concepts of indigenous identity and marginalization to 
advance a political agenda through the process of litigation. It is also 
shown how, by the legal framing of political issues in terms of human 
rights and social justice norms, the Il Chamus were able to effectively 
challenge their political marginalization.  
As a forum for political contestation, this case shows the articulation of 
concepts that are directly relevant to the nature of environmental 
governance in Kenya. These include: indigenous and minority rights; 
public participation in the affairs of the state and the obligations of the 
state in ensuring such participation in fulfilment its human rights 
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obligations; free, prior and informed consent of indigenous people to state 
projects carried out in their territories, and the legal right to participate in 
governance. Within the context of indigenous identity as a political tool, 
this analysis will also incorporate an historical enquiry into the 
development of the concept of indigenous rights globally and its allure for 
communities such as the Il Chamus. 
The chapter is organized into thematic sections that seek to answer the 
following questions: how useful is the notion of ethnic identity in general, 
and indigenous identity in particular, as a political mechanism for access 
to resources? How have the Il Chamus historically been able to influence 
perceptions about their identity? How has the concept of indigenous 
identity developed over the years and how is it articulated in national and 
international legal discourse? What sources of legal protection exist for 
indigenous peoples within the framework of national and international 
law? How have the Il Chamus framed political concepts into legally 
contestable rights, and what rights specifically have they invoked? How 
have the Il Chamus established and maintained links to a global network 
of indigenous movements? 
An important question that arises from both of the Il Chamus cases 
analysed in this thesis, and which is addressed at the end of this chapter, 
is what impact the process of litigation has had on the processes of 
governance that can be positively linked to resilience building.  
In order to understand the Il Chamus case in its proper wider global 
political context, the next section begins by describing the indigenous 
identity phenomenon and its utility as a political tool. It then looks at 
some theoretical groundings of ethnic identity in general and indigenous 
identity in particular. 
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8.1 The political utility of ethnicity 
This thesis treats the notion of identity as an indigenous group 
analogously to that of ethnic identity in general, when viewed as a 
political tool. The notion of ethnicity or ethnic identity is itself highly 
contested and has been described as socially constructed yet complex, 
contested, fluid and in a state of constant evolution (Lynch 2006, Berman 
1998, Waller 1993).  
In Kenya, ethnicity in general is a politically significant category of 
inclusion and exclusion that has been exploited both by political elites at 
the top and the populace at the bottom (Lynch 2006), and is ultimately 
linked to access to resources. A deep analysis of why and how come 
ethnicity as a political category has achieved a prominent status in the 
political articulation of resource issues in Kenya is a complex and much 
studied issue but that is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
What is certain is that geographically defined or politically bounded ethnic 
identities in Kenya as we know them today can largely be traced back to 
the colonial project, which is not to say that pre-colonial Kenya did not 
have already, at the time of colonial occupation, certain well defined 
ethnic entities. British colonial powers in particular, through their “indirect 
rule” model simply attempted to lay a rigid and ethnically coded 
administrative template onto pre-existing but fluid ethnic entities to 
extend their rule. In doing this, they relied on the social structures of 
those entities, which were largely based on patronage and kinship 
networks (Spear and Waller 1993).  
In addition to Kenya’s colonial history, Wa Githinji and Holmquist also 
ascribe the salience of ethnicity in Kenyan politics to a lack of common 
class or ideological base upon which to unify the various cleavages that 
define Kenyan society. They describe political power in Kenya as residing 
in the hands of an all-powerful executive who distribute state resources 
through ethnic affiliation. This powerful executive drives the conduct of 
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the state, access to which is facilitated by powerful regional politicians 
rather than political parties. Ethnic identities, therefore, play a central role 
in the process of governance, and can determine the degree of access to 
resources by a community (Wa Githinji and Holmquist 2009:106-107). 
However, while ethnic identities may be socially constructed through local 
political and social processes, they are first and foremost built upon a 
tangible basic foundation cemented by biological and social ties with 
common histories and myths of origin encompassed within a narrative of 
“one people” (Lynch 2006). Ethnic identities are, as Ake describes them, 
“decidedly real” notwithstanding their fluidity and arbitrariness, and are 
not simply figments of human imagination (Ake 1993: 2). The 
construction of particular ethnic identities is therefore based upon existing 
foundational structures. 
The property of ethnic identities as complex and fluid also means that 
they are not immutable and therefore highly contestable, creating 
uncertainty and ambiguity in defining the boundaries of each ethnic 
group, as well as determining who belongs to what ethnic group. It is 
within this ambiguous space that ethnicity as a political tool finds its 
utility.  
Within this space, individuals are able to negotiate their membership, 
communities are able to negotiate and contest their boundaries, as well 
as determine who is friend and who is foe (Lynch 2006: 50). Within the 
context of current perceptions of indigenous identity, the notion of self-
identification within international legal discourse, which notion allows 
groups to identify themselves as indigenous, has provided ample 
opportunity for indigenous groups such as the Il Chamus to claim the tag 
for themselves without indulging in extensive efforts of justification. It is 
particularly within the context of self-identification as indigenous groups 
that we have seen a proliferation in recent times of groups identifying 
themselves as such. Before getting into a specific discussion of indigenous 
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identity in Kenya we first see in the next section how the Il Chamus have 
historically been involved in shaping perceptions about their identity. 
8.2 Il Chamus identity through history 
This section will show that at various phases of their history, the Il 
Chamus have been able to influence perceptions by others about their 
identity. They have managed to do this by highlighting or suppressing 
certain aspects of their historical roots through a process referred to as 
ethnicity management (Cronk 2004). In terms of resilience thinking, this 
section therefore aims to show how identity may be negotiated at 
different phases of the adaptive cycle, and how it is linked to social 
resilience.  
 
8.2.1 Il Chamus ethnicity management 
 
The manner in which the Il Chamus manipulate perceptions about their 
ethnicity presents a classic example of ethnicity management, a term 
used by Cronk (Cronk 2004: 72-74) to describe the process by which the 
Mukogodo “became” Maasai. The Mukogodo switched from speaking 
Yaaku to Maa and deliberately strove to become pastoralists from a 
predominant activity of hunting and gathering. They presented a different 
facet of their desired ethnicity as the audience demanded. To the British, 
from whom they needed recognition and protection, they presented 
themselves as pure Yaaku speaking hunters and gatherers or Dorobo. 
Dorobo is used here in the sense of not possessing cattle and subsisting 
through hunting and gathering (See Cronk 2002: 32; Waller 1985: 349, 
and for a detailed discussion of the term “Dorobo”, Bernstein 1976: 1-
11). To their Maasai contemporaries, from whom they desired 
acceptance, they shunned their label as Dorobo and presented 
themselves as fellow Maasai. In a similar but less radical fashion, the Il 
Chamus adopt a flexible attitude to their perceptions and descriptions of 
ethnic affiliation. Many Il Chamus Moran I spoke to were keen to describe 
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themselves as “Maasai kamili” (pure Maasai), yet in official forums and in 
the eyes of the Government they want to be seen as ‘Il Chamus’, an 
indigenous people.  
 
It is to be noted that as an ethnic group, the Il Chamus contain elements 
of a diversity of groups with whom they have interacted over the years 
such as Samburu, Loogolala, Uasin Gishu and Laikipiak from among the 
Maasai affiliated communities, as well as of Tugen, Turkana, Elgeyo, 
Kikuyu and even Luo, among others, reflecting their rich heritage through 
time. Representing a mosaic made from a diverse group of peoples, they 
are the product of many upheavals that systematically and gradually 
wove into their ethnic fabric communities of refugees. While some of 
these refugees were being assimilated into the Il Chamus, they brought 
with them elements of their own ethnic and cultural constructs. Waller 
(1985: 350) has described the situation in the Il Chamus settlements of 
Lake Baringo as one where “successive waves of migration and upheaval 
over a wide area are laid bare like geological strata through the accretion 
of different groups to a permanent core population”. Given this complex 
mix of cultures, it is in the end rather difficult to assign Il Chamus identity 
to any one particular origin. According to Little (1998: 451), “The open-
ended nature of Il Chamus identity made it difficult to devise a consistent 
distinction between cultural insiders and outsiders”. It is this quality of Il 
Chamus identity that makes it possible for them to ‘manage’ their 
ethnicity within the boundaries of political contestation. 
In the case of the Il Chamus, instances of ethnicity management can be 
seen in their folklore, dress, song, dance, and expressed in commercial, 
political and legal forums. As is evident below, folklore and myths of 
origin provide one of the most important tools for the expression of 
particular versions of identity. 
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Picture 9: Il Chamus women singing in traditional attire 
As a result of rapid social and ecological change, ethnicity can be 
politicized as part of the resulting political contestation, creating certain 
political narratives built upon ethnic identity. In the case of the present 
day Il Chamus, this entails recourse to an identity that seeks to fit within 
a certain politically expedient category that stresses indigeneity and 
forges a strong link to some ‘ancestral’ place. In this respect, folklore, or 
myths of origin recounted as part of their oral history becomes part of a 
process that gives “meaning and purpose to an ethnic community and its 
cultural symbols of solidarity and exclusion” (Smith 1984: 293). Ethnic 
identities are solidified by myths of origin and descent which are stored in 
a repository of group folklore to be recounted and sometimes re-enacted 
in cultural ceremony. Il Chamus folklore contains such myths to explain 
their origins and as part of their ethnicity management. At present their 
objective is to be seen as a distinct and indigenous entity that is separate 
from the core Maasai groups, and this is reflected in current versions of 
their oral history. The next section looks at some oral myths about the 
origin of the Il Chamus, and also considers the link between the Il 
Chamus and the Maasai. 
8.2.2 Meaning of the name Il Chamus 
One version of Il Chamus folklore attributes the origin of the name “Il 
Chamus” to the word “Amusoo”, which refers to a gift of prophesy or 
foresight. The word “Amusoo” itself means to foretell or guess positively 
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the contents of a person’s luggage, unspoken words or intended deeds. 
This version therefore expresses a positive identity that associates the Il 
Chamus with foresight and vision. 
According to a second version, “Il Chamus” is a corrupted version of the 
word “Mamus”. According to oral history, the Maa speaking group came 
from a “far-away country up north” in search of food, water and pasture. 
On reaching Lake Baringo, one man declared himself too sick to continue 
with the south bound trek. The main party then left him behind, and only 
his family and in-laws decided to remain with him.  
The abandoned party discovered fish in the lake and finding it agreeable, 
the man was quoted as saying, “Mamus ajo aatung’ayeki”, meaning “I am 
glad I was abandoned” (because as a result, he found food in the form of 
fish from the lake). So it is said that the name Il Chamus was derived 
from the word “Mamus”. This particular myth serves to front a distinction 
of the Il Chamus as unique entity with a traceable origin that is separate 
from both the Samburu and larger Maasai groups, contrary to ethnological 
evidence that links the Il Chamus quite strongly to the Samburu. As a 
matter of fact, both Anderson (2002) and Little (1998) refer to the Il 
Chamus as ‘Il Chamus Maasai’, a categorization that the current discourse 
of an indigenous and ethnic minority fights hard to disengage from. As 
the legal analysis of the Identity case will show, the connection of the Il 
Chamus to the Maasai was an important point of legal contestation with 
the government claiming that the Il Chamus were a sub-clan of the 
Maasai and therefore not a culturally distinct ethnic group. Because this 
issue goes to the core of the current formulation of Il Chamus identity, 
the next section therefore considers the nature of the relationship 
between the Il Chamus and the Maasai.  
8.2.3 The “Maasai” question 
In trying to define the Il Chamus as an ethnic group, it is therefore 
important first to address the issue of their “Maasainess”. Are they or not 
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Maasai, and to what extent? This seemingly innocuous question has 
profound political implications for their claim to an indigenous identity as 
well as with regard to the issue of land ownership, which is itself a major 
source of conflict Kenya today. 
 
A consideration of Il Chamus ethnographic history links them quite 
strongly to the Maasai in general and the Samburu in particular (see 
Chapter 3; Little 1992: 27). However, the current political formulation of 
their identity as an indigenous group seeks to downplay this link and 
present the Il Chamus as a distinct cultural group despite these historical 
connections. While not denying their historical connection to the Maasai in 
general and the Samburu in particular, the Il Chamus avoid being strongly 
associated with the Maasai because this diminishes their claim to cultural 
distinctness. 
 
With the “Maasai” question, a paradox presents itself. Within the so called 
Maa speaking pastoral ideal for which the Il Chamus have been known to 
strive but fall short of on account of being associated with foraging, 
fishing and irrigation, being associated with “Maasai” is desirable to them 
(Cronk 2004: 63-64;Spencer 1998: 132), yet they are held in low esteem 
by the larger Maa speaking groups. In relation to the Maasai, Little 
describes the Il Chamus as “one of those ambiguous communities of Maa 
speakers upon whom pastoral Maasai depended for grain and refuge but 
who were held in relatively low esteem by them…geographically on the 
Maasai periphery, although being Maasai was always part of their 
heritage” (Little 1998: 444). Ironically, their foraging heritage, which has 
been central to their survival, was a major reason for their being despised 
by the core Maasai groups (Spencer 1998: 132). 
 
In a different context, being associated with the Maasai is similarly 
desirable. For instance, Il Chamus Moran, when performing traditional 
dances in tourist hotels in Kampi ya Samaki, exploit the Maasai 
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association as a commercial brand and present themselves as Maasai. Not 
many tourists will have heard of the Il Chamus but many are attracted to 
romantic images of the Maasai. It therefore makes perfect business sense 
for the Il Chamus Moran to market themselves as Maasai.  
 
When among their peers, Il Chamus Moran will mimic “fashionable” 
Maasai practices which they consider prestigious. For instance, they kill 
small stock like sheep and goats by smothering just like Samburu Moran 
would do. In contrast, during official ceremonies such as the Eunoto 
(2011)55 or in the homestead they slaughter by the use of sharp knives. 
When they eat fish, which is shunned by other Maasai groups, they cure 
the aberration by avoiding milk for the rest of the day. When asked what 
they admire most in the Maasai culture, many Il Chamus Morans have a 
simple answer: cattle keeping. I find the mimicry and appropriation of 
Maasai cultural imagery and stereotype only a useful façade that does not 
go deep into Il Chamus identity. An Il Chamus teacher at Kiserian 
Secondary school rationalizes this attraction to things Maasai: 
“I think what an Il Chamus Moran desires most is not so much a Maasai 
identity but respect and acceptance from other Maasai as coming from 
the same cultural stock, as people of cattle” (field notes). 
 
It would appear that quite a substantial amount of prestige is associated 
with successful cattle husbandry, and the Maasai reputation is based upon 
it. An Il Chamus Moran’s quest to appropriate a measure of “Maasainess” 
in his outlook is thus rather a quest for validation or even inclusion into a 
select club of enviable cattle breeders. 
 
In the current context of political contestation, however, where there are 
potential dividends to be derived from being indigenous, being strongly 
associated with Maasai could be undesirable. 
                                               
55 This is one of the most important ceremonies where an age group is initiated into 
Moranhood. 
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During different phases of their history, the Il Chamus have grappled with 
the problem that seems at once to be pulling them both away from and 
towards a Maasai association in their identity. Having long recognized 
both the utility and burden of bearing the Maasai brand, they have been 
able to portray the outward appearance of being Maasai when it suited 
their interest and dissociating themselves when the situation demanded 
otherwise. During the 1840s to 1880s, for instance, when conflicts and 
battles for access to pastoral resources among neighbouring pastoralists 
were rife, an association with the Maasai through language, dress and 
general outward appearance was common. Cultural similarity could have 
played a role in attracting refugees into their midst who, as we have seen, 
played a crucial role in the early success of the irrigation economy.  
 
This cultural association was noted by early European ethnographers who 
considered the Il Chamus as a distinct group but with Maasai origins. 
Thompson, for instance, described the Il Chamus (Njemps) as 
“Unquestionably Masai in race, and only separated from that tribe through 
the loss of their cattle and the consequent necessity of breaking their 
cherished convictions by cultivating the soil, they had developed new 
ideas, manners, and customs in a comparatively short period” (Thompson 
1887: 263). 
 
During the early years of British colonial rule and especially when land 
was being demarcated according to perceived ethnic identities, the Il 
Chamus, in negotiating successfully for their own land, stressed their 
“Maasainess” by highlighting their Maa language, names and age set 
system as evidence. This was expedient at the time because the Maasai, 
having signed treaties and made special arrangements, enjoyed a certain 
unique status with the local colonial administration and could claim 
historical and cultural affiliation with the land in question. (Little 1998: 
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448. Also quoted are Galaty 1991, Waller 1976; Kenya Land Commission 
Report 1934: 1846).  
 
Indeed, both the colonial European and their pastoralist neighbours used 
the Maasai label on the Il Chamus. Even Anderson (Anderson 2002: 16) 
refers to the Il Chamus as “Il Chamus Maasai”. Historically, however, until 
the 1870s, the Il Chamus related more to other peripheral Maa speakers 
such as the Uasin Gishu, Samburu and Laikipiak, whom the central Maasai 
sections distinguished from themselves (Galaty 1991, 1993). The strong 
Maasai connection emphasized at this time was therefore more imagined 
than real (Little 1998: 446).  
 
The overwhelming Maasai influence in their social organization and 
outlook, however cannot be denied but only suppressed. Not only do they 
speak a Maa dialect close to that of the Samburu (See for instance Vossen 
1978) but their social organization is distinctly Maasai in orientation, 
complete with age sets that include a Moran regiment. They also maintain 
very close friendship ties with the Samburu (Anderson 2002: 33). This 
connection with the Samburu has been explored in the light of Il Chamus 
clan history in chapter 3 above.  
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Picture 2: Il Chamus elder in ceremonial attire. The black coloured gown (Shuka) is worn 
on special occasions by both men and women. On this occasion, mothers, fathers and 
elders of newly circumcised boys wore the black Shuka. 
 
In recent times, the Il Chamus, prompted by strong political activism by 
opinion leaders within the community, have been downplaying the Maasai 
connection as it does not augur as well with their intended purpose to be 
an authentic other. Their current self-description as an indigenous and 
marginalized community requires a distinction from the Maasai. This then 
necessitates a move away from any strong Maasai connection to one 
loose enough to afford the Il Chamus an “independent” identity. 
 
Such an identity provides the Il Chamus with an important negotiation 
tool for land rights both under local and international legal orders, and the 
Il Chamus have used litigation as a forum to negotiate their ethnicity on 
the basis of indigenous identity. 
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8.3 Assertion of identity through litigation 
In Kenya, the Il Chamus are not alone in exploiting the inherent 
ambiguity and uncertainty of ethnicity to redefine, renegotiate and 
otherwise contest their ethnic identities, branding themselves as 
indigenous groups or otherwise vulnerable ethnic minorities. Over 25 
communities56 in Kenya currently self-identify as indigenous. 
The Okiek, Sengwer,  Endorois and most recently, residents of the Tana 
delta wetlands57 have all brought cases to court with various degrees of 
success (Lynch 2006, ). Thus, the process of ethnic differentiation, 
negotiation and contestation is very active in contemporary Kenya and is 
ultimately linked to access to resources and patronage both internal and 
external (Lynch 2006, 2011a, 2011b). 
Further facilitating this process within the international human rights 
discourse on indigenous identity, several legal institutions have adopted 
as part of their continuing practice, flexible and inclusive notions of the 
category with an underlying logic of inclusivity as opposed to exclusion of 
any groups claiming the right to be identified as such. The African Union, 
for example, through its human rights court established under its 
governing charter, the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR), has recognized the functional utility of the term “indigenous 
peoples” as a politically expedient identity. Noting that indigenous people 
need to have the critical situation of their human rights addressed, they 
describe the term “indigenous” as well suited to provide an analytical 
frame within which the unique situation of vulnerable groups can be 
articulated. The term “indigenous”, in this sense therefore, serves as an 
analytical concept that highlights the situation of people identifying 
themselves as such. 
                                               
56 See IWGIA 2012: Country Technical Notes on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues, The 
Republic of Kenya, at page 1. 
57 See Abdalla Rhova Hiribae and 3 others versus the Attorney General and 6 others, civil 
case No. 14 of 2010, on behalf of the Orma, Wardei, Somali, Pokomo, Mijikenda, 
Malakote, Bajuni and Luo communities. 
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It is as a political rallying point that the term has found the greatest utility 
among indigenous peoples and it has grown into a global movement 
connecting alliances and groups of a diversity of people united by shared 
experiences of suffering and injustice. 
The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights has officially adopted an 
understanding of the term “indigenous peoples” that focuses on shared 
vulnerabilities expressed within the criteria of marginalization, 
discrimination, cultural difference and self-identification. (ACHPR 2005: 9, 
10). 
Indigenous identity as a political category is thus of crucial importance, 
not least because of the rights that have crystallized around it. Being able 
to claim this status, however, is more than just a matter of invocation and 
often, especially in Africa, communities have to go through a lengthy 
process to be recognized as such, not to mention the fact that African 
states have been reluctant to even recognize the existence of a category 
of indigenous peoples in the continent, often pointing out that all Africans 
are indigenous. Because of the highly contested nature of indigenous 
identity, litigation has emerged as an important strategy for communities 
such as the Il Chamus to assert their identity as indigenous peoples. 
Through litigation the Il Chamus find a political forum to negotiate and 
forge an identity under which they can gain access to legal protection as 
well as social, political and economic rights defined in existing national 
and international legal instruments. Here, ethnic identity becomes 
politicized in terms of an indigenous people, a connotation loaded with 
notions of economic and social marginalization and a livelihood defined by 
a special relationship to land as well as a unique culture that is under 
threat of extinction. We have already seen how the Il Chamus engage in a 
process of ethnicity management. This process is further refined by 
litigation that is strategically deployed to portray Il Chamus community as 
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an indigenous and marginalized minority community that qualifies for 
recognition and protection under indigenous or minority group rights.  
Kenyan litigants, however, face an additional difficulty because, until the 
adoption of a new constitution in 2010, the local legal system was not 
designed to promote the rights of indigenous people, a difficulty which 
was however tempered by the possibility to apply international legal 
principles. 
In this regard, and especially for the Il Chamus, the applicability of 
international customary law principles have been very useful in accessing 
rights and protections enshrined in international instruments which would 
otherwise be out of their reach owing to the dualist nature of the Kenyan 
legal system, which requires international legal commitments to be made 
operational locally through specific enabling legislation. Moreover, Kenya’s 
conduct at international forums dealing with the rights of indigenous 
people has not been supportive of indigenous rights. Kenya has for 
example not ratified the ILO 169 and is yet to pass local legislation to 
effect the provisions of the relevant international legal instruments. It was 
also among only seven countries that abstained from the acclamation that 
unanimously passed the UNDRIP at the UN General Assembly in 2007. 
For the Il Chamus therefore, litigation as a strategy to gain access to 
these rights has been a creative process involving the formulation of 
international legal principles to fit into narrowly constructed national 
sources of law. This is a process that requires political awareness, 
organizational and networking skills, legal knowledge as well as financial 
resources, but one that also opens up new networks and sources of 
patronage and therefore potentially expanding both the economic and 
social capital resource bases of the actors. The Il Chamus, like many 
indigenous communities around the globe, are alive to this potential of 
litigation, and, relative to other communities in Kenya that have chosen 
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the path of litigation, the Il Chamus have achieved a reasonable degree of 
courtroom success. 
Indigenous identity as a political tool is attractive for many communities 
in Africa because of the rich content of rights guaranteed to those 
identified as such. These rights, however, are the result of a long process 
of international activism and lobbying. The next section looks at the 
historical development of ‘indigenous rights’, focusing on the political 
processes of contestation that shaped the concept. 
8.4 Sources of legal protection for indigenous rights 
Global spaces where legal rights relating to indigenous people have been 
articulated, negotiated and debated upon in the last three decades 
include: the United Nations human rights system through the United 
Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples (UNWGIP) whose efforts 
have culminated in the Universal Declaration for the Rights of Indigenous 
peoples (UNDRIP); the United Nations human rights treaty monitoring 
bodies; the International Labour Organization (ILO), whose resolution 
number 169 constitutes the sole legally binding instrument specifically 
protecting the rights of indigenous people, and Jurisprudence from the 
inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) and the African Court of 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), other regional courts as well as 
municipal courts which have also been instrumental for the clarification 
and articulation of indigenous rights, contributing to an expanding 
international customary law regime supporting the rights of indigenous 
peoples. The next few sections are devoted to the salient aspects of these 
important sources of indigenous law. 
8.4.1 The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People  
The last three decades have witnessed an increasing importance of 
indigenous rights issues which have grown from an obscure position 
within international legal discourse to the very centre of the international 
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legal and policy framework. That indigenous rights issues have come to 
dominate the international legal and human rights scene is a remarkable 
achievement by itself given the low standing of indigenous affairs in 
international law just three decades ago. 
The remarkable success by indigenous groups in bringing their issues to 
the fore of international attention can be attributed to unrelenting 
pressure from an international network of indigenous people’s 
organizations and civil society operating within a framework coordinated 
from the United Nations human rights system through its institutional, 
legal and policy structures. The United Nations Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations (UNWGIP) has been instrumental in this regard, 
giving space for articulation by indigenous groups of their concerns, and 
guiding a consultative drafting process that culminated in the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). After 
the adoption of the declaration the work of the UNWGIP is furthered by 
the United Nations Human Rights Council and more specifically the United 
Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues which focuses on the 
implementation of the declaration. 
The UNDRIP is the result of over 20 years of negotiations and debate at 
the UN involving indigenous people and their representatives, states and 
other stakeholders. It represents a landmark achievement in the 
advancement of indigenous peoples’ rights. It is a fitting response to the 
historical injustices faced by indigenous people that persist to date, and is 
a reflection of universally applicable human rights norms and best 
practices. 
The UNDRIP is specifically tailored to the human rights issues identified by 
indigenous peoples and their representatives and covers a broad 
spectrum of rights ranging from economic, social, cultural, civil, political, 
spiritual and environmental rights. While it has the status of a declaration 
and therefore does not have the effect of a binding treaty, it nevertheless 
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is a very important contribution to the developing body of international 
customary law and is intended to set “minimum standards “ for the 
treatment of indigenous people (UNDRIP 2007).58  
Anchored on the principles espoused in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR),The UNDRIP is divided into 46 articles and covers 
important rights and freedoms such as the freedom from discrimination 
based on their indigenous origin or identity, the right to self-
determination, the right to their traditional lands and natural resources, 
the right to their traditional way of life and political institutions, the right 
to their identity, the right to preserve and maintain their cultural heritage, 
freedom from forcible relocation, the right to establish and control their 
educational systems and the right to participate in decision-making bodies 
(UNDRIP 2007).  
The UNDRIP represents the biggest single achievement of the United 
Nations human rights system, and by addressing specific human rights 
concerns of indigenous peoples, it ensures their inclusion within the 
international human rights system. Given the complex negotiations and 
other processes of contestation that went into the final draft of the 
UNDRIP, it is fair to say that it would never have been achieved without 
the dedicated structures of the UNWGIP within which confines indigenous 
groups found a voice and a place to articulate their interests. 
The UNWGIP provided a forum for articulation of issues affecting 
indigenous groups spread over the globe. It was here that the long 
standing notion of indigenousness predicated on the idea of “first peoples” 
as exemplified by the North and South American Indians as well as 
Australian aboriginals was successfully challenged, contested and 
eventually expanded to include African groups. 
The entry of African groups claiming to be indigenous within the 
international human rights framework is a recent phenomenon, and as 
                                               
58 Document A/61/295 
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such, they had to contend with settled notions of indigeneity related to 
the ideas of ‘first people’ and autochthony (cited in Hodgson). In other 
parts of the world such as South America and Australia, this was a fairly 
uncontested and straight forward way to categorize indigenous groups. 
Given the particular histories of migration, settlement and colonization in 
Africa, it is often said that all Africans are indigenous (Hodgson: ), a 
classification that had the potential to exclude Africans from the global 
indigenous rights movement and one that was often quoted to deny them 
recognition in their own nation states. (ACHPR, Il Chamus case). The 
UNWGIP played a crucial role in facilitating the entry of African indigenous 
groups into the global indigenous movement by opening their doors to all 
comers and engaging participants in the discussions about meanings and 
understandings of indigeneity and eventually adopting the self-
identification criterion that opened the door to indigenous groups from all 
sections of the globe (Hodgson). If the UNWGIP opened the door for 
African indigenous groups to participate in the international indigenous 
rights movement, many African states, ironically, were reluctant to accept 
the existence of indigenous groups within their national borders and 
became a major stumbling block in the negotiations aimed at achieving 
consensus for the adoption of the UNDRIP. 
African states resisted the recognition of indigenous peoples due to fears 
of upsetting their own fragile nation states through potential cessation 
claims, which fear, strangely enough, is not supported by any indigenous 
groups in Africa ever having expressed the desire to secede. These fears 
were forcefully expressed during the negotiation process that ultimately 
led to the adoption of the UNDRIP by the so called “African group”, led by 
Namibia.  
The African Group used their leverage to seek for a deferment on the 
declaration for a year “to allow time to address the concerns raised”. 
Finding fault with the manner of adoption of the draft Declaration which 
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was done by vote at the Human Rights Council, the African group felt that 
a document of such importance to the international community should 
have been put before the General Assembly for adoption by consensus. 
They also warned that the Declaration posed fundamental political and 
constitutional problems for its implementation. These, and other 
important key concerns listed below, were raised by the African Group in 
a draft aide-memoire59.  
Among the key concerns of the African group were: the absence of a 
definition of indigenous people in the draft text. They claimed that 
adoption of a declaration without such a definition would create tensions 
among ethnic groups and create instability within sovereign states; They 
also expressed fears that the notion of “self-determination” espoused in 
the text of the declaration could be misinterpreted as creating the 
possibility of cessation by certain groups from nation states; They feared 
that the notion of free, prior and informed consent might confer a power 
of veto over the laws of a democratic legislature; They were also 
concerned that it would be politically unworkable to give effect to 
provisions conferring rights to indigenous people to traditional resources 
including land. 
According to this group, these issues had to be clarified before they could 
offer their support to the declaration. 
The responses to these concerns were crucial to the eventual acceptance 
by the African group and the current high profile of indigenous rights 
issues in the African continent can be traced, through the African 
Commission, to these responses. Because of the gravity of the issues and 
their relevance to indigenous rights as a whole, the next few sections are 
devoted to their analysis. 
 
                                               
59 Draft Aide Mémoire, African Group, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People, 9 November 2006, New York. 
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8.4.2 Defining indigeneity 
Recalling that the process of drafting, debating and achieving consensus 
on the UNDRIP was a highly contentious and politicized issue that 
involved a diversity of actors, there were, inevitably, certain sticky points 
that threatened to derail the whole project. Key among these issues was 
how to define the scope and application of the term ‘indigenous group’. 
Different countries put forward their opinions based on their own 
particular experiences with and motives for indigenous populations within 
their territories.  
China, for example, insisted that a precise definition of indigenous 
peoples was “necessary and imperative”. She associated the existing 
discrimination and inequality affecting indigenous peoples with the 
European policy of colonization. According to China, the definition of 
indigenous people had to be "scientific and objective," and based on the 
"special historical misfortunes" of the peoples concerned. Properly defined 
in this manner, the Chinese delegation concluded, indigenous peoples did 
not exist in Asia generally, or China in particular. In support of China, 
Malaysia added that indigenous peoples did not exist in countries where 
the original inhabitants were not put on reservations but lived 
harmoniously in one society. India reasoned that not defining indigenous 
people could weaken the hand of “genuine” indigenous peoples in 
asserting their rights if there was no distinction from social groups, since 
the Declaration was never intended to apply in situations where “the 
entire population of a country can be said to be indigenous, but those 
where the original inhabitants were overrun by settlers from overseas, 
dispossessed and reduced to marginal groups in their own lands". 
Bangladesh, in concurring, stated that in Asia, both tribal and non-tribal 
peoples alike have the same claim to being indigenous, and therefore the 
Declaration should focus on the “unique case of injustice” in the Americas 
and Oceania, where the indigenous inhabitants were subjected to the 
"alien values of an alien culture, dispossession and near extermination” . 
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In the end, it was clear that no consensus was achievable on the issue of 
definition of indigenous people, a situation reflected in the contents of the 
final draft of the Declaration which contains no definition of indigenous 
peoples but instead champions the concept of self-identification. (Barsh 
1996: 792- 793). 
Recognition as an indigenous group does not in itself, however, confer 
upon indigenous people immediate and unqualified rights based on the 
UNDRIP. 
This is because while the UNDRIP was an important milestone in the 
advancement of indigenous peoples rights, it is not by itself, as already 
noted, a binding legal document. However, its adoption by a big majority 
of member states enhances its status as a source of customary 
international law. Moreover, it is given life and binding legal authority by 
national and regional courts in their decisions on matters concerning 
indigenous people, as we shall see shortly in the Il Chamus case that is 
analysed further below.  
The UNDRIP as a source of legal rights for indigenous people is important 
because it articulates specific rights that can be invoked by indigenous 
people worldwide. Within the context of resilience building, however, 
certain notions are crucial in the translation of the legal rights espoused 
by documents such as the African Charter and the UNDRIP into positive 
outcomes of governance. For instance, the notion of a right to 
development as embodied in free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) 
speaks directly to the process of environmental governance as it seeks to 
enforce the participation of indigenous people in decision making 
processes that have a direct impact on their livelihoods.  
The next section therefore identifies certain United Nations human rights 
treaty monitoring bodies as a source of rights for indigenous people, 
highlighting in the process rights specifically contingent to environmental 
governance as alluded to above. 
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8.4.3 United Nations treaty monitoring bodies 
Through the reporting mechanism of United Nations treaty monitoring 
mechanisms, states are subjected to the authority of the treaties and 
conventions governed by the various UN bodies. The obligation on states 
to submit regular reports provides a forum where they can be held 
accountable for their actions or policies towards indigenous people, and 
this obligation is taken so seriously that the very act of submitting reports 
is in itself considered a step towards compliance with treaty objectives60.  
In this connection, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) have been 
active in promoting indigenous group rights by interpreting the provisions 
of human rights treaties and covenants in a way that is favourable to 
indigenous groups, as well as monitoring their implementation. 
For instance in interpreting article 27 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the HRC has issued guidelines strongly 
in favour of indigenous communities. Article 27 of the ICCPR requires 
those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, that 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language. 
In General Comment No. 23, issued as a guide to interpretation, the HRC 
has interpreted Article 27 as regarding the rights of indigenous peoples to 
include the protection of a way of life that is connected to the control 
over, and use of, lands and resources. Further, the HRC states that with 
regard to the cultures of indigenous peoples and the use of their 
traditional lands and resources, a correct reading of Article 27 includes 
                                               
60 See: Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and Content of Reports to be submitted by 
States Parties to the International Human Rights Treaties: Document HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6 
dated 3 June 2009 which contains harmonized guidelines on the form and content of 
reports to be submitted by states parties to human rights treaties. 
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the positive duty of the State to “ensure the effective participation of 
members of minority communities in decisions which affect them.” 
Following this interpretation, the HRC, in its concluding observations, has 
consistently called upon States Parties to respect their duty to consult 
with indigenous peoples prior to any economic development or granting of 
any resource concessions within their traditional lands or territories (Ward 
2011: 56, also get the source documents). 
Similarly, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), in its capacity as the monitoring body for the International 
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), has issued 
General Comment No. 2161, to guide states in interpreting Article 15 of 
ICESCR, which relates to the right to participate in cultural life. The 
CESCR expands these rights to include the rights of indigenous peoples to 
restitution or return of lands, territories and resources traditionally used 
and enjoyed by indigenous communities where they have been taken 
without the prior and informed consent of the affected peoples. Further, it 
explicitly urges States Parties to respect the principle of free, prior, and 
informed consent of indigenous peoples in all matters pertaining to their 
specific rights. Thus, the CESCR has made a clear and unambiguous link 
between the collective rights of indigenous peoples’ to their lands and 
resources and their right to participate in their cultural rights (See here 
Ward 2011). 
A final instance in this section relates to the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which is the monitoring body for the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD). The CERD has issued General Recommendation 
No. 23 which relates to the rights of indigenous people as outlined in the 
                                               
61 CESCR, General Comment No. 21: right of everyone to take part in cultural life (article 
15, paragraph 1 (a), of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (21 December, 2009). 
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ICERD, in which it states that states must consult and obtain informed 
consent of indigenous peoples in decisions that relate directly to them.  
States are specifically required to ensure that indigenous peoples have 
equal rights to participate in public life. Like the General Comment 21 by 
CESCR mentioned above in relation to property and resources, CERD calls 
for restitution in situations where decisions have already been taken 
without the prior and informed consent of the affected indigenous 
peoples. CERD has justified its stance to interpret State parties’ 
obligations as requiring positive steps in the manner described above on 
the duty to protect indigenous peoples from discrimination and uphold the 
right to equality, inherent in which are rights of participation in 
development and resource exploitation which extend to free, prior and 
informed consent.  
From the above sections, it is clear that being classified as an indigenous 
group carries with it strong advantages within the international legal 
framework. The next section is devoted to an in-depth legal analysis of 
the Il Chamus case Rangal Lemeiguran and Others v Attorney General & 
Others [2006]. Through this analysis, legal and political articulations of 
various positions relating to human rights by both the Il Chamus and the 
government are highlighted. Legal analysis is used here as a tool to 
illuminate the political processes of contestation inherent in environmental 
governance as seen through the lenses of adversarial debate performed in 
a court of law. 
8.5 An analysis of the case of Rangal Lemeiguran and Others v Attorney 
General & Others [2006] 
This case, about the right to representation in parliament of indigenous 
people, was lodged in a constitutional court. It sought relief in the form of 
declarations to the effect that state policy executed by the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya, acting as an agent of the government, was in 
breach of the constitutional rights enshrined in the then Constitution of 
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Kenya and alienated the Il Chamus from its protections. Rangal 
Lemeiguran and Others highlighted the marginalization and 
disenfranchisement of the Il Chamus and also confirmed their status as an 
indigenous group. 
This case was also an opportunity for the Il Chamus to restate their 
history and claims to ancestral lands linked to their unique culture and 
way of life. Apart from being an occasion to contest their history in a 
court of law, the case also gave the Il Chamus a chance to create a 
documented record and further entrench their status as an indigenous 
group. 
The case was also used to highlight the effect of violence on their 
livelihood, grabbing of Il Chamus land, exclusion from food aid, locking 
out of Perkerra irrigation scheme to the advantage of their Tugen 
neighbours, and environmental degradation from upstream activities. 
Their train of argument was that in addition to being a numerical 
minority, they were also an indigenous group and therefore qualified, as a 
special interest group within the meaning of section 33 of the then 
Constitution of Kenya, to have a representative from their community 
nominated to parliament  to articulate the particular interests of the 
group.  
The Il Chamus claimed that to have a member of parliament nominated 
from their community would not only give them a voice in parliament and 
encourage political participation but specifically protect Il Chamus land 
from encroachment by the larger communities and also safeguard their 
social, cultural and economic life, which is crucial to their survival as an 
indigenous people. Having an Il Chamus member of parliaments could 
directly bolster their resilience. 
To strengthen their claim, the Il Chamus cited international legal 
instruments such as the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of 
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Indigenous Peoples, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966), the Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Adopted by the UN 
General Assembly Resolution 47/135 of 18th December, 1992), the 
Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human 
Dimension of the CSCE, Copenhagen, 29 June, 1990, the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995), the 
International Labour Organization, and the Convention Concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, No. 169 (1989).  
8.5.1 Legal basis of the case 
The petition by the Il Chamus was based on sections 1 and 1A of the old 
Constitution of Kenya that declared Kenya a sovereign republic founded 
upon multiparty democratic principles. The Il Chamus were seeking to 
enforce their participation in parliament as a “special interest group” by 
virtue of section 33 of the old constitution, which provided for the 
nomination by parliamentary political parties, subject to the approval of 
the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), of an additional twelve 
members of parliament. It was brought against the Attorney General (on 
behalf of the government of Kenya as its main legal advisor), the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya (as the body responsible for the creation and 
distribution of parliamentary constituencies), and the Constitution of 
Kenya Review Commission, which was defunct by the time of 
commencement of the case. It thus sought to enforce the right to political 
representation in parliament based on a classification as a “special 
interest group”. This classification, under the laws of Kenya, availed rights 
analogous to those accorded to indigenous groups in jurisdictions that 
specifically acknowledge them as such. 
8.5.2 Framing of the Il Chamus case 
Legally speaking, the Il Chamus case was premised upon constitutional 
provisions relating to fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined in 
216 
 
section 1 declaring Kenya to be a sovereign republic; section 1A 
describing the Republic of Kenya as a multiparty democratic state; section 
33 describing the procedures for appointment by the president of 
nominated members of the National Assembly to represent special 
interests; section 42 describing the manner of allocation and delimitation 
of parliamentary constituencies; and sections 70-84 defining the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual.  
A political framing also suggested that the disenfranchisement of the Il 
Chamus was part of a wider scheme to alienate Maa speaking groups in 
general. Here they relied on previous efforts by the wider Maa community 
to reinforce the narrative of a history of political marginalization of these 
groups. Such efforts included “A memorandum by Maa community to the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, which highlighted the historical 
injustices against the Maasai as a people, such as the Maasai agreements 
of 1904 and 1911, under which the Maasai were made to cede over 
16,000 square kilometres including 11,500 square kilometres of what 
became the White Highlands”(paragraph 15).They thus suggested that 
the “boundaries in Rift Valley be redrawn to create three regions including 
one comprised of Maa speaking groups of Narok, Kajiado, Transmara, 
Laikipia, Samburu and Marigat Division of Baringo. The Il Chamus argued 
that they were a minority population with minimal impact on a democratic 
system of government which was characterized by the domination of 
smaller communities by the larger ones. A possible way to arrest this 
pattern of marginalization was to have an Il Chamus representative in 
parliament. This could be achieved by invoking the relevant sections of 
the constitution that provided for a mechanism of achieving parliamentary 
representation of special interest groups under section 33(2) of the then 
Constitution of Kenya. 
Consequently, the Il Chamus made representations to the Court based on 
their status as a minority community that had had no representation in 
parliament since Kenya’s independence. Implicit in this contention was 
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the insinuation that former president Daniel arap Moi who was the 
parliamentary representative of Baringo Central (which covered the Il 
Chamus areas) never represented the interests of the Il Chamus in 
parliament. This is even more remarkable considering Moi’s position at 
the centre of power in Kenya for over thirty years. 
The Il Chamus made a direct claim for indigenous status, stating that they 
were “one of the few indigenous communities in Kenya, as recognized in 
international law with attendant rights and protections”. In addition, they 
pointed to the fact that they also qualified to be considered as a minority 
in Kenya on account of their small numbers in relation to Kenya’s total 
population, contending that “the number of the community is very small 
in the context of the total population of 30 odd million in the Republic”. 
The Il Chamus premised their claim to specific instruments of 
international law as well as local Kenyan legal provisions.  
Claiming protection as a “special interest” group as envisaged by section 
33 of the then constitution, the Il Chamus made a strong case that their 
exclusion from parliamentary representation was an ongoing and grave 
breach of the relevant provisions of the constitution, provisions from 
which the Il Chamus “have never benefited and unlikely to benefit”. 
According to the Il Chamus, the breach of these provisions was made 
worse by the mandatory language of the constitution. It was therefore a 
failure of duty by the ECK and the Il Chamus sought a declaration by the 
court to this effect. Such a declaration would naturally trigger a corrective 
action to the advantage of the Il Chamus. The demand by the Il Chamus 
for representation was thus properly grounded following local legal logic 
bolstered by international provisions. 
The Il Chamus thus sought directions from the court that not only 
recognize the failure by the ECK to correctly interpret their mandate 
under the constitution and cater for the Il Chamus but that they should in 
future in the course of their duty apply the necessary constitutional 
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provisions to give effect to the requirement to give the Il Chamus a voice 
as a special interest group. According to the Il Chamus, directions by the 
court to the ECK to effectively reserve a nominated place for a 
representative of the Il Chamus will be in recognition of the fact that such 
a representative will: address potential threats arising from pressure on 
resources stemming from the growth of their more populous neighbours 
and secure Il Chamus livelihood and way of life; prevent “ethnic apathy”, 
which presumably means lack of interest in the political affairs of the 
country. 
They made another claim to indigeneity that links their survival as a 
group to their culture and traditions, and to the territories they occupy, 
which again resonates with modern developments of the indigenous 
identity concept:  “the Il Chamus  being an indigenous community is 
entitled to safeguard its own cultural values, its traditions and its social 
patterns, and the territorial identity of the Il Chamus as an indigenous 
people is critical to its flourishing and its survival” (paragraph 25). 
8.5.3 Preliminary issues: community voice 
A very important issue considered by the court at the beginning of the 
trial was an objection by the government that went to the very core of the 
Il Chamus case. This was whether the four individuals who had raised the 
petition could claim, at law, to be representing the voice of the whole Il 
Chamus community. 
The ECK, in their objection, claimed that the application by the Il Chamus 
lacked merit in law and in facts, was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of 
court process. 
The judges in this case translated the provisions of section 84 (1) of the 
former constitution to mean that no one can bring an action relating to 
breaches of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual on behalf of another except when that other is under detention. 
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Thus, except for a person under detention, “every other complainant of 
an alleged contravention of fundamental rights must relate the 
contravention of such right to himself as a person”. 
Despite this reading, and despite the fact that the wording of this section, 
making reference as it does to “fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual” as opposed to the “group”, the court found it contrary to the 
right of self-expression to invoke a limitation on a person choosing to be 
represented by another as in the present circumstances, declaring that 
there is “nothing in our view to prevent an individual or a group of 
individuals with a common grievance, alleging in one suit that their 
individual fundamental rights and freedoms under section 70 and 83 
inclusive of the Constitution have been infringed in relation to each one of 
them, and to them collectively. In this case the applicants are also not 
restricted to a person, to seek a declaration that each and every one of 
them, and their community, represent or constitute a special interest in 
terms of section 33 of the Constitution. Hence it would be a violation of 
the right to self-expression under section 79 of the Constitution if either 
applicant were denied a right to be heard whether individually or in turns, 
or chose to express themselves through one representative. The 
applicants individually, and as a group, have the legal right to bring this 
application” (at paragraph 61). 
With the court having decided on the matter of whether four members of 
the Il Chamus could purport to represent the whole community, the Il 
Chamus proceeded to lay out their case. 
8.5.4 Restatement of Il Chamus history and cultural uniqueness 
The Il Chamus took the opportunity to restate their population, history of 
occupation and ethnic composition, claiming to number between 25,000 
and 30,000 people. They claimed to be one of the branches of the Maasai 
people that settled at Lake Baringo about two centuries ago. A long 
history of occupation resonates well with contemporary legal reasoning on 
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indigenous people. Consistent with international legal trends that promote 
self-declaration as a mechanism of identifying indigenous groups, the Il 
Chamus made a clear claim to the status of indigenous, referring to 
themselves as “one of the indigenous peoples of the Republic” (at 
paragraph 4). 
They presented a version of their history that highlighted warfare and 
struggles at the turn of the 18th Century that led to warfare, migration 
and assimilation, supported by academic literature. Consistent with 
academic historical accounts (see chapter three), they portrayed the Il 
Chamus as mosaic of different groups who came to settle at Lake Baringo 
at different times seeking refuge and a livelihood, thus incorporating clans 
from the Maasai, Samburu, Turkana, Pokot and Tugen.  
They rejected the “colonial” name “Njemps” and, recounting their bravery 
and collective wisdom, proudly laid claim to the name “Il Chamus”, which 
is supposedly Maa for “people who can see into the future”. These claims 
form the outline of a cultural distinction that seeks to set them apart as “a 
distinct community with their own history and language” (paragraph 6). 
They also use evidence from the Kenya population census (KPC 1989, 
volume 1), setting out data by tribes with separate figures for the 
Kalenjin, the Maasai and Il Chamus to show that even by the reckoning of 
this very important government document, the Il Chamus are a clear and 
distinct group different from the Maasai. 
8.5.5 Disenfranchisement as marginalization 
The Il Chamus presented evidence showing the ECK’s flawed basis of 
creation and distribution of parliamentary constituencies. Using figures 
from data published by the ECK and figures from the 1999 population 
census published by the Ministry of planning in 2001, the Il Chamus 
demonstrated that taking account of the vast expanse of land occupied by 
the Il Chamus as well as their small but homogeneous and sparsely 
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spread population in the areas they occupy, the ECK should have, within 
the requirements of the constitution and the dictates of democracy, 
granted the Il Chamus a nominated seat in parliament on the basis of 
their status as a special interest group.  
They stressed that they were not in any way seeking to secede or be 
considered as not being part of the Lake Baringo district but made a 
compassioned plea for social justice premised on the principles of “human 
rights and fairness”. 
The Il Chamus claimed that the three constituencies carved out by the 
ECK in Baringo district had favoured both the Pokot and Tugen at the 
expense of the Il Chamus. The Tugen dominated Baringo Central and 
Baringo North constituencies, and the Pokot Baringo East constituency. 
It was unlikely, given the voting patterns and distribution of population as 
well as the boundaries in the then Baringo district that a person from the 
Il Chamus community could vie for and be elected as a member of 
parliament for the region. Since independence and probably for the next 
forty years, the Il Chamus will not have a representative reflecting their 
needs and social outlook in parliament. 
It is on this basis that the Il Chamus argued that their fundamental rights 
of representation in parliament guaranteed by the provisions of sections 1 
and 1A of the old Constitution of Kenya had been denied and were likely 
to continue being denied unless something changed. They could not rely 
on the very small statistical possibility for an Il Chamus candidate to be 
elected to parliament in order to guarantee their fundamental human 
rights as guaranteed by the constitution. To prevent their continued 
marginalization, they demanded that the then Baringo Central 
constituency be divided into two separate constituencies so as to increase 
the likelihood of having representation of their needs, and further, that 
this could be achieved by the ECK if they took account of “the appropriate 
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demographic and numerical considerations and all the powers set out in 
section 42 of the Constitution of Kenya”. 
The predicament of the Il Chamus betrayed the paradox of their 40 years 
under Daniel arap Moi, who in all his tenure first as vice president and 
then as president of the Republic of Kenya was the Member of Parliament 
responsible for championing the interests of the Il Chamus. While Moi, 
being both an openly partisan Tugen and a pastoralist, in the latter years 
of his rule relied on politics of cultural similarity that sought to cater for Il 
Chamus interests under the umbrella of KAMATUSA62 (Kalenjin, Maasai, 
Turkana and Samburu), the Il Chamus had to invoke their cultural 
uniqueness and difference in order to fight for their rights. Moi was in 
particular notorious for using the slots reserved for nominated members 
of parliament to represent special interests to spread his patronage by 
awarding them as a reward for loyalty. 
In court, the Il Chamus presented Moi as uncaring, aloof and insensitive 
to their plight. A rare visitor, Moi surrounded himself by a small clique of 
persons and was not therefore accessible to his Il Chamus constituents. 
Being also the president of the country, the Il Chamus saw the lack of 
interest shown by Moi to their predicament as carried on at the national 
level, further marginalizing them. 
Moi’s alleged bias against the Il Chamus was also evident in the fact that 
the Tugen areas of Baringo District have better infrastructure and social 
amenities including schools, health centres, electricity and 
telecommunications compared to only one secondary school in Il Chamus 
areas. Did they bring quantified evidence? 
                                               
62 The group KAMATUSA originated in the early 1990s and was relied on by Moi to 
consolidate his own political base in the newly revived multiparty politics in Kenya. It 
was formed as a counter to a similar tribal grouping that brought together members of 
the Gikuyu, Embu and Meru tribes, known as the Gikuyu Embu Meru Association 
(GEMA). These groups have lately become active again with the GEMA endorsing and 
fronting Uhuru Kenyatta and KAMATUSA endorsing William Ruto (Tom Maliti: Poll: Nearly 
two-thirds of Kenyans are opposed to ethnic groupings: Commentary from Kenya Cases 
at the International Criminal Court. International Justice Monitor, A project of the Open 
Society Justice Initiative, www.ijmonitor.org. (See also Little 1998: 452). 
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This political marginalization was also reflected by the claim that at the 
time of filing this plaint, the highest post ever held by a member of the Il 
Chamus community nationally was that of District officer (DO). 
The Il Chamus, in their pleadings, made a very direct link between lack of 
political representation to economic and social marginalization (§29). 
Due to lack of a political voice for the Il Chamus, and given their weak 
and marginal status, they were unable to defend the land grabbing of Ol 
Kokwa and Parmalok Islands by powerful individuals thought to be a front 
for developers intending to build tourist resorts, which grabbing led to the 
displacement of 200 Il Chamus.  
On insecurity, the Il Chamus painted the situation in very graphic and 
dramatic terms, perhaps as a strategy to highlight what they believed to 
be a grave situation in the eyes of the judges. They pointed out that the Il 
Chamus have been the main victims of cattle rustling and related violence 
by the Tugen and Pokot, claiming that “whenever security forces are 
deployed in the district, it is the Il Chamus who have been beaten and 
maimed, their women raped and people displaced, and that no concern 
has been voiced by their Member of Parliament on such occasions” (Para 
36). 
A rather unfortunate claim but one that reflects the reality of life for most 
pastoralist communities who have lost viability of their pastoral 
enterprises, was the claim that the Il Chamus were discriminated against 
during distribution of relief food during critical times. 
This discrimination and isolation from the political and economic spheres 
has led the community to see itself as “occupying a very dark corner of 
the nation and in comparison with the democratic gains and openness 
that other parts of the country now have as a foundation to build on, the 
community sees itself as neglected and improperly being handicapped in 
the task of undertaking its own development”(at p.40).This impassioned 
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plea for the right to development has been couched in powerful imagery, 
another tactic to reinforce a legal point. 
The Il Chamus also claimed to have been locked out of the Perkerra 
Irrigation Scheme, which, though located in their former lands, was now 
dominated by members of the Tugen community who were now mostly 
benefiting from the lucrative horticultural production. 
Similarly, lack of representation meant the Il Chamus lost out on the 
allocation of commercial and residential plots in both Marigat and Kampi 
ya Samaki market centres. 
The Il Chamus also claimed that they could not, having no representative, 
do much about environmental degradation occasioned by irresponsible 
use of their neighbours. Being downstream users by virtue of their 
location at the shores of Lake Baringo, the Il Chamus faced inconsiderate 
use by upstream communities at the source of the Molo and Perkerra 
rivers in the upper regions of central Baringo whose activities have led to 
“serious deforestation” as well as siltation of Lake Baringo itself, with 
negative consequences on the volume and quality of water available to 
the Il Chamus. This has had a direct impact on the volume of fish and 
pasture available for the Il Chamus with serious consequences on their 
livelihood options. 
According to the Il Chamus, these political, social and economic problems 
have become embedded in the structures of governance and are the 
results of continuous neglect stretching over a period of forty years. Given 
their population in relation to the rest of the country, the Il Chamus 
cannot impact the polls one way or another, and representation by a 
member of Parliament from an overwhelming majority is premised on the 
absence of accountability as such a representative feels no obligation to 
speak up for the rights of the minority. This is essentially what happened 
during the years of representation by the former president Daniel arap 
Moi, who felt under no obligation to cater for the interests of the Il 
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Chamus who were a minority in his parliamentary constituency of Baringo 
Central. 
The Il Chamus further pleaded that their situation would be worsened in 
the event that oil or other mineral wealth was discovered within their 
location. This prospect made representation even more necessary in order 
to prevent the exclusion of the community from enjoying any resulting 
benefits and from needless and exploitative development and/or 
irreversible destruction of their values, traditions and social patterns. 
While rather speculative, these fears by the Il Chamus have been justified 
by recent intense prospecting activities by the Geothermal Development 
Corporation (GDC). According to a report by the GDC, these geophysical 
investigations show the presence of a geothermal resource in the Baringo 
region. Consequently, preliminary work to determine the locations for 
drilling exploration wells is ongoing (Simiyu et. al 2011: 9). 
While the Il Chamus seemed to have made a compelling case before the 
court, the attorney general and the ECK had counter arguments to rebut 
the position of the Il Chamus, and the following section looks at the 
countering arguments of the government. 
8.5.6 contested positions: the Attorney General and the ECK 
Anticipating lack of cooperation by the Attorney General in the 
proceedings, the Il Chamus referred the court to the maxim in Zola and 
Another v Ralli Brothers Limited & Another (1969) EA 691: 
“For the proposition that any defendant or respondent who takes a 
passive attitude to an application and fails to answer it fully or at all do so 
at their own peril and they only have themselves to thank if their 
reticence results in the court taking an adverse view of their side of the 
case”. 
Indeed, the AG failed to file even a single affidavit in response hence the 
court was free to consider as uncontested the various claims made by the 
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Il Chamus against the AG. The AG’s participation in the case was limited 
to a memorandum of appearance and a list of four authorities consisting 
of the constitution of Kenya and three cases63. The limited and rather 
indifferent participation by the AG can be seen as reluctance by the 
government to submit to the authority of the court, a position which has 
important implications for assessing the value of the whole litigation 
process. This issue is discussed to a greater extent at the end of this 
chapter.  
The ECK for its part put up a robust response to the Il Chamus position. 
They denied that the Il Chamus were a distinct community and that they 
numbered between 25,000 and 30,000 as claimed. Further, they claimed 
that the Il Chamus were in fact a Maasai clan in Kenya, and there being 
thousands of clans in Kenya, representations could not be based on clans. 
They also claimed that, according to their District Election Coordinator 
(DEC) for Baringo District, the total population of Il Chamus was 16, 012 
living with Samburus and Maasais in five administrative locations, and 
that they share the same language with the Maasai. The ECK’s contention 
here was therefore that the Il Chamus were not a distinct community and 
neither did they occupy any specific location exclusively. The judges noted 
that this position falsified well documented facts produced by the Il 
Chamus relating to their population numbers and origin. Their contention 
that the Il Chamus were spread out in five locations living with the Maasai 
and Samburu was not supported by facts. 
The ECK also stated that even though the number of registered voters in 
Baringo central constituency was about 48,000 as claimed by the Il 
Chamus, the said registration was not based on communities and they 
wanted the Il Chamus to prove that they occupied and were registered in 
certain wards exclusively. 
                                               
63 Namely:  Kisay Investments Ltd v Attorney-General (HCCC 2832 of 1990), William K 
Chelashaw v Republic (Nairobi miscellaneous criminal appeal 93 of 2003), and Paul 
Imison v Attorney-General (Nairobi HC miscellaneous application 1604 of 2003) 
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The vice chairman of the ECK, in his replying affidavit, denied that ethnic, 
tribal or indigenous community considerations form part of the special 
interest criteria used by the ECK in determining electoral constituency 
boundaries, in a clear contradiction to the position advanced by the 
chairman.  
Conceding that section 42 (3) of the constitution gave the ECK a broad 
discretion when creating or reviewing parliamentary constituencies, the 
chairman of the ECK swore in his replying affidavit that they do in fact 
take account of tribal or clan welfare when considering the parameters of 
“community interest”. They were, however, wary of the potential dangers 
of “over stressing tribal or clan interests which are generally emotional”, 
at the expense of the population criterion (paragraph 55 of judgment).  
To clear this apparent contradiction, the court declared that contrary to 
the position of the ECK vice chairman, “the question of clan, tribe and 
being a minority and an indigenous community is an important element in 
the definition of special interests. For even in the tribe there are features 
that may be specific to a particular clan, such as rain-making or the 
administration of curses and oaths. These aspects distinguish one clan or 
indeed community from another. In particular, it is the social-economic 
organization, language and custom that define one community as being 
distinct from the other, and “to say otherwise would be to ignore the 
reality of the face of Kenya, as the vice-chairman appears to suggest in 
paragraph 14 of his affidavit” ( paragraph 58 of the judgment). 
It is clear already from this clarification by the court that the ECK had 
been wrong all along by not taking this element into consideration in the 
execution of their mandate. 
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8.5.7 Analysis of the judgment of the court 
The court summarized Il Chamus claim thus: 
“It is applicant’s case that the applicants themselves and their community 
the Il Chamus are a distinct and separate community from their 
surrounding neighbours and compatriots the Tugen and Pokot in Baringo 
District. They speak the ‘Maa’ language like the Samburu to their north 
and Laikipia Maasai to their east, but they are not either a clan or Maasai 
tribe. The applicants and their community are the Il Chamus according to 
their perhaps close cousins the Maasai, the ‘people who see far into the 
future’. They say that they are an indigenous and a minority protected 
under the various instruments in international law. From the point of view 
of an indigenous and a minority people the applicants claim that their 
quest for representation as ‘a special interest’ group is a matter of 
consideration both under section 1A and section 33 of the Constitution by 
parliamentary political parties.”(§86). 
The court perused evidence presented by the Il Chamus to support their 
claims about their history and composition and on weighing these against 
the evidence by the ECK, found no basis to justify claims by the ECK that 
the Il Chamus were a sub-clan of the Maasai. The court described the 
ECK’s attempts to describe the Il Chamus as “extremely casual and 
unfortunate”, contradicting even their own census records which had been 
admitted as part of the court record.  
On the other hand, the court found the evidence presented by the Il 
Chamus sufficient to prove the existence of “a unique, cohesive, 
homogenous and a culturally distinct minority which is also quite 
conspicuous by any standards”. The court was satisfied that the Il 
Chamus were united in their quest to preserve their culture, and, perhaps 
most importantly, that they qualify as “internationally recognised 
indigenous peoples” (paragraph 95 of the judgment). 
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To reinforce their finding that the Il Chamus were an internationally 
recognized indigenous people, the judges adopted as their own the 
definition by the UN Special Rapporteur Fransesco Capotorti in the context 
of article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(CCPR): 
“A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, and 
in a non- dominant position whose members — being nationals of the 
state — possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from 
those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of 
solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions religions 
and language”, and that of Jubs Deschenes64  as follows: 
“A group of citizens of a state, constituting a numerical minority and in a 
non-dominant position in that state, endowed with ethnic, religious or 
linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the 
population having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, If 
only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve 
equality with the majority in fact and in law”. 
In the final analysis, the judges ruled that the government had failed to 
prove that the Il Chamus were a sub-clan of the Maasai and declared, 
much to the satisfaction of the Il Chamus that “We do find that the Il 
Chamus do qualify as an indigenous people”. 
In so ruling, the court made further orders, most important of which was 
the effective direction to the ECK to ensure through its machinery that the 
Il Chamus get representation on grounds of their status as a minority and 
indigenous group. The court orders were never implemented, however 
recent developments on indigenous rights in general and marginalization 
in particular have provided the Il Chamus with some remedies. As 
explained in the conclusion to this chapter, the success of Il Chamus 
litigation as a resilience building mechanism lies with the total sum of 
                                               
64 Recommended to the UN in 1985, (Doc E/CN.4/Sub./1985/31). 
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effects of the whole process. These are evident in changing government 
policy and internal cohesion of the community.  
8.6 Recent developments on indigenous rights 
Since the conclusion of the two Il Chamus cases analysed in this thesis, 
some major developments have taken place within both the national and 
international legal arena. Locally, Kenya has adopted a new constitution 
and internationally, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR) has adjudicated over a very important case that clarified 
and shed more light on indigenous peoples’ rights. The next section looks 
at some of these developments. 
8.6.1 Recognition of marginalized and minority groups in the new 
constitution 
In August 2010, after years of political agitation, lobbying and 
representations by different groups of Kenyan societies including 
representatives of indigenous groups such as the Il Chamus, the Republic 
of Kenya adopted a new constitution65. This was done through a national 
referendum vote. 
With this new constitution, rights of marginalized communities as well as 
duties of the state, some of which were the subject of litigation by the Il 
Chamus, were given juridical recognition. The Constitution provides a 
legal framework which spells out national values and principles of 
government which include participation of the people, human dignity, 
equity, social justice, inclusiveness, equality, human rights, non-
discrimination and protection of the marginalized. It is quite telling that 
protection of the marginalized has been included as a national value and 
principle of governance, and this underlines the recognition of lack of 
protection of these groups under the previous legal regime. 
                                               
65 See: The Republic of Kenya 2010, Laws of Kenya: The Constitution of Kenya, Revised 
Edition 2010 Published by the National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of 
the Attorney General. 
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Most importantly for the Il Chamus, the new constitution addresses to 
quite a significant degree the issues of government policy and 
marginalization, issues that have contributed most to their vulnerability 
context. All state and public officers are now bound by the principles of 
governance inscribed in the new constitution whenever they make or 
implement public policy decisions, so that discriminatory policies such as 
the Sessional Paper Number 10 discussed in Chapter 5 will never ever be 
part of public policy again. This means that government policy as a basis 
of intervention must pass the new constitutional test to be applicable. 
As a consequence of awareness of the new guidelines, a new policy paper 
to guide government engagement with the arid and semi-arid areas of 
Kenya (ASAL) was adopted in 201266.This paper recognizes the 
marginalizing effect of the previous policy paper and is deliberately 
formulated as a counter measure and is intended to release the full 
potential of the ASAL. The paper therefore identifies and addresses three 
areas of particular significance to Kenya’s ASAL: strengthening national 
cohesion by reducing the development gap evident between Northern 
Kenya and the rest of the country; ensuring sustainable livelihoods 
through the protection and promotion of traditional and customary 
institutions and mechanisms essential to productive pastoralism; 
strengthening the climate resilience of communities in the ASALs by 
ensuring food and nutritional security across the ASAL. 
An important quality of the new policy is its incorporation of alternative 
views and knowledge of ecology and range management, such as non-
equilibrium environments. Consequently, the influence of equilibrium 
system concepts such as carrying capacity has been diminished, and 
pastoralist systems are now looked at with new and alternative 
perspectives. 
                                               
66 Republic of Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 8 of 2012 on National Policy for the 
Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands: ‘Releasing Our Full 
Potential’. 
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The issue of marginalization is addressed in the constitution at both 
conceptual and operational levels. The constitution not only clarifies terms 
and meanings related to marginalization but also gives specific guidelines 
on the implementation of relevant provisions relating to marginalization. 
For instance, Article 260 of the Constitution defines marginalized and 
minority communities as follows: 
“Marginalized community” means— 
(a) A community that, because of its relatively small population or for any 
other reason, has been unable to fully participate in the integrated social 
and economic life of Kenya as a whole; 
(b) A traditional community that, out of a need or desire to preserve its 
unique culture and identity from assimilation, has remained outside the 
integrated social and economic life of Kenya as a whole; 
(c) An indigenous community that has retained and maintained a 
traditional lifestyle and livelihood based on a hunter or gatherer economy; 
or 
(d) Pastoral persons and communities, whether they are— 
(i) Nomadic; or 
(ii) A settled community that, because of its relative geographic isolation, 
has experienced only marginal participation in the integrated social and 
economic life of Kenya as a whole; 
“Marginalized group” means- 
A group of people who, because of laws or practices before, on, or after 
the effective date, were or are disadvantaged by discrimination on one or 
more of the grounds in Article 27 (4) of the Constitution’ (i.e., race, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
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age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, dress, language or 
birth)’. 
Further, the Constitution protects against discrimination whether by public 
or private actors and calls on the state to take legislative and other 
measures including affirmative action programmes and policies designed 
to redress any disadvantage suffered by individuals and groups because 
of past discrimination (section 27 (6)). 
The Constitution also provides for the right of marginalized communities 
to participate in the political affairs of the country. It calls upon 
parliament to enact legislation to promote the parliamentary 
representation of vulnerable groups including minorities and marginalized 
communities (Article 100). Public participation in elections is promoted to 
enhance universal suffrage based on the aspiration for fair representation 
and equality of vote (Article 81). 
Another critical issue that has been addressed by the new constitution is 
land. Most importantly for pastoral communities, community land is now a 
recognized category of land tenure in Kenya. This development means 
that communities are now able to register communally held land and 
obtain recognized title documents for it. According to Article 63 (1), 
communities can be identified for the purposes of such registration on the 
basis of ethnicity, culture or similar community of interest. Community 
land is defined as consisting of: (a) land lawfully registered in the name of 
group representatives under the provisions of any law; (b) land lawfully 
transferred to a specific community by any process of law; (c) any other 
land declared to be community land by an Act of Parliament; and (d) land 
that is: (i) lawfully held, managed or used by specific communities as 
community forests, grazing areas or shrines; (ii) ancestral lands and 
lands traditionally occupied by hunter-gatherer communities; or (iii) 
lawfully held as trust land by the county governments, but not including 
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any public land held in trust by the county government under Article 62 
(2). 
Furthermore, community land shall not be disposed of or otherwise used 
except in terms of legislation specifying the nature and extent of the 
rights of members of each community individually and collectively. 
These provisions on community land remove the uncertainty brought 
about by lack of clear title to land as was previously the case, a situation 
that both diminished the value of communal land as a factor of production 
and exposed it to illegal excisions and land grabbing. 
In order to facilitate and oversee the translation of rights and definitions 
relating to land issues, the Constitution has created, among other 
institutions, The National Land Commission (NLC). The NLC is mandated, 
among other duties, to manage public land on behalf of the national and 
county governments; regulate land use and property; register title in land 
throughout Kenya; initiate investigations, on its own initiative or on a 
complaint, into present or historical land injustices, and recommend 
appropriate redress; and encourage the application of traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms in land conflicts. 
Perhaps the most significant impact of the new constitution has been the 
change in nature of government from a fully centralized state to one 
where certain functions of government have been devolved to the 
counties. Under this new system, Kenya is now a republic with a central 
government and devolved units of local governance spread in 47 counties. 
The Il Chamus fall under Baringo County. 
Article 174 of the constitution defines the objects of the devolution of 
government as, among others:  to promote democratic and accountable 
exercise of power; to foster national unity by recognizing diversity; to 
give powers of self-governance to the people and enhance the 
participation of the people in the exercise of the powers of the State and 
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in making decisions affecting them; and to recognize the right of 
communities to manage their own affairs and to further their 
development. 
8.6.2 On the right to development (Article 22 ACPHR) 
Another important development with regard to indigenous peoples’ rights 
that has a direct impact on the Il Chamus is the so called right to 
development. While the court case analysed above did recognize in 
principle the right of the Il Chamus to sustainable development, this right 
has been more comprehensively articulated in the case law of the ACPHR. 
One of the major sources of marginalization of the Il Chamus was their 
non-involvement in the design and implementation of projects within their 
residential areas, such as happened with the introduction of Prosopis. The 
right to development sets out clear provisions requiring not just the 
participation of indigenous people in such projects but also their free, 
prior and informed consent. Consequently, indigenous people have to be 
adequately involved in the development process. 
The African Commission conceives of the right to development as 
consisting of two limbs, one constitutive and the other instrumental, with 
the two together providing the procedure and substance of development. 
For the state to fulfil its obligations under the right to development, it 
must meet the requirements of both limbs, as the right can only be 
fulfilled in toto and not by parts. A violation of either limb constitutes a 
violation of the right to development, as if the fulfilment of only one limb. 
Further, according to the African Commission, the execution of the right 
to development must be “equitable, non-discriminatory, participatory, 
accountable, and transparent, with equity and choice as important, over-
arching themes in the right to development”.67 
                                               
67 The Endorois case, paragraph 277, refers also to U.N. Declaration on the Right to 
Development, U.N. GAOR, and 41st Session. Document A/RES/41/128 (1986), Article 
2.3, on “active, free and meaningful participation in development.” 
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Even where the state is providing services, the recipients must be able to 
exercise their freedom of choice, such as choosing where to live where 
housing is provided. In other words, state benevolence, despite its good 
intentions, must never be arbitrary if it is to fulfil the right to 
development. Freedom of choice is thus part and parcel of the right to 
development (paragraph 278). 
The principle of free, prior and informed consent requires that “indigenous 
peoples are not coerced, pressured or intimidated in their choices of 
development.”68 
The African Commission has set its own standards that require states to 
consult with indigenous peoples especially on such sensitive issues as 
land. For such consultations to be considered effective participation, they 
must be adequate. As such, they must be “undertaken in good faith and 
in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of 
achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures”.69 
Further, according to Article 2(3) of the UN Declaration on Development70, 
the right to development includes “active, free and meaningful 
participation in development”. Such development should result in 
empowerment of the recipient community. 
The IActHR has made a close connection between participation and the 
right to development. In the Saramaka v Suriname case, it stated that in 
order to ensure the effective participation of the Saramaka people in 
development or investment plans within their territory, the State had a 
                                               
68 Antoanella-Iulia Motoc and the Tebtebba Foundation, Preliminary working paper on the 
principle of free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples in relation to 
development affecting their lands and natural resources that they would serve as a 
framework for the drafting of a legal commentary by the Working Group on this concept. 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2004/4 (2004), paragraph. 14 (a), quoted in paragraph 
279 of the Endorois case. 
69 ILO Convention 169, forming the basis of Report of the African Commission’s Working 
Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities (Twenty-eighth session, 
2003). 
70 U.N. Declaration on the Right to Development, U.N. GAOR, 41st Session, Doc. 
A/RES/41/128 (1986). 
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duty to actively consult with them according to their customs and 
traditions. This duty requires the State to both accept and disseminate 
information, and entails constant communication between the parties, 
which consultations must be in good faith, through culturally appropriate 
procedures and with the objective of reaching an agreement71. 
The African Commission is therefore of the view that where any 
development or investment projects are likely to have a major impact on 
the territory of an indigenous people, the State has a duty not only to 
consult with them, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed 
consent, according to their customs and traditions (paragraph 291). A 
project cannot therefore proceed on the territory of indigenous people 
without them agreeing to it, and their decision must be based on correct 
and relevant information related to the project, and it must be freely 
obtained. 
Finally, where benefit is to derived from exploitation of resources within 
the territory of indigenous people, such benefit must be shared. The 
African commission, following the IActHR in the Saramaka case has said 
that benefit sharing is vital both in relation to the right to development 
and, by extension the right to own property. The right to development will 
be violated when the development in question decreases the well-being of 
the community (paragraph 294). 
Crucially, the state bears the responsibility for creating conditions 
favourable to a people’s development72. 
 
 
 
                                               
71 Inter- American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname 
(Judgment of 28November 2007). 
72 Declaration on the Right to Development, Article 3. 
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Conclusion 
Considering the Il Chamus community as being part of a politically 
bounded SES, this thesis has sought to contribute to our knowledge of 
how important variables defining SESs interact with each other in 
situations of profound changes in SES dynamics, and how societies adapt 
to such changes.  
As a complex SES, this study identified Prosopis juliflora, violent 
regulation and marginalization as key drivers of change in the system. 
Each of these drivers was then analysed to reveal a series of linkages 
between them and other variables in the system. A historical analysis of 
environmental change in the Baringo area revealed a pattern of 
continuous intervention measures by the state starting from the colonial 
era to the current government. 
It was also shown that these intervention measures were largely based on 
a discourse of environmental degradation resulting from African 
traditional range management and animal husbandry practices. 
Supported by early scholars and influential scientists, this discourse 
became dominant in matters of environmental knowledge, and was used 
by the state to justify intervention in local environmental governance 
systems. In this connection, it was mostly expressed in terms of 
overstocking, overgrazing and presented as likely to end in desertification 
and other catastrophic scenarios if unchecked. 
As a product of such intervention measures, Prosopis juliflora was 
introduced to the Baringo area by the government in the 1980s ostensibly 
to curb the rate of desertification. This environmental intervention 
measure had profound effects on the environment which have been 
extensively discussed in chapter 4 and overall it was shown that it had 
detrimental effects of the viability of the mixed agro-pastoral livelihood 
system of the Il Chamus. 
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Similarly, violence was analysed as part of the regulating mechanism 
defining interactions within the SES. Violent regulation was analysed as a 
social process of contestation between differently located actors in the 
system. As a political process, violent regulation produced losers as well 
as winners. Among the winners were shown to be an emerging class of 
young Il Chamus known locally as Wanjurusi, who, through both 
legitimate and illegal forms of business, are thriving amidst the violence. 
The rise of Wanjurusi has however altered internal power structures 
among the Il Chamus, reducing the power and influence of elders who, 
along with most ordinary Il Chamus, suffer from the effects of insecurity 
and general poverty. Overall, however, violence was shown to have a had 
devastating effect on the Il Chamus livelihood 
For instance, increasing insecurity has led to overcrowding in certain parts 
of Kiserian, where Il Chamus refugees have congregated in large numbers 
with their animals. As an adaptation to the constant risk of violence 
especially from their Pokot neighbours, the Il Chamus in this area keep all 
their herds in one place, combining numbers to secure their animals. This 
has increased the risk of disease and further internal conflicts in the 
management and use of available water and pasture resources. 
Il Chamus ability to cope with the effects of violence has greatly been 
affected by their systematic political and economic marginalization by the 
state. This study therefore also analysed the marginalization of the Il 
Chamus within the context environmental governance under a nominal 
democratic state committed to the values of equality and social justice. 
This study linked the marginalization of the Il Chamus to the state 
economic and development policies as well as the unique character of the 
Kenyan state controlled by patronage networks based on ethnicity. With 
weak administrative institutions, accountability in the use of state 
resources has been elusive, and powerful actors from larger and stronger 
ethnic groups have come to dominate the control of state resources at the 
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expense of smaller and weaker groups like the Il Chamus. The effects of 
marginalization were found to be many and varied and provided the main 
factors underlying poverty in Il Chamus society. 
Given the vulnerability context of the Il Chamus driven by the above 
mentioned key factors of Prosopis, violence and marginalization, this 
thesis aimed to explain, within resilience analysis of SESs, the enduring 
character of the Il Chamus as a resilient system. A brief historical analysis 
of Il Chamus society was done that placed the pre-colonial and early 
colonial Il Chamus society within a complete adaptive cycle. The resilience 
of the Il Chamus during this particular cycle was shown to have been 
mainly due to a socially instituted irrigation economy that was dependent 
upon a particular optimum level of technology and ecological conditions, 
the collapse of which marked the end of the cycle and the beginning of 
another. 
In contemporary Il Chamus society, we notice litigation and appeal to the 
power of authority as a key strategy of the Il Chamus in building up their 
resilience. The main proposition by this thesis, therefore, is that litigation 
by the Il Chamus has been a key source of resilience building in their 
system. 
In explaining the resilience of societies within SESs, this study started 
from the proposition that access to resources is a key determinant of 
social resilience, and further, that access to resources is a function of 
environmental governance. Defining environmental governance as the 
politics of access to resources, a process that invariably creates winners 
and losers, this thesis then goes on to define the vulnerability context of 
the Il Chamus as a product of unfavourable outcomes of governance. 
This thesis has shown that by being able to positively intervene in the 
process of governance, litigation has altered the power dynamics inherent 
in the process and had a direct impact on all the three key drivers of 
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vulnerability identified here, namely Prosopis, violence and 
marginalization. 
This thesis made use of legal analysis to demonstrate particular nuances 
of political contestation inherent in the process of environmental 
governance. Through legal analysis we saw how the Il Chamus were able 
to: link themselves to an international network of human rights activists; 
organize themselves into a coherent social and legal unit able to invoke 
legally defined rights; appropriate global concepts of indigeneity and 
marginalization; negotiate and contest, using the language of human 
rights and social justice, an identity and categorization that that would 
secure them and protect their access to resources crucial to their 
livelihood; convert their experiences of vulnerability into political and 
legally claimable sources of  access to resources, and challenge 
government policy and practice by invoking state obligations in both local 
and international legal systems. 
Specifically, this thesis has demonstrated how the targets, processes and 
outcomes of litigation have enhanced the resilience building capacity of 
the Il Chamus with certain specific results. 
Firstly, the targets of Il Chamus litigation can be seen as having direct 
resilience building capacity. In the Kenya Truth and Justice Commission 
process, the Il Chamus targeted a determination that they had been 
victims of marginalization by the state and had suffered as a consequence 
from several negative effects such as being denied political 
representation, lack of protection from violence and poverty in general. A 
declaration that they, as an indigenous community, were indeed 
marginalized by the Kenyan state led to recommendations to redress the 
situation, including a change in the economic policies responsible for their 
marginalization. New institutions such as the National Land Commission 
as well as the National Gender and Equality Commission are now in place 
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to address issues specifically related to marginalization of vulnerable 
sectors of the Kenyan society. 
Similarly, in the Prosopis case, the Il Chamus targeted declarations to the 
effect that the introduction of Prosopis juliflora in Baringo had breached 
their rights to life, property, a clean environment and sustainable 
development. They also wanted it declared a noxious weed since being 
classified as such would enable them to destroy the weed using any 
means possible, including burning it as charcoal. Charcoal burning, free 
from the normal stringent rules regulating the charcoal trade in Kenya, 
has provided an alternative source of livelihood for the Il Chamus, clearly 
building their resilience. 
In the identity case, the Il Chamus targeted declarations that they were 
indeed an indigenous community and that this gave them a status as a 
specially protected category of citizens qualifying for representation in 
parliament. An Il Chamus Member of Parliament (MP) would be 
instrumental in articulating their issues and in this way influencing 
governance at a high level. Also, such a member would be an alternative 
source of patronage for the Il Chamus as well as promote their projects 
through the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) managed by MPs. 
Further, as an indigenous community, they are now able to benefit from 
standards laid down by the World Bank for funding government projects 
involving indigenous groups. 
As social practice, it was shown that the process leading to litigation had 
the overall effect of enhancing unity and solidarity while suppressing 
dissent and internal conflicts. The various roles played by different 
sections of the community also had the effect of reinforcing social ties and 
provided an occasion to act out social roles in a situation of social 
upheaval. 
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The process of litigation also saw members of the Il Chamus using their 
professional and social contacts to connect the community to an 
international network. It was shown that particular individuals facilitated 
the connection of the connection of the community to MPIDO, an NGO 
with international connections all the way to the highest levels of the UN. 
Through MPIDO, the Il Chamus found access to an external source of 
patronage and support that, by providing an alternative source of 
resources, reduced dependence on the government. 
As far as the outcomes of litigation were concerned, it is noted that in the 
first instance, purely as legal contests, the Il Chamus were successful in 
all the three instances analysed here. Such positive outcomes at the end 
on an emotionally and financially draining process such as litigation boost 
the morale of the community as a whole and encourage other 
communities in similar situations to follow a similar course.  
Among the positive outcomes of the litigation were: the vindication of Il 
Chamus rights to life, land, property, political participation, representation 
and sustainable development; the classification of Prosopis as a noxious 
weed; the recognition of the Il Chamus as an indigenous group; the 
recognition of the Il Chamus as a marginalized group in Kenya and the 
definition of the exact nature and cause of that marginalization.  
All these outcomes were accompanied by specific orders and directions for 
the government and its administrative institutions to undertake but are 
yet to be fully implemented. Il Chamus litigation must however be viewed 
within the limits of an intransigent Kenyan state operating in an 
environment of weak local and regional legal institutions and where 
impunity prevails over respect for the rule of law and court directives are 
seldom respected .  
This thesis therefore measures the outcome of Il Chamus litigation not in 
terms of the degree of compliance with Court orders which have so far 
been overwhelmingly in their favour, but with the overall incremental 
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effect of the litigation taken together with other forms of political 
activism, agitation and lobbying.  
The Il Chamus have shown remarkable resilience throughout their history 
and are likely to do so in the future. Key to this is their overall attitude 
that sees challenge as opportunity. The Il Chamus have displayed a 
readiness to adapt and change to new conditions, an attitude that has 
enabled them shift between different forms of subsistence. Perhaps 
Spencer best captures this “dynamic flexibility” when he describes the Il 
Chamus as having held on to a foraging strategy, extending their range of 
activities as opportunities arose (Spencer 1998: 134). 
In modern times, the Il Chamus have developed a reputation as a litigious 
community, and this thesis has shown the effect and potential of litigation 
as a resilience building mechanism. 
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